marlonbrowndo
Senior ODI Player
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The Old Man and The Sea by Ernest Hemingway. What a great book
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Contact the PP Team
What was the last book you read?
- Thread starter Kashif
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ManFan
T20I Debutant
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I’m reading Adam Zamoyski right now, perhaps the best contemporary Napoleonic scholar.
“Moscow 1812” and “Rites of Peace” are fine works.
“Moscow 1812” and “Rites of Peace” are fine works.
Azfar Moin’s book The Millennial Sovereign. This is the most remarkable book I have read on the Mughal empire. Moin recreates what to modern eyes appears a world full of strange beliefs and rituals. A world of divination, of belief in the occult powers of numbers and letters, a world of dream interpretation and astrological calculations. A time when rulers consulted astrologers, soothsayers, and holy men associated with certain shrines.
With Babur we learn the importance of dreams, for they “implied a prophetic connection with the invisible world and were considered a highly regarded source of truth.” With Humayun we are told that he was guided by cosmological principles. That he arranged his imperial administration according to an augury of names, that the schedule of his court was based on “astral auspiciousness” - the positions of the planets. That the colour of his attire on any day depended on what planet the day was linked to. He divided his court into twelve ranks, with the number twelve chosen because “of its far-reaching cosmological and scriptural importance.” With Akbar, Moin argues that he used the first Islamic millennium to project himself as a sacred redeemer of a new age. With Jahangir we see how he used the medium of painting to portray his “spiritual power, with which he could perform miracles, sustain the balance of the cosmos, inaugurate new cycles of time, and impose his will on the world by mere allusion.” With Shah Jahan, Moin turns to architecture and specifically the jharoka throne in Delhi, where the emperor was “focus of supplication” to “whom the people turned to in need, and his jharoka was the rising place of the sun of the spheres of sovereignty and the caliphate.”
This is a different world indeed, but Moin’s work reminds us that we need to understand history on its own terms and not through our post-enlightenment rationalist lens. In uncovering the cultural foundations of Mughal political authority he makes the case that Mughal sovereignty rested not on doctrinal Islam but was in fact shaped by Sufi, millennial and cosmic motifs.
With Babur we learn the importance of dreams, for they “implied a prophetic connection with the invisible world and were considered a highly regarded source of truth.” With Humayun we are told that he was guided by cosmological principles. That he arranged his imperial administration according to an augury of names, that the schedule of his court was based on “astral auspiciousness” - the positions of the planets. That the colour of his attire on any day depended on what planet the day was linked to. He divided his court into twelve ranks, with the number twelve chosen because “of its far-reaching cosmological and scriptural importance.” With Akbar, Moin argues that he used the first Islamic millennium to project himself as a sacred redeemer of a new age. With Jahangir we see how he used the medium of painting to portray his “spiritual power, with which he could perform miracles, sustain the balance of the cosmos, inaugurate new cycles of time, and impose his will on the world by mere allusion.” With Shah Jahan, Moin turns to architecture and specifically the jharoka throne in Delhi, where the emperor was “focus of supplication” to “whom the people turned to in need, and his jharoka was the rising place of the sun of the spheres of sovereignty and the caliphate.”
This is a different world indeed, but Moin’s work reminds us that we need to understand history on its own terms and not through our post-enlightenment rationalist lens. In uncovering the cultural foundations of Mughal political authority he makes the case that Mughal sovereignty rested not on doctrinal Islam but was in fact shaped by Sufi, millennial and cosmic motifs.
Space Cat
ODI Debutant
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Just finished reading The Expanse with the final book to be released later this year.
Fantastic sci fi with an emphasis on believable science and physics mixed in beautifully with a fascinating backdrop of planetary politics.
The TV series is also excellent.
Fantastic sci fi with an emphasis on believable science and physics mixed in beautifully with a fascinating backdrop of planetary politics.
The TV series is also excellent.
imrankhannsu
Local Club Regular
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I am mainly looking for a thriller: I really liked Da Vinci Code and Angels and Demons. Was looking for recommendations
I am also a Kite Runner (but didnt enjoy the bullying incident) and Shantaram fan. Any recommendations here will also be appreciated
I am also a Kite Runner (but didnt enjoy the bullying incident) and Shantaram fan. Any recommendations here will also be appreciated
miandadrules
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In the shadow of the sword
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The demise of Pakistan – a country with a reputation for volatility, brutality and radical Islam – is regularly predicted. But things rarely turn out as expected, as renowned journalist Declan Walsh knows well. Over a decade covering the country, his travels took him from the raucous port of Karachi to the gilded salons of Lahore to the lawless frontier of Waziristan, encountering Pakistanis whose lives offer a compelling portrait of this land of contradictions.
He meets a crusading lawyer who risks her life to fight for society's most marginalised, taking on everyone including the powerful military establishment; an imperious chieftain spouting poetry at his desert fort; a roguish politician waging a mini-war against the Taliban; and a charismatic business tycoon who moves into politics and seems to be riding high – till he takes up the wrong cause. Lastly, Walsh meets a spy whose orders once involved following him, and who might finally be able to answer the question that haunts him: why the Pakistanis suddenly expelled him from their country.
Intimate and complex, unravelling the many mysteries of state and religion, this formidable book offers an arresting account of life in a country that, often as not, seems to be at war with itself.
He meets a crusading lawyer who risks her life to fight for society's most marginalised, taking on everyone including the powerful military establishment; an imperious chieftain spouting poetry at his desert fort; a roguish politician waging a mini-war against the Taliban; and a charismatic business tycoon who moves into politics and seems to be riding high – till he takes up the wrong cause. Lastly, Walsh meets a spy whose orders once involved following him, and who might finally be able to answer the question that haunts him: why the Pakistanis suddenly expelled him from their country.
Intimate and complex, unravelling the many mysteries of state and religion, this formidable book offers an arresting account of life in a country that, often as not, seems to be at war with itself.
JaDed
T20I Captain
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- May 5, 2014
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Finished a thousand Splendid Suns, easy read but well written esp worth time for South Asian,Middle-eastern readers.
For a week I kept going Laila jo in my head.
Started -the Sympathizer by Nguyen, different from what I usually read.
For a week I kept going Laila jo in my head.
Started -the Sympathizer by Nguyen, different from what I usually read.
Colonial Lahore by Ian Talbot and Tahir Kamran. In truth it is a bit of a dry read and the style of writing does not quite bring to life this famous city. But there is a fair amount of useful information. The title of the chapters give a glimpse of some of the territory covered: Darvarzas and Mohallas; Travellers, Tourists and Texts; Poets, Wrestlers and Cricketers; A World of Goods; Pilgrims and Shrines in the Colonial Age; Martyrs, Migrants and Militants.
While the focus of the book is squarely on Lahore during the colonial era, it made me think of the different sorts of history that are evoked by three Punjabi cites: Lahore, Faisalabad and Islamabad.
For many Pakistanis, Lahore carries Muslim history on its shoulders. Although Pakistan saw itself as a cultural successor to the Mughal empire, many of the great monuments and cultural centres were inherited by India. Lahore was the exception. Its monuments - particularly the Badshahi mosque and Shalimar gardens - evoked Mughal history. It was a city associated with high Muslim culture. Following the shock of the rebellion in 1857, the centre of gravity for the output of Urdu literature moved westwards to Lahore. Key intellectuals such as Azad and Hali spent time in the city. Azad reached Lahore in 1861 after the trauma of 1857 and remained there until death. He helped organise a modern style of mushairas. Hali’s stay was temporary but seminal in his intellectual development. The city has not only a sense of cultural importance but of political importance too. It was at the very back end of 1929 when the Congress declared Purna Swaraj in the city. It was in 1940 when the Lahore resolution was passed by the Muslim League. Mochi Gate and Mochi Bagh have been sites for political rallies including the mobilisation for Pakistan. It was at Mochi Gate that Iqbal recited his famous poem Jawab-e Shikwa, in 1912.
With Faisalabad I am prompted by the 'ghanta ghar' to think of its colonial origins at the heart of a quintessential canal colony. The British constructed clock towers in many cities, but in Faisalabad it has become one of its most famous monuments. The clock tower represented two faces of British rule in the Punjab which remained in tension. On the one hand, for the British it stood as a symbol for the modernising side of its rule, standing for rationality and order. On the other hand it was constructed in the mould of Indo-Saracenic architecture, a style that the British projected as a sign that their rule was continuing an Indian tradition and therefore reflected the sense that they were protectors of custom and tradition.
With Islamabad we enter firmly the post-colonial period. In the 1960s there was a strong emphasis on development and this was reflected in the making of Islamabad. Three currents shaped this attitude. Firstly, this was in some ways the high point for Islamic modernists who tended to project Islam as a symbol of unity and personal commitment. It is not insignificant that the new city would be named Islamabad. The selection process for the Faisal mosque - featuring a striking design - was guided by the desire to demonstrate that Pakistan was a site where Islam was consistent with a progressive and modern ethos. Secondly, the attention to development was in some ways a continuation of colonial thinking. The British had attempted to legitimise their rule on grounds that they were bringing material progress to the ‘backwaters’ of the subcontinent. The anglicised elite that dominated the government of Pakistan after independence shared in this colonial outlook. Thirdly, this was an era of international development and modernisation theory. There was a theory of development, emanating from the US to whom Pakistan was closely aligned at the time, that focused on the transition to a modern economy which had growth at its centre with little concern for equity.
