enkidu_
Local Club Captain
- Joined
- Nov 15, 2014
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[MENTION=131701]Mamoon[/MENTION], does that rhetoric remind you of someone ? I've also highlighted the Asma Jahangir reference for you. The only reason he changed his tune is because he was no more allowed to dance on his own terms.
Taken from (Hussain Haqqani's wife) Farahnaz Ispahani, "Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan's Religious Minorities", pp. 157-158 :
Other references to Sharif from the same book, here p. 139 :
pp. 141-142 :
p. 144 :
pp. 159-160 :
[MENTION=142317]Loralai[/MENTION] [MENTION=5869]yasir[/MENTION] [MENTION=142451]Mian[/MENTION]
Taken from (Hussain Haqqani's wife) Farahnaz Ispahani, "Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan's Religious Minorities", pp. 157-158 :
In May 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests within a week of similar tests by India. Sharif took credit for leading Pakistan into the “nuclear club,” and the government encouraged hyper- nationalist sentiment over Pakistan’s emergence as the world’s only Islamic nuclear power. International sanctions following the nuclear tests created serious economic challenges. But the government decided to distract the public with doses of propaganda about economic hardship being a small price to pay for the glory of Islam and Pakistan. By August, Sharif was ready to amend Pakistan’s constitution “to create an Islamic order in Pakistan and establish a legal system based on the Quran.”
The country’s opposition, led by Benazir Bhutto, pointed out that further Islamization “would deepen strife in a country where religiously motivated violence has killed hundreds of people.” But Sharif insisted that his proposed new order would create a “true Islamic welfare state.” He said all laws would be based exclusively on the Quran and Sunnah. “Simple changes in laws are not enough,” he said in a televised address to the nation. “I want to implement complete Islamic laws where the Quran and Sunnah are supreme.” Under the amendment, the federal government would be “obliged” to enforce prayers five times a day and collect annual tithes as zakat.
This attempt at sweeping Islamization was similar to that undertaken by General Zia- ul- Haq, with one crucial difference. While Zia was a military dictator who lacked legitimacy, Sharif was an elected leader who was trying to move Pakistan further along the path toward theocracy through an act of Parliament. Like Zia, Sharif sought to assure minorities and women that the new Islamic laws would not violate their rights. But human rights advocates accused Sharif of using Islam to buttress his power at a time when he seemed globally isolated and embattled at home. “In the name of Islam, Nawaz Sharif is trying to perpetuate a fascist rule,” warned Asma Jahangir, a prominent human rights activist and lawyer. She also warned that militant Muslims will use the new law to impose their brand of Islam on the populace.
Sharif, however, was unmoved by the criticism. He declared at one point that he admired the Taliban and wanted the introduction of swift Islamic justice in Pakistan, including the hanging of rapists within twenty- four hours of being arrested. He said his “goal was a system of justice like that followed by the Taliban movement in Afghanistan,” which would “rid the country of crime and corruption.” Sharif told a public meeting that “in Afghanistan, crimes have virtually come to naught. I have heard that one can safely drive a vehicle full of gold at midnight without fear.” He added that he wanted the same kind of system in Pakistan where “justice will end oppression and bring prosperity.”
Other references to Sharif from the same book, here p. 139 :
The disputed 1990 elections resulted in Nawaz Sharif, now head of the Muslim League, becoming prime minister. The ISI had backed Sharif for the greater freedom that a Sharif- led government would afford it in encouraging jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. For his part, Sharif, a Punjabi businessman, was interested primarily in opening up the economy and advancing free enterprise. But both the ISI and Sharif depended heavily on Islamist factions for support in the streets, which ensured the preeminence of the Islamist agenda. Soon after Sharif’s election, it became apparent that the ISI would get its jihad and Sharif would be able to advance his economic agenda only if they conceded greater space to the Islamists. Further, they would have to allow the Islamists to continue their systematic marginalization of religious minorities.
Even during the 1990 election campaign, the minorities had expressed dismay at being left out of the national mainstream.
pp. 141-142 :
Critics saw Sharif as following in Zia’s footsteps in playing the Islamic card. Addressing a gathering of religious leaders at Islamabad, Sharif announced his resolve to amend the constitution to ensure the supremacy of the shariat as the law of the land, even though the National Assembly had already enacted the sharia bill. “The prime minister’s policy seemed to be ‘hunting with the hounds and running with the hare,’ ” commented Rais Khan, an academic.
p. 144 :
By the time of Sharif’s second year in power, attacks on religious minorities had become frequent and widespread. International human rights organizations listed several such attacks on Christians. Niamat Ahmer, a teacher, poet, and writer, was murdered by extremists in 1992. Bantu Masih, aged eighty, was stabbed and killed in the presence of the police in 1992. Apart from Ahmadis and Christians being victimized by blasphemy laws, violence against Shias also worsened. The army was called out in Gilgit and Quetta after attacks on Shias. But instead of clamping down on militant Islamists, the government announced an alloca- tion from zakat of 250 million rupees ($10 million) for Sunni madrasas, which were incubating the anti- Shia hatred. Dawn, Pakistan’s newspaper of record, editorially described these sectarian schools as “theological time capsules buried somewhere in the fifteenth century, out of which step young fanatics programmed to spread sectarian hatred.”
Also in 1992, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, candidates fielded by an openly militant sectarian group, Sipah- e- Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Prophet’s Companions) (SSP), won by- elections in Jhang and won representation in both the National Assembly and the Punjab Assembly.
pp. 159-160 :
Sharif insisted he was motivated by his own strong beliefs. But some scholars, such as Lawrence Ziring, see Sharif’s moves for further Islamization as simply part of an effort to amass more power. Soon after his election for a second time, Sharif had thwarted efforts by Supreme Court Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah to hold him accountable by installing a new chief justice. Later he secured the resignation of the army chief general Jehangir Karamat and appointed a handpicked successor, General Pervez Musharraf, as commander. According to Ziring, this made Nawaz Sharif more powerful than any of his predecessors and gave full rein to Pakistan’s more extremist Islamist organizations. Sharif named his own election commissioner and strengthened his legitimacy by “surrounding himself with ultra- orthodox Islamic clerics.”
Through the Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution, Ziring wrote, Sharif “aimed to bypass the parliament, the judiciary, and the provincial governments by emphasizing the elevation of sharia above secular law.” He wanted to be unrestrained by the common law and “anticipated achieving maximum power as the leader of a Muslim people who were wholly subject to Islamic jurisprudence.” Ziring argues that Sharif “had his sights on transforming Pakistan into an Islamic state only slightly different from Afghanistan under the Taliban.”
[MENTION=142317]Loralai[/MENTION] [MENTION=5869]yasir[/MENTION] [MENTION=142451]Mian[/MENTION]
