Very interesting - thank you.
It is striking that a large part of the film is taken up by the Queen’s visits to the sites of the various development projects. Ayub Khan had of course sought to legitimise his regime on the basis of ‘development’. Indeed, internationally development was a preoccupation. There was extensive involvement of overseas development agencies; there was much spent on international development aid, and there were ample opportunities for foreign consultants to advise on development.
So in the film we see the newly constructed satellite town of Korangi, designed and built to resettle refugees, whom many years after migrating to Karachi still awaited rehabilitation. The project was funded by the Ford foundation and the Unites States International Cooperation Administration. It was planned by Greek architect, Constantinos Doxiadis. Doxiadis would also provide the original master plan for Islamabad. The Warsak Dam, as noted in the film, was financed by the Canadian government under the Colombo Plan of 1950. Not mentioned - as work had not yet started in 1961 - was the Mangla Dam Project. Built between 1962 and 1967 on the Jhelum River in Punjab it was funded in the main by foreign loans, built by foreign contractors and involved hundreds of foreign technicians and engineers. Gustav Papanek, involved in public policy in Pakistan at the time, was frank, “foreign aid contributed significantly to Pakistan’s growth from the late 1950s: without it, the rapid increase in development in the 1960s could not have been possible.”
It is also interesting that much less time is devoted in the film to East Pakistan. There is mention of the construction of fourteen jute mills. It is stated that jute is the ‘chief export’. And herein lies some of the tensions of the period. There was a widespread belief in East Pakistan that the surplus generated by the export of jute was being used to bolster development in West Pakistan. Certainly, interregional disparity between West and East Pakistan had increased under military rule. Per capita income in 1949/50, was 10 per cent higher in West Pakistan, but by 1964/65 this had risen to over 30 per cent.
Finally, despite the emphasis on development, we see, as noted by Mian in post 3, that the Governor of West Pakistan at the time was none other than Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, the Nawab of Kalabagh. Although initially, Ayub had seemingly sought to undermine the landed elite, eventually he aimed to co-opt elements of this elite to widen his regime’s basis of support. The appointment of Kalabagh - who possessed in the region of 20,000 acres of land - in 1960 paved the way for other landed elites to shift support back to the military regime. In the end, this was also striking. Despite the nostalgia which often accompanies memories of the period, the main beneficiaries of the ‘decade of development’ were landed and industrial elites. It was in such an atmosphere that the People’s Party’s promise in the 1970 elections to level the field met with a particular resonance amongst a large section of the West Pakistani population.