While the focus of the book is squarely on Lahore during the colonial era, it made me think of the different sorts of history that are evoked by three Punjabi cites: Lahore, Faisalabad and Islamabad.
For many Pakistanis, Lahore carries Muslim history on its shoulders. Although Pakistan saw itself as a cultural successor to the Mughal empire, many of the great monuments and cultural centres were inherited by India. Lahore was the exception. Its monuments - particularly the Badshahi mosque and Shalimar gardens - evoked Mughal history. It was a city associated with high Muslim culture. Following the shock of the rebellion in 1857, the centre of gravity for the output of Urdu literature moved westwards to Lahore. Key intellectuals such as Azad and Hali spent time in the city. Azad reached Lahore in 1861 after the trauma of 1857 and remained there until death. He helped organise a modern style of mushairas. Hali’s stay was temporary but seminal in his intellectual development. The city has not only a sense of cultural importance but of political importance too. It was at the very back end of 1929 when the Congress declared Purna Swaraj in the city. It was in 1940 when the Lahore resolution was passed by the Muslim League. Mochi Gate and Mochi Bagh have been sites for political rallies including the mobilisation for Pakistan. It was at Mochi Gate that Iqbal recited his famous poem Jawab-e Shikwa, in 1912.
With Faisalabad I am prompted by the 'ghanta ghar' to think of its colonial origins at the heart of a quintessential canal colony. The British constructed clock towers in many cities, but in Faisalabad it has become one of its most famous monuments. The clock tower represented two faces of British rule in the Punjab which remained in tension. On the one hand, for the British it stood as a symbol for the modernising side of its rule, standing for rationality and order. On the other hand it was constructed in the mould of Indo-Saracenic architecture, a style that the British projected as a sign that their rule was continuing an Indian tradition and therefore reflected the sense that they were protectors of custom and tradition.
With Islamabad we enter firmly the post-colonial period. In the 1960s there was a strong emphasis on development and this was reflected in the making of Islamabad. Three currents shaped this attitude. Firstly, this was in some ways the high point for Islamic modernists who tended to project Islam as a symbol of unity and personal commitment. It is not insignificant that the new city would be named Islamabad. The selection process for the Faisal mosque - featuring a striking design - was guided by the desire to demonstrate that Pakistan was a site where Islam was consistent with a progressive and modern ethos. Secondly, the attention to development was in some ways a continuation of colonial thinking. The British had attempted to legitimise their rule on grounds that they were bringing material progress to the ‘backwaters’ of the subcontinent. The anglicised elite that dominated the government of Pakistan after independence shared in this colonial outlook. Thirdly, this was an era of international development and modernisation theory. There was a theory of development, emanating from the US to whom Pakistan was closely aligned at the time, that focused on the transition to a modern economy which had growth at its centre with little concern for equity.
sweep_shot
World Star
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30 DAYS: Change your habits, Change your life.
Madplayer
Senior Test Player
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- Aug 30, 2012
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Read 2 in last 20 days:
The richest man in Babylon by George S Clason:
To be honest, I read it without knowing what it was about just because it was available in the house. Bit of a self-help kind of a book. Quite nice if you want to get elementary insights into how to manage your finances.
Carrie by Stephen king:
His first ever novel. I guess it comes under horror category. Was good overall but the last 30-40 pages were a bit of drag and felt as if forced into the book.
Next i'll read Metamorphosis by Franz Kafka.
The richest man in Babylon by George S Clason:
To be honest, I read it without knowing what it was about just because it was available in the house. Bit of a self-help kind of a book. Quite nice if you want to get elementary insights into how to manage your finances.
Carrie by Stephen king:
His first ever novel. I guess it comes under horror category. Was good overall but the last 30-40 pages were a bit of drag and felt as if forced into the book.
Next i'll read Metamorphosis by Franz Kafka.
JaDed
T20I Captain
- Joined
- May 5, 2014
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- 40,540
A man Called Ove - 10/10 amazing. Can't wait to read all Fredrik Bakman's books, can't believe all these books are swedish and translated.
Robert
Test Star
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- Nov 4, 2007
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Yes it is.
Slaughterhouse Five by Kurt Vonnegut. A sort of science fiction tale about a reluctant soldier’s experience in and around WW2, culminating in the firebombing of Dresden.
JaDed
T20I Captain
- Joined
- May 5, 2014
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- 40,540
Beartown , second book of Fredrik that I read, well written ,emotional and describes Ice hockey and how much it means to smaller towns very well.
9/10.. cant wait to read the sequel.
To all NHL fans this is a must read eventhough it doesn’t cover NHl but is the best book ice hockey and smaller teams.
[MENTION=99630]nextover666666[/MENTION]
9/10.. cant wait to read the sequel.
To all NHL fans this is a must read eventhough it doesn’t cover NHl but is the best book ice hockey and smaller teams.
[MENTION=99630]nextover666666[/MENTION]
This year I have read three books on Islam in South Asia that are concerned with the period roughly from 1857 onwards: Francis Robinson’s collection of essays, The Muslim World in Modern South Asia; Brannon Ingram work on the Deobandi movement, Revival from Below; and Justin Jones work on the Shi’a minority of upper India in Shi’a Islam in Colonial India.
The books are all quite different. Robinson looks at the characteristics of the Islamic revival in the age of Western dominance. Ingram examines Deobandi thought in relation to Sufism, highlighting how many Deobandis understood Sufism as in essence standing for ethical self-fashioning. Jones outlines Shi'a religious change and the development of a harder sectarian identity in the colonial period. But where they converge, is on the changing nature of religious authority in the modern era.
Before the onset of colonial rule, mosques, madrasas, the law and the ulama were generally supported by Muslim state power. The authority of the individual alim rested on possession of ijazas and on a system of person to person transmission of religious knowledge.
With the waning of Mughal rule and the deepening of British rule, patronage of the ulama declined. No longer did the British fund madrasa education; no longer after 1865 was the advice of Muftis to be sought when administering Anglo-Muhammadan law. Revenue free grants that supported families of the ulama were reclaimed in many instances; religious knowledge was deemed inferior and government servants were increasingly expected to have obtained their qualifications from government schools.
It is in this context, that firstly, many worked to build a Muslim society from the bottom up; to mould the conscience of the believer. In Ingram’s words, “one had to reform the individual to reform society.” One also had to educate the individual. Thus, there was a profusion of madrasas after 1857 and the objective of the madrasa was now no longer to produce individuals who would serve the state as civil servants, but to produce individuals who would serve society through the religious knowledge that they learned. Fatwas once produced by and large for judges were now directed at individual Muslims.
In the process, a greater emphasis was placed on personal responsibility and in Robinson’s words, a “this-worldly Islam of action on earth to achieve salvation." Listen to the modernist, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: “I regard it as my duty to do all I can, right or wrong”, he said “to defend my religion and too show the people the true, shining countenance of Islam. This is what my conscience dictates and unless I do its bidding, I am a sinner before God.”
In the case of the Deobandi, Ashraf Ali Thanvi, he reminded his followers of the horrors of the Day of Judgment to focus their minds on their responsibilities. Ingram’s book in fact begins with a quote from a sermon delivered by Thanvi, in 1923:
“O Faithful, save yourself and your family from the torments of Hell.”
Secondly, we see in the colonial period the development of ‘brands’ such as Deobandi or Barelwi. Religious authority was now not just vested on those that possessed ijazas but was also based on ‘maslaki’ identity. It became more important for adherents to distinguish themselves from other denominations, to guard ‘their’ boundaries.
Thirdly, and related to this, the attempt to prove one’s authority in itself contributed greatly to the development of modern sectarianism. Indeed Jones stresses inner conflicts within the sects themselves. So he says, “while Shi‘a–Sunni arguments received all the contemporaneous comment and press attention, they were in fact frequently something of a smokescreen for competition, or even conflict, within Shi‘ism itself.” The same no doubt applies for many Sunnis who engaged in polemical religious debate. It became a more “crowded religious marketplace” and debates were often about the desire to “consolidate their own positions of internal leadership through the vituperation of manufactured external communities.”
Fourthly, the expansion of print also enabled those outside the religious establishment to speak on behalf of Islam. In Robinson’s words:
“Increasingly from now on any Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad could claim to speak for Islam. No longer was a sheaf of impeachable ijazas the buttress of authority…The force of 1200 years of oral transmission, of person-to-person transmission, came increasingly to be ignored.”
The emergence of religious thinkers outside of the ulama was a global phenomenon. Teachers, lawyers, journalists, intellectuals and engineers stepped forward to speak in the name of Islam. Think of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Iqbal and Maududi in South Asia; of al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt; of Hasan al-Turabi in Sudan; of Rashid al-Ghannushi in Tunisia; of Mahdi Bazargan in Iran.
Fifthly, rather than seeking patronage of an elite, as they might have once done, many seeking a claim to religious leadership now looked to rally public opinion. Authority could be derived from public backing. Communication in vernacular languages and an emphasis on oratory, on stirring emotion, on demonstrating a devotion and commitment to Islam, was increasingly prevalent. Indeed Margrit Pernau in her book (Emotions and Modernity in Colonial India) has argued that in Colonial India there was an intensification of emotion in Muslim discourse. There was a shift from an emphasis on adl, that is balance, to josh, that is fervour, ebullience.
