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Has the resumption of India-Taliban ties given a new life to the Deoband movement?

Bhaijaan

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The Deoband movement arose after the failed Indian Rebellion of 1857, when the Mughal Empire collapsed and British colonial control tightened. Many Indian Muslims saw this as both a political and moral defeat.
Scholars of Islamic law and theology believed that Muslim decline stemmed from moral weakness, ignorance of true Islam, and adoption of foreign (Western or Hindu) influences.

In 1866, scholars established Darul Uloom Deoband, an Islamic seminary in Deoband, a small town in Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh (India).
Its founders aimed to revive Islamic learning and preserve Muslim identity under British rule without direct political confrontation.

Core Doctrines and Beliefs

• Scriptural Purism: The movement stresses strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, interpreted through the classical Hanafi school. Innovation (bid‘ah) in worship or belief is strongly rejected.

• Reform of Sufism: Deobandis retained Sufi spirituality, but stripped it of folk practices like shrine worship, music, and excessive veneration of saints. They emphasized personal reform and inner purification.

• Education: Central to their mission. The Dars-e-Nizami curriculum combines traditional Islamic sciences — Quran, Hadith, Fiqh (jurisprudence), Arabic, logic, and ethics while rejecting Western-style secular education.

• Non-political beginnings: Early Deobandis believed political power should follow moral reform, not precede it. They focused on education and personal piety, avoiding rebellion against the British. Later, some graduates engaged in politics, especially in movements against British rule.

• Social conservatism: They uphold conservative gender roles, oppose Western cultural influence, and promote modesty and discipline in public and private life.


Spread and Influence

• India and Pakistan:
After Partition in 1947, many Deobandi scholars migrated to Pakistan and established seminaries that shaped Pakistani religious thought.

• Afghanistan: Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan (especially in cities like Akora Khattak) educated many Afghan Taliban leaders, linking the movement to militant networks.

• Global reach: Deobandi institutions now exist in the UK, South Africa, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Indonesia, serving diaspora Muslims.


Controversies
• Connection to Militancy: While the original Deoband movement was nonviolent, several militant groups — notably the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan — trace ideological roots to Deobandi seminaries. These groups reinterpret Deobandi conservatism into political extremism, which the original seminary disavows.

• Conflict with Barelvi movement:
Deobandis have long-standing theological disputes with Barelvis, another South Asian Sunni movement.
Barelvis embrace Sufi shrine culture and celebrate the Prophet’s birthday, practices Deobandis call bid‘ah (innovation). This rivalry has fueled deep divisions among South Asian Muslims.

• Relationship with Wahhabism:
Western observers often conflate Deobandism with Wahhabism, but they differ: Deobandis follow the Hanafi school and maintain a form of moderated Sufism, unlike the puritanical Wahhabi rejection of Sufism.
Still, their mutual emphasis on “purifying” Islam has led to overlapping influences, especially via Saudi funding of South Asian madrasas.

• Political Ambiguity: Some Deobandi factions (e.g., Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan) engage in politics; others remain purely scholastic. This duality blurs the line between religious authority and political activism.


Ideological position in India :
Indian Deobandis advocate Islamic conservatism within a democratic, secular state. They promote Sharia-based personal ethics but do not seek an Islamic government. They oppose both religious extremism and cultural westernization. The Indian government regulates madrasas lightly compared to Pakistan. Deobandi schools operate independently but must meet basic administrative norms. Some states encourage modernization (math, English, computers), which Deoband has cautiously accepted.

 
Completely agree. Foreign Policy Tushtikaran.

This request by Taliban Foreign Minister should not have been accepted.

we should have stopped at just elevating engagement with Taliban. Not allowed the Tamasha over the last couple of days as if a great statesman and Islamic scholar has come to town—coz he is not.

:kp
 
A Zero win game for India, this is why I don't understand BJP for all their right wing Hindtuva they support some of the worst Muslim leaders.
Any Hindu who thought the BJP under Modi-Yogi actually give a damn about them should've gotten a wakeup call when the Kashmiri Pandits were cast aside once their purpose had been served. This, apart from him being generally useless which affects their daily lives of course, being the vast majority :jimmy


The only way for the BJP to stymie their current freefall is to encourage a sizably influential Islamic lot that are willing to engage in extreme acts.

A few years after Modi became PM, I began to think about the initial killings of Hindus as part of Godhra and wondered if it might have been enabled and sold as a sacrifice for the greater cause.
 
I found it so odd that India allowed a Taliban to go Deoband and declare it is his Alma mater!

Odd that Indian foreign ministry allowed it and odd that Deoband accepted it!

