Two points here: first, this ‘balancing act’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia represents a long-standing policy and secondly it could be argued that given the difficult geo-political context, the Pakistani state has achieved relative success in striking a delicate balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The first head of state to visit Pakistan was the Shah of Iran. Lacking strategic depth and confronted by difficult relationships with India and Afghanistan from the outset, the fledgling Pakistan state sought cordial relations with Iran to provide some relief on its borders. Iran in the 1950s, too, perceived its security as linked to Pakistan’s stability, viewing the newly formed state as a useful buffer against Soviet interests in the region. The fact that both nations at this time were closely aligned with western powers also helped cement the relationship. At this time Saudi Arabia was not a significant factor in the minds of Pakistan state officials.
This began to change towards the end of the Ayub regime. In 1967, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reached agreement to work on defence cooperation, and for Pakistanis to provide some training to Saudi military personnel. But it was really under Bhutto in the 1970s that the relationship strengthened in important ways. Following the secession of the Eastern wing, Pakistan had to seek new markets and restructure its trade and one market that Pakistan sought to develop was West Asia. Closer diplomatic ties with the Arab world also facilitated the inflow of Libyan and Saudi money which was ultimately crucial for the nuclear programme. It is also in this period that significant opportunities for labour migration presented itself. In time such remittances from Pakistan's ‘manpower’ exports, would - and in fact still is - a crucial component of the Pakistani economy with important implications. Notably, Iran is not a key destination for Pakistani labour.
At the same time Bhutto was careful not to upset the Iranians. As Bhutto told Kissinger, “Iran is our neighbor. Saudi Arabia is far away.” Iran assisted Pakistan in overcoming the Baluch insurgency in 1975. Iran itself feared that a successful insurgency in Pakistan could encourage separatism amongst Iran’s population of Baloch. In the end Bhutto was able to extract aid from both Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In the Zia years, Pakistan maintained a pragmatic stance. This was despite the strains engendered by the first Afghan war and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Both events seemed to tilt Pakistan closer to Saudi interests. Ayatollah Khomeini sought to export the revolution and took a more interventionist stance on Pakistani Shi’a interests. The Pakistan government were aware that Iranian students played a role in the riots against compulsory zakat collections. The Afghan war also tightened the nexus of interests between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The latter provided vast sums of financial assistance to the mujahideen. In return, Pakistan agreed to station 20,000 soldiers to protect the Kingdom, although all expenses were to be footed by Saudi Arabia. In addition, remittances from West Asia, in particular Saudi Arabia, were huge in the 1980s and helped stabilise the Pakistan economy. Yet, Pakistan was still careful not to antagonise Iran and refused to support Iraq in its war with Iran between 1980 and 1988.
In the 1990s, the relationship with Iran did cool, as Pakistan opted to support the Taliban in Afghanistan, whereas Iran saw its interests as best secured through the Northern Alliance.
Today, with Iran and Saudi fighting its proxy war in their bid for West Asian hegemony, Pakistan continues to do its best to strike a delicate balance. Such a stance is shaped by a number of considerations. Strategically, Pakistan seeks to avoid encirclement: antagonising Iran could push it to join a hostile alliance with India and Afghanistan. Domestically, with a significant Shi’a minority, Pakistan has no appetite to be sucked into conflict which could give rise to sectarian violence on a destabilising scale and potentially weaken the unity of the military forces. Economically, remittances from the Middle East (and it is from Saudi that most remittances derive from), as well as imports of crude oil (Saudi is the key supplier) and natural gas (here Qatar is the most significant trading partner) also shape thinking on the matter in Pakistan.