The following quote from Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari is indicative of this ethos, though it is not included in any of these books - I take this instead from David Gilmartin’s book, Empire and Islam. The Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, which emerged in 1929, composed mainly of Punjabis and those mainly from a Deobandi background. Most of their leaders relied on fiery oratory. None more so than Bukhari. “I would fain allow myself to be thrown before fierce lions as a punishment for my love of the Prophet,” he declared in a speech delivered at Saharanpur in 1935. He continued, “I would deem myself fortunate if those lions were to chew my bones in their jaws and I were conscious enough to hear them cracking.”
The books are all quite different. Robinson looks at the characteristics of the Islamic revival in the age of Western dominance. Ingram examines Deobandi thought in relation to Sufism, highlighting how many Deobandis understood Sufism as in essence standing for ethical self-fashioning. Jones outlines Shi'a religious change and the development of a harder sectarian identity in the colonial period. But where they converge, is on the changing nature of religious authority in the modern era.
Before the onset of colonial rule, mosques, madrasas, the law and the ulama were generally supported by Muslim state power. The authority of the individual alim rested on possession of ijazas and on a system of person to person transmission of religious knowledge.
With the waning of Mughal rule and the deepening of British rule, patronage of the ulama declined. No longer did the British fund madrasa education; no longer after 1865 was the advice of Muftis to be sought when administering Anglo-Muhammadan law. Revenue free grants that supported families of the ulama were reclaimed in many instances; religious knowledge was deemed inferior and government servants were increasingly expected to have obtained their qualifications from government schools.
It is in this context, that firstly, many worked to build a Muslim society from the bottom up; to mould the conscience of the believer. In Ingram’s words, “one had to reform the individual to reform society.” One also had to educate the individual. Thus, there was a profusion of madrasas after 1857 and the objective of the madrasa was now no longer to produce individuals who would serve the state as civil servants, but to produce individuals who would serve society through the religious knowledge that they learned. Fatwas once produced by and large for judges were now directed at individual Muslims.
In the process, a greater emphasis was placed on personal responsibility and in Robinson’s words, a “this-worldly Islam of action on earth to achieve salvation." Listen to the modernist, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: “I regard it as my duty to do all I can, right or wrong”, he said “to defend my religion and too show the people the true, shining countenance of Islam. This is what my conscience dictates and unless I do its bidding, I am a sinner before God.”
In the case of the Deobandi, Ashraf Ali Thanvi, he reminded his followers of the horrors of the Day of Judgment to focus their minds on their responsibilities. Ingram’s book in fact begins with a quote from a sermon delivered by Thanvi, in 1923:
“O Faithful, save yourself and your family from the torments of Hell.”
Secondly, we see in the colonial period the development of ‘brands’ such as Deobandi or Barelwi. Religious authority was now not just vested on those that possessed ijazas but was also based on ‘maslaki’ identity. It became more important for adherents to distinguish themselves from other denominations, to guard ‘their’ boundaries.
Thirdly, and related to this, the attempt to prove one’s authority in itself contributed greatly to the development of modern sectarianism. Indeed Jones stresses inner conflicts within the sects themselves. So he says, “while Shi‘a–Sunni arguments received all the contemporaneous comment and press attention, they were in fact frequently something of a smokescreen for competition, or even conflict, within Shi‘ism itself.” The same no doubt applies for many Sunnis who engaged in polemical religious debate. It became a more “crowded religious marketplace” and debates were often about the desire to “consolidate their own positions of internal leadership through the vituperation of manufactured external communities.”
Fourthly, the expansion of print also enabled those outside the religious establishment to speak on behalf of Islam. In Robinson’s words:
“Increasingly from now on any Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad could claim to speak for Islam. No longer was a sheaf of impeachable ijazas the buttress of authority…The force of 1200 years of oral transmission, of person-to-person transmission, came increasingly to be ignored.”
The emergence of religious thinkers outside of the ulama was a global phenomenon. Teachers, lawyers, journalists, intellectuals and engineers stepped forward to speak in the name of Islam. Think of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Iqbal and Maududi in South Asia; of al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt; of Hasan al-Turabi in Sudan; of Rashid al-Ghannushi in Tunisia; of Mahdi Bazargan in Iran.
Fifthly, rather than seeking patronage of an elite, as they might have once done, many seeking a claim to religious leadership now looked to rally public opinion. Authority could be derived from public backing. Communication in vernacular languages and an emphasis on oratory, on stirring emotion, on demonstrating a devotion and commitment to Islam, was increasingly prevalent. Indeed Margrit Pernau in her book (Emotions and Modernity in Colonial India) has argued that in Colonial India there was an intensification of emotion in Muslim discourse. There was a shift from an emphasis on adl, that is balance, to josh, that is fervour, ebullience.
The following quote from Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari is indicative of this ethos, though it is not included in any of these books - I take this instead from David Gilmartin’s book, Empire and Islam. The Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, which emerged in 1929, composed mainly of Punjabis and those mainly from a Deobandi background. Most of their leaders relied on fiery oratory. None more so than Bukhari. “I would fain allow myself to be thrown before fierce lions as a punishment for my love of the Prophet,” he declared in a speech delivered at Saharanpur in 1935. He continued, “I would deem myself fortunate if those lions were to chew my bones in their jaws and I were conscious enough to hear them cracking.”
- Joined
- Oct 2, 2004
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- 218,092
The novelist and screenwriter Hanif Kureishi has said he may never be able to walk or use a pen again after a fall on Boxing Day in Rome.
The Buddha of Surburbia author has now tweeted about the incident, following reports in the Italian media that he was in intensive care.
“I had just seen Mo Salah score against Aston Villa, sipped half a beer, when I began to feel dizzy,” Kureishi wrote.
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2...-novelist-screenwriter?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
The Buddha of Surburbia author has now tweeted about the incident, following reports in the Italian media that he was in intensive care.
“I had just seen Mo Salah score against Aston Villa, sipped half a beer, when I began to feel dizzy,” Kureishi wrote.
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2...-novelist-screenwriter?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
SalimBhai
First Class Player
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Among the believers
House of mr biswas
House of mr biswas
ElRaja
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don't read much these days, but read "when breath becomes air" on a friend's recommendation, great quick read, dealing with issues of mortality in a very impersonal, and then personal way.
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- Oct 2, 2004
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- 218,092
Gary Lineker, Gary Neville and Marcus Rashford are among those nominated for the 2023 Sports Book Awards, an annual prize for sports writing and publishing.
Alex Scott, Peter Crouch, Gabby Logan and Micah Richards are also featured in the 11 category shortlists, alongside Steve Thompson, Beth Mead, Sue Barker and Mark Noble.
The aim of the awards is to highlight "the most outstanding sports books of the previous calendar year, to showcase their merits and enhance their reputation and profile".
Mark Pougatch will host the 21st Sports Book Awards, which will take place at the Kia Oval on the evening of 24th May. A Bat For A Chance will be the 2023 Sports Book Awards charity of choice.
New for this year is the New Women’s Sports Writing award, which will be named in honour of Vikki Orvice, a sports journalist who championed female sports writing. The prize will be judged by Nick Greenslade, Dame Katherine Grainger, Sue Anstiss, Anya Shrubsole, Susie Petruccelli and Lewes c.e.o. Maggie Murphy.
Orvice’s husband, Ian Ridley, said: "Vikki was a great champion of the written word and was often frustrated by the limited opportunities and lack of opportunities for women to see their writing commissioned and showcased. This welcome award plays a big part in putting that right and I am proud that it will be in her name, the use of which I readily agreed to as I know she would have readily endorsed it."
The Sports Book Awards are judged by an academy including The Football Writers’ Association, The Rugby Union Writers’ Club, The Cricket Society, National Literacy Trust, Christine Ohuruogu, Baroness Tanni Grey Thompson, Mark Pougatch, Annie Vernon, Simon Halliday, Jill Douglas and Simon Brotherton.
A public vote is also now open to find the winners in two categories, Autobiography of the Year and Sports Entertainment Book of the Year.
https://www.thebookseller.com/news/...ose-nominated-for-the-2023-sports-book-awards
Alex Scott, Peter Crouch, Gabby Logan and Micah Richards are also featured in the 11 category shortlists, alongside Steve Thompson, Beth Mead, Sue Barker and Mark Noble.
The aim of the awards is to highlight "the most outstanding sports books of the previous calendar year, to showcase their merits and enhance their reputation and profile".
Mark Pougatch will host the 21st Sports Book Awards, which will take place at the Kia Oval on the evening of 24th May. A Bat For A Chance will be the 2023 Sports Book Awards charity of choice.
New for this year is the New Women’s Sports Writing award, which will be named in honour of Vikki Orvice, a sports journalist who championed female sports writing. The prize will be judged by Nick Greenslade, Dame Katherine Grainger, Sue Anstiss, Anya Shrubsole, Susie Petruccelli and Lewes c.e.o. Maggie Murphy.
