Handwara Encounter –Open Source Intelligence version
Late in the evening on May 2, there were sensitive and restricted reports that Indian Security forces may have suffered a major, unexpected damage in Handwara gunfight, a Colonel, a Major, 2 soldiers and a sub-inspector from J&K Police’s counterinsurgency wing (SOG) who had gone into the target-house, remained out of contact for many hours. Radio calls and calls on personal mobile phones remain unanswered. This was my reaction:
I treated the information as sensitive and maybe classified, did not share it or make it public.
I struggled to understand why would a commanding officer of ~1500 soldiers venture into the target-house with just 3-4 soldiers with him and an officer from SOG. I had only two explanations at that time:
(1)
The Colonel and team ventured into the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militant(s), the ‘dead’ militant(s) rose from the debris, found the Colonel and team totally off guard and took them out before they could even react, like the Pulwama gunfight last year where Indian army lost five soldiers, including a Major after a militant presumed dead came out of nowhere and sprayed-down his Kalashnikov at them. A Lt. Colonel, a Brigadier, a Captian and a DIG police were injured in the unexpected attack too. Or the Handwara gunfight in 2019 where, in a similar incident, a paramilitary officer and SOG personnel were killed.
(2)
The Colonel and team ventured into the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militant(s), the militant(s) who were alive, attacked them, the Colonel and team somehow positioned themselves in or outside the house, are alive, have strategically switched their radios and mobile devices to silent mode.
At 2145 hours (approx.), the news hit Twitter; an Indian journalist working for a Hindi news channel ‘broke’ the news, and in no time an army of mainstream Indian journalists with blue ticks shared and recycled the news, and with it the details of missing officers, some claimed the soldiers were taken hostages by militants. I found it ridiculous. I knew the Colonel and Co. were either dead already, or alive, positioned strategically, in control, waiting for militants to make their move, to take them out. A militant who knows his certain death is moments away, or any militant for that matter, would never take hostages, do any talking or waste any time on negotiations in middle of a fierce gunfight. He won’t miss a chance to kill his enemy at the first sight, at the first opportunity that arises. Some Indian journalists claimed “all five soldiers were rescued and safe”. I wasn’t sure how to react to that. How exactly do you ‘rescue’ a SOG officer and a Colonel with three buddies, who have won multiple gallantry awards for their valor and achievements working in counterinsurgency ops in the valley for decades, from two militants? If they were unarmed and off duty , maybe.
I spent some time researching on the encounter. I went through different accounts, versions, some old stories, intel reports etc and came up with my version of what happened in Handwara on May 2.
The OSINT version
Indian soldiers taking positions behind a concrete barrier near the gunfight site in Handwara on May 2)
Friday, May 1 (1400 hours): India Security forces received intel that a large group of Lashkar-e-Taiba militants led by local commander Gani Khawaja is moving in the Rajwar and Marwar forest area. Gani Khawaja is big fish in the Handwara-Sopore belt, allegedly responsible for multiple attacks on Indian security forces and executions of civilians in Sopore area. Indian army’s 21-RR, 15-RR, 30-RR, SOG, 92-CRPF and Para-9 launched a search ops in the forest. A brief contact with militants was established, exchange of fire between militants and Indian security forces took place in Waddar-Bala pocket of the forest. Militants escape from the area in multiple groups, in multiple directions. Indian security forces believed that some of the militants went further deep into the forest, and some fled down into the residential area, close to the forest. The first fire was opened by militants, forcing Indian security forces to take cover and helping militants vanish from the sight. Indian security forces believe if the militants had not launched a proactive, sudden attack on them at a disadvantageous location, the militants might as well would have been neutralised in the forest itself. The proactive attack gave militants an upper hand. Indian security forces continued the siege and search ops throughout the night. The ops was called off at 1000 hours on Saturday May 2, without any success or maybe strategically. All the human-intel in the area was activated.
Saturday, May 2 (1500 hours (approx.): Indian army receive intel, a group of militants that escaped from Rajwar forests a day before have taken refuge in a two storey house in Changimulla, in the foot of the forest, 1.4 miles (approx.) from the location where first standoff with militants took place on previous day. Indian security forces launch a cordon and search ops in the village. 21-RR, 15-RR, 30-RR, 22-RR, 92-CRPF, Para-9 and J&K Police’s SOG take part in the ops. The joint-ops is led by Colonel Ashutosh Sharma, Major Anuj and sub-inspector SOG, Qazi Sagheer, two of them decorated counterinsurgency specialists with decades of experience working in counterinsurgency ops in Kashmir.
Saturday, May 2 (1530 hours (approx.): The target-house is located and contact with militants is established. A fierce gun battle rages, exchange of fire takes from both sides. Indian army used assault rifles, UBGLs, recoilless launchers against the holed up militants. The firefight ‘ends’ and there is a long enduring lull, long enough to give Indian security forces assurance and confidence that all militants were neutralised and encounter was over. Indian security forces chose not to blow up the house in usual way or burn it down to ashes like it is usually done in encounters in Kashmir. They may have tried to save the poor carpenter’s house presuming militants were dead already and no further action was required. When militants don’t resist for long, are neutralised in initial stages of the gunfight, the house is spared.