How much will Indians bend for this regime? They have already voted against woman's rights movement in Afghanistan at the UN no keep Taliban happy.
 
Deobandi’s are not as hardcore as Wahabi’s, but they do have a leaning towards hardline Islam, maybe India have put the Taliban in touch with the most extreme wing they could find in their bid to legitimise all the groups which want to oppress people regardless off race, religion or creed; BJP are making real progress for the first time in years, good stuff Modi.
 
So we're do the Brailvee clan sit amongst all these. From my experience, they are vile and resort to levels of sheer embarrassment
 
i kept saying modi is zia 2.0 but even i never saw the red carpet being rolled out for fundamentalist muslims in india. this has the potential to backfire massively if the fairly docile muslim population of india is radicalised politically. its a very strange move, that wasnt really needed.
 
they could find in their bid to legitimise all the groups which want to oppress people regardless off race, religion or creed;
That would had made Pakistani Establishment as top contender.
 
i kept saying modi is zia 2.0 but even i never saw the red carpet being rolled out for fundamentalist muslims in india. this has the potential to backfire massively if the fairly docile muslim population of india is radicalised politically. its a very strange move, that wasnt really needed.
Colonial era aside, they’ve always been under thumb. Spineless.

Sit in the mosque and go to heaven type of people. They don’t get involved in politics, this is why the youth have abandoned them in the west.
 
i kept saying modi is zia 2.0 but even i never saw the red carpet being rolled out for fundamentalist muslims in india. this has the potential to backfire massively if the fairly docile muslim population of india is radicalised politically. its a very strange move, that wasnt really needed.


There are definite echoes of Zia's unintended radicalisation of Pakistan's population. The Mujahideen lit a fire across the world in their fight against Russia, supported by the rest of the world. Taliban being lionised in India will have unintended long term consequences for the country.
 
Modi is sowing the seeds for his eventual downfall. He is trying to weaponize something he doesn’t understand.

Interesting times ahead for India.
 
That would had made Pakistani Establishment as top contender.

Getting cosy with the Taliban is progress for the BJP & their enlightened wing, what has Pak got to do with that unless something of yours got stuck up Modi’s rear
:yk
 



The Deoband movement arose after the failed Indian Rebellion of 1857, when the Mughal Empire collapsed and British colonial control tightened. Many Indian Muslims saw this as both a political and moral defeat.
Scholars of Islamic law and theology believed that Muslim decline stemmed from moral weakness, ignorance of true Islam, and adoption of foreign (Western or Hindu) influences.

In 1866, scholars established Darul Uloom Deoband, an Islamic seminary in Deoband, a small town in Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh (India).
Its founders aimed to revive Islamic learning and preserve Muslim identity under British rule without direct political confrontation.

Core Doctrines and Beliefs

• Scriptural Purism: The movement stresses strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, interpreted through the classical Hanafi school. Innovation (bid‘ah) in worship or belief is strongly rejected.

• Reform of Sufism: Deobandis retained Sufi spirituality, but stripped it of folk practices like shrine worship, music, and excessive veneration of saints. They emphasized personal reform and inner purification.

• Education: Central to their mission. The Dars-e-Nizami curriculum combines traditional Islamic sciences — Quran, Hadith, Fiqh (jurisprudence), Arabic, logic, and ethics while rejecting Western-style secular education.

• Non-political beginnings: Early Deobandis believed political power should follow moral reform, not precede it. They focused on education and personal piety, avoiding rebellion against the British. Later, some graduates engaged in politics, especially in movements against British rule.

• Social conservatism: They uphold conservative gender roles, oppose Western cultural influence, and promote modesty and discipline in public and private life.


Spread and Influence

• India and Pakistan:
After Partition in 1947, many Deobandi scholars migrated to Pakistan and established seminaries that shaped Pakistani religious thought.

• Afghanistan: Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan (especially in cities like Akora Khattak) educated many Afghan Taliban leaders, linking the movement to militant networks.

• Global reach: Deobandi institutions now exist in the UK, South Africa, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Indonesia, serving diaspora Muslims.


Controversies
• Connection to Militancy: While the original Deoband movement was nonviolent, several militant groups — notably the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan — trace ideological roots to Deobandi seminaries. These groups reinterpret Deobandi conservatism into political extremism, which the original seminary disavows.

• Conflict with Barelvi movement:
Deobandis have long-standing theological disputes with Barelvis, another South Asian Sunni movement.
Barelvis embrace Sufi shrine culture and celebrate the Prophet’s birthday, practices Deobandis call bid‘ah (innovation). This rivalry has fueled deep divisions among South Asian Muslims.