Orvice’s husband, Ian Ridley, said: "Vikki was a great champion of the written word and was often frustrated by the limited opportunities and lack of opportunities for women to see their writing commissioned and showcased. This welcome award plays a big part in putting that right and I am proud that it will be in her name, the use of which I readily agreed to as I know she would have readily endorsed it."
The Sports Book Awards are judged by an academy including The Football Writers’ Association, The Rugby Union Writers’ Club, The Cricket Society, National Literacy Trust, Christine Ohuruogu, Baroness Tanni Grey Thompson, Mark Pougatch, Annie Vernon, Simon Halliday, Jill Douglas and Simon Brotherton.
A public vote is also now open to find the winners in two categories, Autobiography of the Year and Sports Entertainment Book of the Year.
https://www.thebookseller.com/news/...ose-nominated-for-the-2023-sports-book-awards
Just finished Pratinav Anil’s book, Another India: The Making of the World's Largest Muslim Minority, 1947–77.
It is a dazzling book written with great flair and panache. As the subtitle indicates, the experience of the Indian Muslims in the thirty years after partition is the focus of the work. Anil disabuses us of the idea that the Nehruvian era represented some golden age for Indian Muslims. He also dispels the idea that Muslims were passive bystanders. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Muslim elite largely failed in their efforts at advancement for the Muslim community as a whole and it is a failure that Anil ascribes in large part to the Muslim elite itself.
He acknowledges that partition circumscribed space for Muslim assertion. There was always the pejorative label of communalism that Indian Muslims had to be especially wary of after the division of British India. In Anil’s striking words: “’Communalism’. Less a description than an imputation, contempt drips from every mention of the word.”
But partition does not explain all and there were continuities in the thought and ideas of ‘nationalist Muslims’, pre and post-partition. There was first an uncritical commitment to Congress as embodying the India nation. There was, secondly, an attitude of "complaisance" towards the Congress. Anil quotes one prominent nationalist Muslim - Syed Mahmud (1889 - 1971) — as writing to Nehru on his thirty fifth birthday: “Now the only present that I can offer is my life-long devotion and fidelity to you and to the Nehrus. I am painfully conscious of the worthlessness of my devotion, but then, my boy, just like a dog I have nothing else or better in my possession to give my master…”
Thirdly, and for Anil perhaps most fatally, there was an “unflinching belief” in juridification. Even before partition many Congress supporting Muslims envisaged India as a “juristic ghetto” where Muslims would be independent of the state and governed by the shari’a. In the post-independent period the Muslim elite retained an attachment to Muslim personal law and more generally to symbols of Muslim culture, but paid insufficient attention to the political, social and economic advancement of the wider Muslim community. For Anil, the elite Muslims “betrayed” the Muslim community with its focus on depoliticisation and juridification rather than on the political and material uplift of the community as a whole.
For Anil, “No single life encapsulates the depoliticisation of the nationalist Muslim that followed independence better than Azad’s.” Maulana Azad (1888-1958) - frequently held as a poster child for secular supporters of the Congress - comes out badly in this account, indeed a rather spineless figure. He allowed himself to be reduced to a mere figurehead as President of the Congress.
This said, while this is a valuable work, Anil’s superior tone will grate on some. You will also be well advised to keep a dictionary close by as Anil has a particular penchant for the arcane, with the following a small sample of the words that make an appearance: acephalous, prosopography, heteroclite, transhumance, epigoni, peripeteia.
It is a dazzling book written with great flair and panache. As the subtitle indicates, the experience of the Indian Muslims in the thirty years after partition is the focus of the work. Anil disabuses us of the idea that the Nehruvian era represented some golden age for Indian Muslims. He also dispels the idea that Muslims were passive bystanders. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Muslim elite largely failed in their efforts at advancement for the Muslim community as a whole and it is a failure that Anil ascribes in large part to the Muslim elite itself.
He acknowledges that partition circumscribed space for Muslim assertion. There was always the pejorative label of communalism that Indian Muslims had to be especially wary of after the division of British India. In Anil’s striking words: “’Communalism’. Less a description than an imputation, contempt drips from every mention of the word.”
But partition does not explain all and there were continuities in the thought and ideas of ‘nationalist Muslims’, pre and post-partition. There was first an uncritical commitment to Congress as embodying the India nation. There was, secondly, an attitude of "complaisance" towards the Congress. Anil quotes one prominent nationalist Muslim - Syed Mahmud (1889 - 1971) — as writing to Nehru on his thirty fifth birthday: “Now the only present that I can offer is my life-long devotion and fidelity to you and to the Nehrus. I am painfully conscious of the worthlessness of my devotion, but then, my boy, just like a dog I have nothing else or better in my possession to give my master…”
Thirdly, and for Anil perhaps most fatally, there was an “unflinching belief” in juridification. Even before partition many Congress supporting Muslims envisaged India as a “juristic ghetto” where Muslims would be independent of the state and governed by the shari’a. In the post-independent period the Muslim elite retained an attachment to Muslim personal law and more generally to symbols of Muslim culture, but paid insufficient attention to the political, social and economic advancement of the wider Muslim community. For Anil, the elite Muslims “betrayed” the Muslim community with its focus on depoliticisation and juridification rather than on the political and material uplift of the community as a whole.
For Anil, “No single life encapsulates the depoliticisation of the nationalist Muslim that followed independence better than Azad’s.” Maulana Azad (1888-1958) - frequently held as a poster child for secular supporters of the Congress - comes out badly in this account, indeed a rather spineless figure. He allowed himself to be reduced to a mere figurehead as President of the Congress.
This said, while this is a valuable work, Anil’s superior tone will grate on some. You will also be well advised to keep a dictionary close by as Anil has a particular penchant for the arcane, with the following a small sample of the words that make an appearance: acephalous, prosopography, heteroclite, transhumance, epigoni, peripeteia.
SalimBhai
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Just read Biko again. Great bio
Angrez Pakistani
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Finishing The Poppy War trilogy. First two books were great. Last one is a bit of a slow burn but I hope it gets better. I have high hopes.
In Plain Sight by Dan Davies about Jimmy Savile. Based on the author's recollections of interviewing him over several years.
Some of the details of his abuse are truly harrowing, especially in the hospitals where he worked as a porter and behaved like he ran the place. It's remarkable how brazen he was, making little effort to disguise his actions, and even constantly dropping hints in public. Yet he formed a highly effective smokescreen through his eccentricity, charity fundraising, and connections with police and high officials.
The guy had the keys to Broadmoor psychiatric hospital housing some of the worst criminals in the country. Had he been brought to justice, that's exactly where he belonged.
Some of the details of his abuse are truly harrowing, especially in the hospitals where he worked as a porter and behaved like he ran the place. It's remarkable how brazen he was, making little effort to disguise his actions, and even constantly dropping hints in public. Yet he formed a highly effective smokescreen through his eccentricity, charity fundraising, and connections with police and high officials.
The guy had the keys to Broadmoor psychiatric hospital housing some of the worst criminals in the country. Had he been brought to justice, that's exactly where he belonged.
sweep_shot
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I am currently reading a book called "The Way of the Champion: Pain, Persistence, and the Path Forward". It was written by Paul Rabil.
It is almost exactly fifty years since the Emergency was declared by Indira Gandhi, leading to an extraordinary twenty-one month period. It was a period of civil liberties being suppressed, of mass arrests, of forced sterilisation, of slum clearances, of cruel violence.
Last year, I read Gyan Prakash’s finely crafted book, The Emergency Chronicles (published in 2019). Like any good historian he provides the context for understanding the event and persuasively challenges the “myth that the Emergency dropped from nowhere.” Indira Gandhi bore a heavy responsibility but at the same time, “Indira did not concoct the Emergency regime out of ether…Historical forces with roots in the past and implications were at work in the extraordinary turn of events of 1975-77.”
What were some of these roots? One: the achievement of independence as a “passive revolution,” that is a political rising unaccompanied by social revolution. In the words of Prakash: “Able to mobilise the population against British rule but incapable of accommodating popular demands and aspirations into its vision of the nation, the elite was compelled to rule with a heavy dose of coercion.”
Two: and linked to one, was the nature of the Congress party that Indira inherited. It was an “umbrella” party home to varied and conflicting interests. As Congress prestige rose, many of the aspirant politicians viewed it primarily as a vehicle to enhance personal careers. It also relied on a network of patron-client linkage. This was partly because while support for the independence movement was certainly required on a wide enough scale to register support in the elections, which of course occurred under a restricted franchise, support need not have been much wider or deeper than this. In other words the Congress did not need to develop into a cadre-led movement, tightly organised with a clear sense of direction. It was a strong instrument for achieving stability but a weak one for engendering radical change.
Three: and also linked to one, was a strong desire by the Congress leaders that spearheaded the nationalist movement for a strong state. This desire pre-dated partition and existed for various reasons - anxiety of a social upheaval not the least amongst them - and was only encouraged by the violence of partition. The result: the 1935 Government of India Act - once labelled a “charter of slavery” was heavily leaned on in the making of the Indian constitution. “Now that the nationalists were in power,” writes Prakash, “they felt no qualms about incorporating the arsenal of executive powers granted by the colonial law.”