1830 hours (approx.): Indian security forces lead by Colonel Sharma, Major Anuj and sub-inspector Qazi approached the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militants, a miscalculation, an error in judgement that would cost them dearly. As soon as they came closer to the target-house, a lone militant, out of nowhere, emerged from an abutting single storey structure and fired indiscriminately at them. The spray-down from his Kalashnikov hit four men, Major Anuj, two soldiers and sub-inspector Qazi, two of them above neck, two in the wings and abdomen. Colonel Sharma ran towards an adjacent cowshed, others fled back to their original positions away from the gunfight site. It was already dark by now. The lone militant followed Colonel Sharma, caught hold of him and shot him dead inside/ or at the entrance of the cowshed. It is not clear if Colonel Sharma was armed with an assault rifle or had accidentally dropped it at the sudden and intense attack, or wasn’t carrying one in the first place. Some of the wounds on Indian soldiers appear to be inflicted by a blunt object, not bullets. It is not clear if the militant also used some sort of cutting tool in the assault or only the assault rifle. Indian security forces’ unit outside the gunfight site, made several attempts to reach Colonel Sharma and team on the radio. There was no answer. In a desperate attempt, a phone call was finally made to Colonel Sharma’s personal mobile phone later in the night. It was answered by a militant. The nature of conversation remains unknown. It was at this moment, the unit outside the gunfight site knew that Colonel Sharma and his team were KIA and final assault to neutralise the militant started. The pictures of slain Colonel Sharma and team that I saw, suggest Colonel Sharma was killed separately. His body cannot be seen near the other four bodies lying on the ground, that of Major Anuj, two soldiers and sub-inspector Qazi. Indian security forces were not sure how many militants were holed up in the target-house or the adjacent structure(s).
The lone militant then picked up arms and ammunition from the slain soldiers and went inside the target-house. He fought all night. One of the reasons he lasted longer was that he did not exhaust his limited ammo, like militants usually do. He had picked up enough ammo from the slain soldiers. However, the main reason why he lasted so long was that Indian security forces did not blow up the house, did not burn it down because bodies of five of their comrades were lying very close to the house. They were not sure if the bodies were outside the house or inside the house. Indian security forces outside the gunfight site suspected that militants may have dragged the bodies inside the house. They had to save the bodies. They used small arms to take out the militant, assault rifles and UBGLs, a hell lot of them. That is why the house is still standing on its four walls. The militant fought fiercely for 8-10 hours, a bullet from his Kalashnikov pierced through the tyre of a DySP’s armoured SUV, quite far from the gunfight site, a narrow escape for the soldier near the SUV.
One of the OSINT accounts said that Colonel Sharma and team did not approach the target-house with an intent to venture into it to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militants. They were moving around the gunfight site when they suddenly came in face to face with the militant. They were not expecting the militant to be in that location. The militant took them by surprise and sprayed down his Kalashinkov at them, some of them tried to run into the target house, but didn’t make it, Colonel Sharma ran into cowshed and others retreated to their original positions away from the gunfight site.
The Militants
The lone militant who killed Colonel Sharma, Major Anuj, sub-inspector Qazi and two army soldiers was not Lashkar-e-Taiba’s chief in Kashmir. LeT’s chief in Kashmir goes by nom de guerre Abu-Zargam, not “Haider”. He was not a Pakistani either. He was a Kashmiri, Ashiq Hussain from Warpora area of Sopore Baramulla. There is a Pakistani connection though. Keep reading. The other militant was also a local, Asif Reshi from Kralgund, Handwara, which is also Gani Khawaja’s native area. Asif Reshi was killed in the initial stages of the gun-battle, on the first storey of the target-house, hours before Colonel Sharma and team ventured into its compound. Ashiq Hussain survived the initial assault because he had taken refuge in the cow-shed or the next-door single storey house, not in the target-house. He moved back to the target-house after killing Colonel Sharma and team. He was also killed in the first storey of the building at 0500 hours (approx.) on Sunday, nearly after a 24-hour long and deadly gunfight. There was now a permanent lull and the encounter was over, officially.
No militant escaped from the encounter or was killed outside the encounter site while attempting to escape. If any of the militants had escaped from the encounter, TRF wouldn’t have missed the chance to share its version of the gunfight. They would shared an audio or video propaganda, in typical TRF way. Two militants were killed in the encounter, both on first storey of the target-house. A possible Type-56 Chinese AKM pattern assault rifle and a possible PM MD-65 was recovered from the dead militants. The recovery of basic weapons suggests the lone militant could not have managed to fight so long, which further backs the OSINT theory that he picked up the ammo from KIA Indian soldiers before going into the target-house.
Arms and ammunition recovered from the militants.
Sunday, May 3 (0700 hours): Indian security forces summoned the village-head, directed him to go to the gunfight site and check on the soldiers and militants. The scared and reluctant village-head, Mohammed Abdullah Lone with some locals went in, found bodies of all five security forces personnel in the compound of the target-house, 4 bodies were on the ground close to each other, very close to the target-house. Colonel Sharma’s body, at some distance, near the cow-shed. The village head found bodies of two militants on the first storey of the house. He informed the Indian security forces, they moved in and took over.