• Relationship with Wahhabism:
Western observers often conflate Deobandism with Wahhabism, but they differ: Deobandis follow the Hanafi school and maintain a form of moderated Sufism, unlike the puritanical Wahhabi rejection of Sufism.
Still, their mutual emphasis on “purifying” Islam has led to overlapping influences, especially via Saudi funding of South Asian madrasas.

• Political Ambiguity: Some Deobandi factions (e.g., Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan) engage in politics; others remain purely scholastic. This duality blurs the line between religious authority and political activism.


Ideological position in India :
Indian Deobandis advocate Islamic conservatism within a democratic, secular state. They promote Sharia-based personal ethics but do not seek an Islamic government. They oppose both religious extremism and cultural westernization. The Indian government regulates madrasas lightly compared to Pakistan. Deobandi schools operate independently but must meet basic administrative norms. Some states encourage modernization (math, English, computers), which Deoband has cautiously accepted.

King Amaullah Khan ruled Afghanistan as a Amir (of Afghanistan) between 28 February 1919 – 9 June 1926 and then as King. The reason he gained legitimacy in Afghanistan was because Darul-uloom Deoband backed the establishment of an "Islamic state" and encouraged migration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan and a this was a parallel movement called "Hijrat Tehreek"

Amaullah Khan was so indebted to Darul-uloom Deoband that when Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi died on 30 November 1920, a funeral in absentia (Ghaibana Namaz-e-Janzah) was performed in Kabul he publicly vowed to complete the mission of "Khailafat of Islamic state".

Darul-uloom sent the handpicked Lieutenant of Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi, a Sikh Revert to Islam by the name of Ubaidullah Sindhi.

Within a few years, Amanullah did a deal with the "British" to keep his borders and betrays Darul-uloom Deoband and exiles Ubaidullah Sindhi under orders from British Government.

The Afghans exiled Ubaidullah Sindhi and many "Punjabi" Scholars and thus begins the Afghan resentment towards Punjabi people stoked by the King which exists to this day.

Darul-ul-uloom Deoband feels betrayed and backstabbed by Amanullah Khan and try to make Afghans rise against the "Despot King" in late 1920s.

Darul-uloom Deoband as stated yesterday wanted to use Afghanistan as a center of activities against the British. Amanullah Khan betrayed Indian Muslims, back stabbed and exiled them at the behest of British empire.

The second purpose was for Indian Muslims to make Hijrat (religious migration) from India to Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan betrayed Indian Muslims by originally agreeing and then leading social boycott against "Hindi Muslims" once they were in Afghanistan, thousands died on the way back to India in the mountains...

Some Islamic Scholars opposed this migration to Afghanistan from India from the beginning but others when they saw the horrendous suffering and casualties repented from their "Fatwa" but the reason was Afghan betrayal of Darul-uloom Deoband.

This was the second betrayal of Indian Muslims at the hands of Afghans.
 
This senseless sectarianism as Muslims never fails to make me feel sick

This guy is a wahabi, this guy is a deobandi, this guy is this this guy is that. Have even heard of people saying I’m not gonna pray behind that guy because he doesn’t follow Hanafi fiqh. WTH?

As long as you’re not worshipping graves, saints, etc basically open shirk (associating partners with Allah) and you believe in the foundations of Islam, then you’re Muslim.

This is like a Zionist dream come true who actively paid to infiltrate and send spies to create divisions amongst Muslims so they identify with these made up names more than their identity of being Muslims.

It is not a surprise that whenever western powers touch lands that all sorts of rifts and divides and new names pop up for new groups who once lived together in harmony with one name.
 
Deobandi’s are not as hardcore as Wahabi’s, but they do have a leaning towards hardline Islam, maybe India have put the Taliban in touch with the most extreme wing they could find in their bid to legitimise all the groups which want to oppress people regardless off race, religion or creed; BJP are making real progress for the first time in years, good stuff Modi.
Deobandi were calm in India because they were minority , in Pakistan all the shias who were murdered in 90s deobandi were involved. Disagreeing with someone's ideology is fine , but killing other Muslims and declaring them as disbelievers is not correct. Even the other day I heard a scholar in Pakistan saying that Engineer Muhammad Ali is a jahanumi . Imagine audacity of these Mullahs who think they are God , now these Mullahs will give a certificate of hell and heaven?
 
This senseless sectarianism as Muslims never fails to make me feel sick

This guy is a wahabi, this guy is a deobandi, this guy is this this guy is that. Have even heard of people saying I’m not gonna pray behind that guy because he doesn’t follow Hanafi fiqh. WTH?