The tools were, therefore, in place for a future Indira Gandhi to leverage: emergency provisions, preventative detention and colonial-era inherited laws of repression. Somnath Lahiri, a Communist member of the Assembly, put it bluntly, when the proposed fundamental rights were presented: “many of these fundamental rights have been framed from the point of view of a police constable.”
This is the critical backdrop. Fast forward to 1970s, and this inheritance became problematic in the context of the rising unrest as the promises of freedom went unrealised. Prakash makes the point that there was a larger global context: “globally, political and social convulsions marked the late 1960s and the early 1970s.”
In India, opponents began to rally the people. In a speech in November 1974, Jayaprakash Narayan, quoted the poet, Ramdhari Singh Dinkar: “Clear the way / hear rumbling of the chariot of time / leave the throne / for the people are coming.”
Indira was not to be left behind in her desire to marshal popular opinion and reestablish popular consent for the the rulers.
All of this provides a much deeper and richer understanding of the roots of the Emergency.
Prakash also gives sufficient attention to the awful human consequences of the Emergency. I will take one example. It involves, P. Rajan, an engineering student in Kerala and his father Professor T.V. Echara Varier.
Rajan was arrested on 29 February 1976 and taken to a police camp where he was tortured. His father moved “heaven and earth to get information.” To no avail. Rajan’s body was never found.
Poignantly, Professor Varier wrote:
“My son is standing outside drenched in the rain.
I still have no answer to the question whether or not I feel vengeance. But I leave one question to the world: why are you making my innocent child stand in the rain even after his death.
I don’t close the door. Let the rain lash inside and drench me. Let my invisible son at least know that his father never shut the door.”
Professor Varier himself died in 2006, “still grieving for the son whose body he never found.”
Last year, I read Gyan Prakash’s finely crafted book, The Emergency Chronicles (published in 2019). Like any good historian he provides the context for understanding the event and persuasively challenges the “myth that the Emergency dropped from nowhere.” Indira Gandhi bore a heavy responsibility but at the same time, “Indira did not concoct the Emergency regime out of ether…Historical forces with roots in the past and implications were at work in the extraordinary turn of events of 1975-77.”
What were some of these roots? One: the achievement of independence as a “passive revolution,” that is a political rising unaccompanied by social revolution. In the words of Prakash: “Able to mobilise the population against British rule but incapable of accommodating popular demands and aspirations into its vision of the nation, the elite was compelled to rule with a heavy dose of coercion.”
Two: and linked to one, was the nature of the Congress party that Indira inherited. It was an “umbrella” party home to varied and conflicting interests. As Congress prestige rose, many of the aspirant politicians viewed it primarily as a vehicle to enhance personal careers. It also relied on a network of patron-client linkage. This was partly because while support for the independence movement was certainly required on a wide enough scale to register support in the elections, which of course occurred under a restricted franchise, support need not have been much wider or deeper than this. In other words the Congress did not need to develop into a cadre-led movement, tightly organised with a clear sense of direction. It was a strong instrument for achieving stability but a weak one for engendering radical change.
Three: and also linked to one, was a strong desire by the Congress leaders that spearheaded the nationalist movement for a strong state. This desire pre-dated partition and existed for various reasons - anxiety of a social upheaval not the least amongst them - and was only encouraged by the violence of partition. The result: the 1935 Government of India Act - once labelled a “charter of slavery” was heavily leaned on in the making of the Indian constitution. “Now that the nationalists were in power,” writes Prakash, “they felt no qualms about incorporating the arsenal of executive powers granted by the colonial law.”
The tools were, therefore, in place for a future Indira Gandhi to leverage: emergency provisions, preventative detention and colonial-era inherited laws of repression. Somnath Lahiri, a Communist member of the Assembly, put it bluntly, when the proposed fundamental rights were presented: “many of these fundamental rights have been framed from the point of view of a police constable.”
This is the critical backdrop. Fast forward to 1970s, and this inheritance became problematic in the context of the rising unrest as the promises of freedom went unrealised. Prakash makes the point that there was a larger global context: “globally, political and social convulsions marked the late 1960s and the early 1970s.”
In India, opponents began to rally the people. In a speech in November 1974, Jayaprakash Narayan, quoted the poet, Ramdhari Singh Dinkar: “Clear the way / hear rumbling of the chariot of time / leave the throne / for the people are coming.”
Indira was not to be left behind in her desire to marshal popular opinion and reestablish popular consent for the the rulers.
All of this provides a much deeper and richer understanding of the roots of the Emergency.
Prakash also gives sufficient attention to the awful human consequences of the Emergency. I will take one example. It involves, P. Rajan, an engineering student in Kerala and his father Professor T.V. Echara Varier.
Rajan was arrested on 29 February 1976 and taken to a police camp where he was tortured. His father moved “heaven and earth to get information.” To no avail. Rajan’s body was never found.
Poignantly, Professor Varier wrote:
“My son is standing outside drenched in the rain.
I still have no answer to the question whether or not I feel vengeance. But I leave one question to the world: why are you making my innocent child stand in the rain even after his death.
I don’t close the door. Let the rain lash inside and drench me. Let my invisible son at least know that his father never shut the door.”
Professor Varier himself died in 2006, “still grieving for the son whose body he never found.”
Vikram1989
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Thanks for this great gem of a thread.
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In official terminology, when freedom came to India it was described prosaically: a “transfer of power.” This phrase pointed to a negotiated handover of power rather than a complete rupture. The case of Indonesia was rather different: freedom was to come via Revolusi - the Indonesian term for revolution.
Revolusi is the name of the magnificently written book by David Van Reybrouck. It tells an immense story, from the Dutch colonial era, to the Japanese occupation, to the Indonesian struggle for independence. Van Reybrouck humanises the picture by leaning on oral history; stitching stories from survivors into the narrative. Violence - unflinchingly revealed in this account - is central to the story. There was brutality from Japanese occupiers, from the Indonesian youth militias and especially from the Dutch colonialists.
The Dutch ruled with an even more heavy hand than the British did in India. The Prime Minister of Netherlands from 1940 to 1945, Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, is quoted as saying that for him, “all Muslims were fuel for the fires of hell.”
Imperial endings greatly shaped what was to come. In the case of India, where colonial rule was ended by agreement rather than revolution, there was much continuity in the ethos and structures of governance. In the case of Indonesia, where freedom had to be won forcibly, there was far more discontinuity after independence. It is no surprise that constitutional democracy was more unstable in Indonesia and broke down in the 1950s.
Indonesia has a huge population (only China, India and the USA has more people), is the largest Muslim country in the world, with the biggest economy in Southeast Asia. The story of its independence struggle is gripping, requiring an understanding of both a grass-roots movement and the actions of elites (Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir are fascinating figures). The movement for freedom was shaped by Islam, communism, nationalism and even gangsterism. It is a story that deserves to be more widely understood. Van Reybrouck’s book provides a compelling starting point.
Revolusi is the name of the magnificently written book by David Van Reybrouck. It tells an immense story, from the Dutch colonial era, to the Japanese occupation, to the Indonesian struggle for independence. Van Reybrouck humanises the picture by leaning on oral history; stitching stories from survivors into the narrative. Violence - unflinchingly revealed in this account - is central to the story. There was brutality from Japanese occupiers, from the Indonesian youth militias and especially from the Dutch colonialists.
The Dutch ruled with an even more heavy hand than the British did in India. The Prime Minister of Netherlands from 1940 to 1945, Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, is quoted as saying that for him, “all Muslims were fuel for the fires of hell.”
Imperial endings greatly shaped what was to come. In the case of India, where colonial rule was ended by agreement rather than revolution, there was much continuity in the ethos and structures of governance. In the case of Indonesia, where freedom had to be won forcibly, there was far more discontinuity after independence. It is no surprise that constitutional democracy was more unstable in Indonesia and broke down in the 1950s.
Indonesia has a huge population (only China, India and the USA has more people), is the largest Muslim country in the world, with the biggest economy in Southeast Asia. The story of its independence struggle is gripping, requiring an understanding of both a grass-roots movement and the actions of elites (Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir are fascinating figures). The movement for freedom was shaped by Islam, communism, nationalism and even gangsterism. It is a story that deserves to be more widely understood. Van Reybrouck’s book provides a compelling starting point.
sweep_shot
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I recently bought a book called "Atomic Habit". Haven't started yet but seems like a great self-improvement book.
RedwoodOriginal
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Hell's Angels by Hunter S. Thompson. One of my favorite writers and this is arguably his most famous book that I hadn't read until now.
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Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam
This is a superb book on the topic as to why university graduates shy away from traditional scholars of Islam and get attracted to fringe figures. Mirza isn't a militant but a lot of what is discussed in this book makes sense and applies to Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam: Burke, Jason: 9781850436669: Amazon.com: Books
Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam [Burke, Jason] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam
www.amazon.com
shaz619
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Did you ever watch Tom Hardy’s The Bikeriders, I think you’d like that on the topic of motorcycle culture in the US, I think any petrolhead would enjoy it to, I don’t think it did well at the box-office but engaging stuff rarely does….
RedwoodOriginal
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I did and I really liked it. Really good and poignant film. The performances were top-notch across the board, particularly from Tom Hardy and Jodie Comer. Austin Butler, I liked a little less because I feel like plays the same character in most movies but even his performance mostly worked here.