No Hostage Situation
There was no hostage situation, neither the residents of the target-house were taken hostages by militants, nor the Colonel Sharma and team. There were no residents in the target-house when the gunfight broke. Colonel Sharma and team never went inside the target-house. The house belonged to a carpenter who was at work along with his two sons. His wife dropped their daughter at a relative’s house earlier on that day. They probably took their kids away knowing it is not safe with militants in the house and Indian security forces on their trail. When the lone woman in the house saw Indian army cordoning off the house and taking positions, she fled well on time. When the gunfight broke, only militant(s) were in the house.
There is No Haider
Nobody called “Haider” was killed in the Handwara gunfight.
No Pakistani militant was killed either. The two militants killed were: (1) Asif Reshi from Kralgund, Handwara. (2) Ashiq Hussain from Warpora, Sopore. None of them was “Haider” or a Pakistani militant. Asif Reshi had joined Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in September 2019 during the lockdown.
He was locally trained, classified as “soyat” in local technical language, meaning locally or untrained militant. Ashiq Hussain had travelled to Pakistan on a valid passport and visa via Wagah-Atari in Punjab, in April 2018, received arms training and infiltrated illegally into Kashmir in September 2019 during the lockdown. He was possibly accompanied by another Kashmiri from Sopore, Kamar-ud-Din along with some Pakistanis. Kamar-ud-Din and Ashiq Hussain had probably travelled to Pakistan together, left home for Nepal, but ended up in Pakistan. Kamar-ud-Din was killed in Ganderbal on September 27 last year, days after infiltrating, possibly from an old and inactive infiltration route; Tulail Valley in Ganderbal. It was believed to be a large militant group, intercepted in Gangbal forests of Ganderbal on September 27, 2019, two were killed in the ops from September 27 to September 30, including a Pakistani, others managed to reach deep into the hinterlands of Kashmir. The ops was called off after more than two weeks. Ashiq Hussain like the militants that infiltrated through Keran in April first week and wiped-out an entire Special Forces team, would have received serious and similar training in Pakistan too. Hence, the major high-profile damage on Indian Security forces in a decade.
The Curious Case of The Resistance Front
The Resistance Front, as expected owned both militants killed in Handwara gunfight and identified them as Asif Reshi and Ashiq Hussain. I guess I don’t have to explain why did The Resistance Front own militants that were officially affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba once, at least one of them for sure. You can also read my previous report on The Resistance Front to understand how the militant group works. I will try to further decode TRF in coming days, if I find enough time.
Indian Army version: The official Indian army version of the gunfight is that Colonel Sharma and team went inside the target-house to recue hostages. They rescued the hostages and were KIA in the process! The official version also claims that Lashkar-e-Taiba’s chief/ commander “Haider”, a Pakistani national was killed in the gunfight. You can read more on the official version in this Greater Kashmir report. I am not going to analyse it or ask questions. I don’t want to stretch this article longer.
LeT/ TRF version: LeT/ TRF haven’t shared any details about the gunfight, except for the identities of two militants killed.
(The photos of KIA soldiers and some details are graphic. As a mark of respect to the families and friends of fallen soldiers, I did not add them here or shared them anywhere, not even the censored versions.)
The soldiers that never returned home, sleep gentle under the Himalayan heaven.
[MENTION=134400]kashmir[/MENTION]osint
Disclaimer: The OSINT version does vary from the official version of Indian army. The OSINT version always varies from the official version, not just in Kashmir but everywhere. I do not claim that The OSINT version is true and Indian army’s version is false. I did some research and came up with The OSINT version. If the OSINT was broken, the details in my report may be broken too. The OSINT version could be false and Indian army’s version could be true. I leave that for you to judge!
https://kashmirosint.wordpress.com/2020/05/12/handwara-encounter-open-source-intelligence-version/
Kashmir Zone Police <a href="https://t.co/lkkJuSlFwO">pic.twitter.com/lkkJuSlFwO</a></p>— ANI (@ANI) <a href="https://twitter.com/ANI/status/1256879341058658304?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 3, 2020</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
Jai Hind <a href="https://t.co/HIAltyZ7QX">pic.twitter.com/HIAltyZ7QX</a></p>— Virat Kohli (@imVkohli) <a href="https://twitter.com/imVkohli/status/1256993169385951232?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 3, 2020</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
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<br><br>Encounter is still going on <a href="https://t.co/crf2qzHOWv">pic.twitter.com/crf2qzHOWv</a></p>— Junaid Bhat Photographer (@Junaidbhatphoto) <a href="https://twitter.com/Junaidbhatphoto/status/1256667491037786113?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 2, 2020</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
<a href="https://t.co/Siuklzfnxw">pic.twitter.com/Siuklzfnxw</a></p>— Aditya Raj Kaul (@AdityaRajKaul) <a href="https://twitter.com/AdityaRajKaul/status/1257348482014339075?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 4, 2020</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