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Pakistan or the Partition of India?
Read online
@ElRaja, @IronShield @Bewal Express @mazkhan @The Bald Eagle @KingKhanWC@Boyka @DeadlyVenom @HalBass9
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar wrote this book in 1941 and he also wrote the constitution of India.
Please start from Chapter 3 about his thoughts on Indian Army and his conclusions (roughly):
- In order for India (to progress) and for an Army to be able to safeguard India...
- Give "Punjabi" soldiers from Indian Army their own country Pakistan
His prediction was that the composition of Indian Army if kept the same way will not fulfill its duties in safeguarding India and Army will make a state within a state.
Search for discussions on Afghanistan and read when he discusses the Indian Army: http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/pakistan.pdf
When I read this in 2025 it send chills down my spine!
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Author:
Younger brother of Captain Asfandyar Bukhari Shaheed.
Mas'ala Falastine Ki Mukhtasar Tareek
In cooperation with Pak-Palestine Forum, a new book in Urdu
Read here: https://dn710107.ca.archive.org/0/i...ikh/Masla e Falasteen ki Mukhtasar Tarikh.pdf
Younger brother of Captain Asfandyar Bukhari Shaheed.
Dr Hassaan Bokhari is a graduate of Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi. In 2018-19, he cleared the CSS exam and was 34th in Pakistan. However, he declined to join the civil service in order to pursue his passion for the study and analysis of history more freely. Presently, he is running a YouTube channel "Tareekh aur Tajziya (History and Analysis)" which focuses on the objective analysis of history and current affairs. Dr. Hassaan Bokhari has authored a book titled "Forks in the Road" about the 1971 fratricide and has also headed the India Desk at South Asia Times Islamabad. He aims to play a part in the process of enabling the nation to understand its history in a perspective marked by objectivity, honesty, and confidence.
Mas'ala Falastine Ki Mukhtasar Tareek
In cooperation with Pak-Palestine Forum, a new book in Urdu
Read here: https://dn710107.ca.archive.org/0/i...ikh/Masla e Falasteen ki Mukhtasar Tarikh.pdf
How can Palestine Liberate Pakistan!
Qalandar mail taqreeray nadarad
Bajuz een nukta akseeray nadarad
Azan kisht-e-kharabay hasil-e-neest
Ke aab-az-khoon-e-Shabbeeray nadarad
(This mystic doesn’t wish to preach but can see no other cure apart from this: The ruined harvest won’t yield any benefit until and unless the field is watered with the blood of a Shabbir [RA])
Yes, you read the title right. On this 14th August, I aim to elaborate how Palestine, a victim of genocide, can help liberate Pakistan, the only nuclear state in the Islamic World!
I have heard many common people and intellectuals discussing the question, “How can Pakistan liberate Palestine?” Just a few days ago, I had the “pleasure” of listening to a sub-inspector of Islamabad Police telling a youth: “Son! The Arabs and Iranis are useless. It is only us, the Pakistanis, who will liberate Masjid al-Aqsa, but we will first do Ghazwa-e-Hind, and after subjugating India, we will smash Israel to pieces!” I would have laughed loudly, had I not kept in mind the solemnity of the occasion. I remembered that I was there for the purpose of offering the Janaza prayer organized by the Save Gaza Campaign for the martyred Palestinian leader Ismail Haniya. Only around a couple of hundred people from the sprawling city of Islamabad (the population of Islamabad district is almost equal to the Gaza Strip) were attending. However, the police contingent deployed to “control” these few people had more numerical strength. Not a single member of the police, including the zealous sub-inspector, bothered to offer the Janaza prayer for a martyred Muslim leader though.
I am a rational person. And I cannot bring myself to believe that a country infected with delusions of grandeur, apathy, lethargy, elite capture, bigotry, and most of all ignorance can “liberate” Palestine or any other oppressed region (eg Kashmir). The history of Pakistan, especially in the last 3 decades, quite clearly proves that Pakistan, as it is, cannot even liberate itself! So, the question, “How can Pakistan liberate Palestine?” is impertinent and only reeks of delusion. And this isn’t just the problem of Pakistan. Most of the Islamic world feeds itself on such delusions while practically ignoring even those little bits that it can do to help the Palestinians. The behavior of the Pakistani state in particular, and most of the rest of the Muslim states in general, is in line with the police sub-inspector who can but won’t even offer the Janaza prayer for Ismail Haniya but instead boast loudly about conquering India and Israel while working as a minion for the Western-slave elite of Pakistan whose only purpose is to suppress, oppress, and loot Pakistan as much as it can before it sends its sons and daughters to the Western countries where they build a paradise for themselves on money looted from millions of starving Pakistanis!
It is imperative for us to liberate Pakistan if we are to help Palestine. Not only have we failed to liberate Pakistan ourselves, but we have also managed to surrender the small bits of freedom we had earned as a nation in 1947. Clearly, we need external help. But how can Palestine, a country that isn’t even on the map (thanks to the champions of human rights and democracy like the USA), which is currently experiencing a devastating genocide, and whose bulk of population consists of pitiful refugees, liberate Pakistan? Yes, Palestine can’t send any army to dethrone the Western slaves occupying the power corridors of Pakistan. Yes, it cannot give financial aid to save Pakistan from imminent bankruptcy. But it can, and is doing something very important. It is supplying the psychological impulse for liberation to a Pakistani nation wracked with apathy and indifference. And it is doing so by expending the most suitable currency for this purpose: blood.
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Iqbal, the sage, clearly wrote in the last verses of his illustrious life that blood has to be paid to turn a desert into an oasis. Pakistan was created not merely as a nationalist state only concerned with its own people. The foundational ideology of Pakistan, elucidated by Iqbal and Jinnah themselves, was that Pakistan was going to be a vanguard Islamic state, one of whose cardinal purposes of existence was to support the Islamic brethren globally. Jinnah himself had told The New York Times even before the birth of Pakistan that it would use even violence, if required, for the cause of Palestine! Without actually fulfilling its deal with history, and pursuing its ideology, Pakistan will surely perish. And we can see today the country is on the brink. Only the people of Pakistan can liberate and save Pakistan, but the chief hurdle here is the slumber and apathy of the people to the impending doom.
Here’s where Palestine comes in. If the slaughter of thousands (at least 40,000 have been killed while the deaths due to the conflict are projected as high as 186,000), if the visuals showing disfigured kids, wailing mothers, bodies blasted into smithereens, the rape of prisoners in broad daylight in front of cameras, can’t wake the Pakistani nation, nothing else will. And if the Pakistanis do not wake up, they might end up seeing the re-enactment of the Gaza holocaust in their own homes. They might end up witnessing all these horrors at the hands of Hindutva goons but by then it will be too late. Muslim Spain could have been saved before 1492, but the people remained apathetic, and after 1492, try as they might, there wasn’t going to be a chance at redemption for them.
Palestine and the Gazans had options. They could have accepted Israeli slavery. They could have accepted exile (Israel’s patron, the USA, would have funded it to facilitate the ethnic cleansing of Palestine). But they chose the way of death and supreme sacrifice. Why? Hamas couldn’t hope to defeat the military machine of Israel backed by the might of the USA. Militarily, this “war” could only result in a huge slaughter and a transition of Israel from a policy of slow genocide to an active genocide. Then why did Palestine opt to fight? The answer is quite clear to all those who understand the concept of “Husainiyyat” (the way of Imam Hussain aka Shabbir [RA]). Why did Imam Hussain fight at Karbala? 72 men could never have militarily defeated a force numbering in thousands. Why did he fight then? Dr. Ali Shariati answers: “Imam Hussain now stands between two inabilities. He cannot remain silent, but neither can he fight. He has only one weapon, and that is death. If he cannot defeat the enemy, he can at least disgrace them with his own death. If he cannot conquer the ruling power, he can at least condemn it. For him, martyrdom is not a loss, but a choice. He will sacrifice himself on the threshold of the temple of freedom, and be victorious.”
Iqbal mentions in “Rumuz-e-Bekhudi”:
Moses and Pharaoh, Shabbir and Yazid –
From Life spring these conflicting potencies;
Firm as a mountain‐chain was his resolve,
Impetuous, unwavering to its goal The Sword is for the glory of the Faith
And is unsheathed but to defend the Law.
The Muslim, servant unto God alone before no Pharaoh cast down his head.
His blood interpreted these mysteries,
And waked our slumbering community.
He drew the sword There is none other god
And shed the blood of them that served the lie;
From Hussain (RA) we learned the riddle of the Book,
and at his flame kindled our torches.
Vanished now from ken Damascus might, the splendor of Baghdad,
Granada’s majesty, all lost to mind;
Yet still the strings he smote within our soul
Vibrate, still ever new our faith abides in his Allahu Akbar,
Gentle breeze, thou messenger of them that are afar,
Bear these my tears to lave his holy dust.
The Palestinians of Gaza are dying in their thousands to wake the slumbering Islamic community. And already, there have been results. It wasn’t a coincidence that thousands of Palestinian flags were seen aloft in Bangladesh during the successful revolution that overthrew a tyrant who was an Indian stooge. Palestine has helped Bangladesh in taking the first vital step towards “Haqiqi Azadi” and complete liberation. It is high time that Pakistan follows its estranged Eastern brother. By embracing the Palestinian cause we can unite the different ethnicities and sects, awaken the nation, and march towards a free Pakistan. A Pakistan that was envisioned by Iqbal and Jinnah. A Pakistan that will be able to fulfill its promise with history and help Palestine with all its might, even “with violence, if necessary!”
Bajuz een nukta akseeray nadarad
Azan kisht-e-kharabay hasil-e-neest
Ke aab-az-khoon-e-Shabbeeray nadarad
(This mystic doesn’t wish to preach but can see no other cure apart from this: The ruined harvest won’t yield any benefit until and unless the field is watered with the blood of a Shabbir [RA])
Yes, you read the title right. On this 14th August, I aim to elaborate how Palestine, a victim of genocide, can help liberate Pakistan, the only nuclear state in the Islamic World!
I have heard many common people and intellectuals discussing the question, “How can Pakistan liberate Palestine?” Just a few days ago, I had the “pleasure” of listening to a sub-inspector of Islamabad Police telling a youth: “Son! The Arabs and Iranis are useless. It is only us, the Pakistanis, who will liberate Masjid al-Aqsa, but we will first do Ghazwa-e-Hind, and after subjugating India, we will smash Israel to pieces!” I would have laughed loudly, had I not kept in mind the solemnity of the occasion. I remembered that I was there for the purpose of offering the Janaza prayer organized by the Save Gaza Campaign for the martyred Palestinian leader Ismail Haniya. Only around a couple of hundred people from the sprawling city of Islamabad (the population of Islamabad district is almost equal to the Gaza Strip) were attending. However, the police contingent deployed to “control” these few people had more numerical strength. Not a single member of the police, including the zealous sub-inspector, bothered to offer the Janaza prayer for a martyred Muslim leader though.
I am a rational person. And I cannot bring myself to believe that a country infected with delusions of grandeur, apathy, lethargy, elite capture, bigotry, and most of all ignorance can “liberate” Palestine or any other oppressed region (eg Kashmir). The history of Pakistan, especially in the last 3 decades, quite clearly proves that Pakistan, as it is, cannot even liberate itself! So, the question, “How can Pakistan liberate Palestine?” is impertinent and only reeks of delusion. And this isn’t just the problem of Pakistan. Most of the Islamic world feeds itself on such delusions while practically ignoring even those little bits that it can do to help the Palestinians. The behavior of the Pakistani state in particular, and most of the rest of the Muslim states in general, is in line with the police sub-inspector who can but won’t even offer the Janaza prayer for Ismail Haniya but instead boast loudly about conquering India and Israel while working as a minion for the Western-slave elite of Pakistan whose only purpose is to suppress, oppress, and loot Pakistan as much as it can before it sends its sons and daughters to the Western countries where they build a paradise for themselves on money looted from millions of starving Pakistanis!
It is imperative for us to liberate Pakistan if we are to help Palestine. Not only have we failed to liberate Pakistan ourselves, but we have also managed to surrender the small bits of freedom we had earned as a nation in 1947. Clearly, we need external help. But how can Palestine, a country that isn’t even on the map (thanks to the champions of human rights and democracy like the USA), which is currently experiencing a devastating genocide, and whose bulk of population consists of pitiful refugees, liberate Pakistan? Yes, Palestine can’t send any army to dethrone the Western slaves occupying the power corridors of Pakistan. Yes, it cannot give financial aid to save Pakistan from imminent bankruptcy. But it can, and is doing something very important. It is supplying the psychological impulse for liberation to a Pakistani nation wracked with apathy and indifference. And it is doing so by expending the most suitable currency for this purpose: blood.
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Iqbal, the sage, clearly wrote in the last verses of his illustrious life that blood has to be paid to turn a desert into an oasis. Pakistan was created not merely as a nationalist state only concerned with its own people. The foundational ideology of Pakistan, elucidated by Iqbal and Jinnah themselves, was that Pakistan was going to be a vanguard Islamic state, one of whose cardinal purposes of existence was to support the Islamic brethren globally. Jinnah himself had told The New York Times even before the birth of Pakistan that it would use even violence, if required, for the cause of Palestine! Without actually fulfilling its deal with history, and pursuing its ideology, Pakistan will surely perish. And we can see today the country is on the brink. Only the people of Pakistan can liberate and save Pakistan, but the chief hurdle here is the slumber and apathy of the people to the impending doom.
Here’s where Palestine comes in. If the slaughter of thousands (at least 40,000 have been killed while the deaths due to the conflict are projected as high as 186,000), if the visuals showing disfigured kids, wailing mothers, bodies blasted into smithereens, the rape of prisoners in broad daylight in front of cameras, can’t wake the Pakistani nation, nothing else will. And if the Pakistanis do not wake up, they might end up seeing the re-enactment of the Gaza holocaust in their own homes. They might end up witnessing all these horrors at the hands of Hindutva goons but by then it will be too late. Muslim Spain could have been saved before 1492, but the people remained apathetic, and after 1492, try as they might, there wasn’t going to be a chance at redemption for them.
Palestine and the Gazans had options. They could have accepted Israeli slavery. They could have accepted exile (Israel’s patron, the USA, would have funded it to facilitate the ethnic cleansing of Palestine). But they chose the way of death and supreme sacrifice. Why? Hamas couldn’t hope to defeat the military machine of Israel backed by the might of the USA. Militarily, this “war” could only result in a huge slaughter and a transition of Israel from a policy of slow genocide to an active genocide. Then why did Palestine opt to fight? The answer is quite clear to all those who understand the concept of “Husainiyyat” (the way of Imam Hussain aka Shabbir [RA]). Why did Imam Hussain fight at Karbala? 72 men could never have militarily defeated a force numbering in thousands. Why did he fight then? Dr. Ali Shariati answers: “Imam Hussain now stands between two inabilities. He cannot remain silent, but neither can he fight. He has only one weapon, and that is death. If he cannot defeat the enemy, he can at least disgrace them with his own death. If he cannot conquer the ruling power, he can at least condemn it. For him, martyrdom is not a loss, but a choice. He will sacrifice himself on the threshold of the temple of freedom, and be victorious.”
Iqbal mentions in “Rumuz-e-Bekhudi”:
Moses and Pharaoh, Shabbir and Yazid –
From Life spring these conflicting potencies;
Firm as a mountain‐chain was his resolve,
Impetuous, unwavering to its goal The Sword is for the glory of the Faith
And is unsheathed but to defend the Law.
The Muslim, servant unto God alone before no Pharaoh cast down his head.
His blood interpreted these mysteries,
And waked our slumbering community.
He drew the sword There is none other god
And shed the blood of them that served the lie;
From Hussain (RA) we learned the riddle of the Book,
and at his flame kindled our torches.
Vanished now from ken Damascus might, the splendor of Baghdad,
Granada’s majesty, all lost to mind;
Yet still the strings he smote within our soul
Vibrate, still ever new our faith abides in his Allahu Akbar,
Gentle breeze, thou messenger of them that are afar,
Bear these my tears to lave his holy dust.
The Palestinians of Gaza are dying in their thousands to wake the slumbering Islamic community. And already, there have been results. It wasn’t a coincidence that thousands of Palestinian flags were seen aloft in Bangladesh during the successful revolution that overthrew a tyrant who was an Indian stooge. Palestine has helped Bangladesh in taking the first vital step towards “Haqiqi Azadi” and complete liberation. It is high time that Pakistan follows its estranged Eastern brother. By embracing the Palestinian cause we can unite the different ethnicities and sects, awaken the nation, and march towards a free Pakistan. A Pakistan that was envisioned by Iqbal and Jinnah. A Pakistan that will be able to fulfill its promise with history and help Palestine with all its might, even “with violence, if necessary!”
Hikaru
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Very interesting. It's amazing to see the kind of intellectual and operational liberty starting from scratch provides when it comes to framing a structure. These ideas would be unthinkable today if we actually had an Akhand Bharat for 80 years. It was a timely split and people who orchestrated it had the foresight a lot of us nationalists lack today.Pakistan or the Partition of India?
Read online
@ElRaja, @IronShield @Bewal Express @mazkhan @The Bald Eagle @KingKhanWC@Boyka @DeadlyVenom @HalBass9
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar wrote this book in 1941 and he also wrote the constitution of India.
Please start from Chapter 3 about his thoughts on Indian Army and his conclusions (roughly):
His thoughts are totally communal and his logic is "Anti-Islamic" but his thoughts have proven to be accurate!
- In order for India (to progress) and for an Army to be able to safeguard India...
- Give "Punjabi" soldiers from Indian Army their own country Pakistan
His prediction was that the composition of Indian Army if kept the same way will not fulfill its duties in safeguarding India and Army will make a state within a state.
Search for discussions on Afghanistan and read when he discusses the Indian Army: http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/pakistan.pdf
When I read this in 2025 it send chills down my spine!
Ahmed216
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I will read it. It is someone I don't know too much about apart from reading some online discussionsPakistan or the Partition of India?
Read online
@ElRaja, @IronShield @Bewal Express @mazkhan @The Bald Eagle @KingKhanWC@Boyka @DeadlyVenom @HalBass9
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar wrote this book in 1941 and he also wrote the constitution of India.
Please start from Chapter 3 about his thoughts on Indian Army and his conclusions (roughly):
His thoughts are totally communal and his logic is "Anti-Islamic" but his thoughts have proven to be accurate!
- In order for India (to progress) and for an Army to be able to safeguard India...
- Give "Punjabi" soldiers from Indian Army their own country Pakistan
His prediction was that the composition of Indian Army if kept the same way will not fulfill its duties in safeguarding India and Army will make a state within a state.
Search for discussions on Afghanistan and read when he discusses the Indian Army: http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/pakistan.pdf
When I read this in 2025 it send chills down my spine!
There is an interesting comparison to be made between Jinnah and Ambedkar, through the lens of three issues.Pakistan or the Partition of India?
Read online
@ElRaja, @IronShield @Bewal Express @mazkhan @The Bald Eagle @KingKhanWC@Boyka @DeadlyVenom @HalBass9
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar wrote this book in 1941 and he also wrote the constitution of India.
Please start from Chapter 3 about his thoughts on Indian Army and his conclusions (roughly):
His thoughts are totally communal and his logic is "Anti-Islamic" but his thoughts have proven to be accurate!
- In order for India (to progress) and for an Army to be able to safeguard India...
- Give "Punjabi" soldiers from Indian Army their own country Pakistan
His prediction was that the composition of Indian Army if kept the same way will not fulfill its duties in safeguarding India and Army will make a state within a state.
Search for discussions on Afghanistan and read when he discusses the Indian Army: http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/pakistan.pdf
When I read this in 2025 it send chills down my spine!
On the first issue, minority concerns, we see a convergence of views and tactics. Both were concerned that without adequate rights a minority would be at the mercy of a majority. Like the Muslim League, Ambedkar sought at different times, separate electorates and even separate territory for the Dalits. In 1946, he said:
“The fear which the Scheduled Castes have of the Hindu majority is far greater and far more real than the Muslim community has or can have. The Scheduled Castes have been arguing that the only effective protection they can have is representation through separate electorates and the provision of a separate settlement.”
It was in 1931, during the Second Round Table Conference, that Ambedkar emphatically demanded separate electorates for the Untouchables, a demand that Britain initially accepted. It was only when Gandhi - in one of his most controversial acts - responded by beginning a fast unto death, that Ambedkar was forced against his will to abandon his stance. For Ambedkar, Gandhi’s fast was “a foul and filthy act … the worst form of coercion against a helpless people to give up the constitutional safeguards.”
Ambedkar also had visions of carving out a specific territory for the Dalits (though not a separate sovereign state which is what Jinnah in the end fought for but rather as ‘settlements’). In 1944 Ambedkar confided to a British officer:
“In every village there is a tiny minority of Untouchables. I want to gather those minorities together and make into majorities. This means a tremendous work of organisation - transferring populations, building new villages. But we can do it, if only were are allowed [by the British].”
On another occasion, he asserted that the Untouchables “are, as a matter of fact, socially separate [from the rest of Hindus], [they] should be made separate geographically and territorially also.”
Like Jinnah, Ambedkar understood that power, and not merely claims to goodwill, mattered. “What I want is power,” Ambedkar said, “political power for my people - for if we have power we have social status.”
On the second issue, nationalism, we see some divergence. M.R.A. Baig, who’s served for a period as Jinnah's secretary, wrote that when Jinnah was challenged on how the Muslims could be a nation separate from Hindus when they were of the essentially same ethnicity, he brushed this off by indicating nationalism was subjective. That all that was needed was the “belief in the 'power of faith, which he held to be the foundation of nationhood.” His was a conceptual or abstract understanding of nationalism. He did not speak in romantic terms of blood and soil.
To some extent, Ambedkar agreed. On page 13 of his book, in the link above, Ambedkar writes: “Nationality is a subjective psychological feeling. It is a feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin.” On page 21, he stresses the importance of a “will to live as a nation,” which he believes the Muslims of India have developed.
But in his other writings we also see the role of autochthony in his thinking. He argued that the Dalits were the original, pre-Aryan, inhabitants of India. Gail Omvedt wrote of “the growing popularity of Ambedkar’s notion that Dalits were the autochthons of India…being a Maha became a source of pride since it seemed to be synonymous with ‘son of the soil.’” Ambedkar also believed that “Conversion to Islam or Christianity will denationalise the Depressed Classes.” This clearly implied that even for this rationalist, romantic notions of national belonging tugged at him.
On the third issue, liberal universalism, we see both men probing its limitations, while offering different solutions.
For the idea of liberal universalism we may turn to Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre, who famously - in 1789 - declared in the French national assembly: “To the Jews as individuals—everything; to the Jews as a nation—nothing.” Here the focus is on the individual as the ultimate building block of society and political system and a disavowal of group identities.
In contrast, Jinnah while still committed to individual liberty was more sensitive to group rights and uniqueness of groups. Jinnah’s concern with group rights was always present, and over time his liberalism became more particularist and less universalist. “For most of his political career,” writes historian, Joya Chatterji, “Jinnah struggled with what liberal political theorists recognise to be a problem at the heart of the liberal project – the place of the “group rights” of minorities in a liberal democracy. His goal – and it was a complex one – was to see how group rights (and Muslim concerns) could be accommodated in an Indian constitution.”
Ambedkar himself strongly believed in individual liberty and individual dignity. But liberal universalism on a political level was insufficient in of itself if not accompanied by social and economic equality. As he famously said:
“On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognising the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has so laboriously built up.”
Both men started with a liberal concern for the individual but in seeking dignity and justice for a minority they went well past this concern. Jinnah championed group rights, while Ambedkar pressed for state enforced social equality.
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I also believe that there is some commonality between Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Dr Ambedkar in terms of both trying to protect the rights of minorities under the majority Hindu rule but the turning point for Muhammad Ali Jinnah was his declining Health and Nehru's increasing hostility. I believe that Muhammad Ali Jinnah tried to use "Pakistan" as a bargaining chip to get more devolved power for Muslims but in the end realized that it will never be enough.
On the case of "belief in the 'power of faith", Muhammad Ali Jinnah never had a chance and subsequent Pakistan Governments have failed to put systems in place to strengthen or to cohesively use the "power of faith", in fact the various politicians and Pakistan Military have used "Islam" to strengthen their ironclad grip on "state of Pakistan" using a Mullah-Military alliance where "faith" is used to lead the masses into submission.
In fact, since Muhammad Ali Jinnah wasn't religious or practicing himself who knows what he would have done had he lived longer on using the "power of faith".
In terms of rights for the (Dailt) minority in India, Dr Ambedkar is not successful as clearly evident across India. It is my opinion that Muslims and Dalits are more naturally aligned compared to Muslims and any other group in India.
Chandrashekhar Azad 'Ravan" visits Mosques around the country during elections but work needs to be done on Muslim-Dalit solidarity.
What are your thoughts as to how history would have turned out differently if the message of Bhimrao Ramji about Gandhi would have taken hold in India? Do you think Muhammad Ali Jinnah would have taken the (late) decision to carve out an independent Pakistan?
We can only speculate, but there are three relevant points that come to my mind. Firstly, had Ambedkar been more influential, the Congress may have acted in a less hegemonic and monopolistic manner. The great Indian historian, Joya Chatterji wrote:
“What changed, particularly in the 1930s and 40s, was not Jinnah but the Congress, whose leadership became ever more insistent that it represented the entire nation, and after its electoral successes in 1937, grew less interested in the politics of compromise. From the 1930s onwards, the Congress claimed to be the sole spokesman for ‘India’, and progressively its leadership saw less reason to conciliate those who rejected that claim. This more hegemonic stance drove out those, Jinnah among them, who believed that constitutional safeguards were necessary for minorities in Indian circumstances, and that there were identities other than ‘Indian’ that demanded recognition, space and respect. It proved impossible, in the end, for the arch-negotiator to bring about a compromise with a party which would not bend.”
Secondly, we might compare the differing philosophies of Ambedkar and Gandhi. In Gandhi’s words, "government over self is the truest Swaraj.” In other words, Gandhi championed a transformation of the self, rather than a transformation of society. It was not institutions but moral suasion that for him held the key to positive human relationships.
For Ambedkar, societal structures mattered and as a result constitutionalism and state-managed social change were more important to him than a reliance on a change of the individual heart. If Ambedkar’s views gained more purchase, it may have been easier to press for institutional safeguards for minorities and there may have been a generally greater sensitivity towards minorities and their anxieties.
Thirdly, Indian nationalism was infused with Hindu iconography. To quote Chatterji again, “A modernised Hinduism dominated the language and imagery of Indian nationhood; and its votaries were almost all ‘upper-caste’ Hindus.”
Although Gandhi himself advocated religious tolerance, he greatly contributed to this trend of Indian nationalism becoming saturated with Hindu symbolism and therefore appearing exclusionary to many Muslims. Had Ambedkar held greater sway, such a trajectory may have been somewhat circumscribed.
In sum, had Ambedkar exercised greater influence, the Congress may have been less imperious and Indian nationalism less bathed in Hindu idiom and imagery. There might have been a greater empathy for minority concerns and more robust institutional protections offered. All of this may have made it less likely for Jinnah to demand a separate state.
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