As long as you’re not worshipping graves, saints, etc basically open shirk (associating partners with Allah) and you believe in the foundations of Islam, then you’re Muslim.

This is like a Zionist dream come true who actively paid to infiltrate and send spies to create divisions amongst Muslims so they identify with these made up names more than their identity of being Muslims.

It is not a surprise that whenever western powers touch lands that all sorts of rifts and divides and new names pop up for new groups who once lived together in harmony with one name.
I will not be surprised if on day of judgement I find out that certain shia sunni scholars were paid agents of western powers who intentionally gave statements to make Muslims disunited and fight amongst themselves.
 
Getting cosy with the Taliban is progress for the BJP & their enlightened wing, what has Pak got to do with that unless something of yours got stuck up Modi’s rear
:yk
It's not progress it's regression , I already said it but i was making an observation on your point that if political leaderships that oppressed were the goal of BJP, Pakistani Establishment would be first in the list.
 
I personally don't support all this non-sense. For once, I thank Pakistan that they are in the middle of India and Afghanistan and we don't share a border with the extremist regime. I cannot fanthom how women struggle under this taliban regime.

Infact, Afghanistan were making good progress until US suddenly pulled out and somehow Imran khan thought, supporting Talibans is a good move.

I think, India needs support on rare-earth minerals for our semi-conductor industry and that’s a potential US$30bn+industry by itself by 2030. Hence, all this show pieces.

But the problem is that one cannot influence a regime change unless the people themselves want it. Its upto people of Afghanistan to rise up against extremism.
 
Many liberal-minded Afghans, especially the women, have expressed deep disappointment over India’s unprecedented decision to allow the Taliban to engage openly with the Deoband seminary. Never before has the Taliban been accorded such legitimacy and public warmth, not even within Afghanistan itself. The sight of crowds showering rose petals on Taliban representatives on Indian soil marks a striking and controversial moment, one that will likely be remembered as a turning point in India’s regional diplomacy.

Yet, it would be naive to assume that the Government of India is unaware of the dangers arising from the Armageddon monster it is conjuring. It is a desperate and calculated move that shows India has finally concluded that its traditional channels of influence in Afghanistan have always been outdone and disrupted by competing regional powers, leaving India with little real leverage despite decades of goodwill and investment.

Activating the Deoband-Taliban connection is India’s last and most desperate throw of the dice.

If India cannot outspend or outmuscle Americans and Chinese in Afghanistan, might as well just flip the script by awakening an ancient ideological force that the Americans and the Chinese have no answer to. It’s a dangerous play, one that could either give India renewed influence in the Afghan theatre or unleash unpredictable consequences far beyond its borders.

The dangers are well known but Modi has chosen to go all-in.
 
Many liberal-minded Afghans, especially the women, have expressed deep disappointment over India’s unprecedented decision to allow the Taliban to engage openly with the Deoband seminary. Never before has the Taliban been accorded such legitimacy and public warmth, not even within Afghanistan itself. The sight of crowds showering rose petals on Taliban representatives on Indian soil marks a striking and controversial moment, one that will likely be remembered as a turning point in India’s regional diplomacy.

Yet, it would be naive to assume that the Government of India is unaware of the dangers arising from the Armageddon monster it is conjuring. It is a desperate and calculated move that shows India has finally concluded that its traditional channels of influence in Afghanistan have always been outdone and disrupted by competing regional powers, leaving India with little real leverage despite decades of goodwill and investment.

Activating the Deoband-Taliban connection is India’s last and most desperate throw of the dice.

If India cannot outspend or outmuscle Americans and Chinese in Afghanistan, might as well just flip the script by awakening an ancient ideological force that the Americans and the Chinese have no answer to. It’s a dangerous play, one that could either give India renewed influence in the Afghan theatre or unleash unpredictable consequences far beyond its borders.

The dangers are well known but Modi has chosen to go all-in.

If this fails, we will still achieve Dar al khilafa al hindiyyah, potentially the greatest nation ever. @Suleiman
 
I don't understand all this stuff much, but last thing Bharat needs is Islamic fundamentalism.

I'll be forced to enter politics and take Modi Ji down for this if need be. This might be the start of my Jon Snow arc.
 
It's not progress it's regression , I already said it but i was making an observation on your point that if political leaderships that oppressed were the goal of BJP, Pakistani Establishment would be first in the list.

Through hardline groups, that’s an Indian speciality now
 
I personally don't support all this non-sense. For once, I thank Pakistan that they are in the middle of India and Afghanistan and we don't share a border with the extremist regime. I cannot fanthom how women struggle under this taliban regime.

Infact, Afghanistan were making good progress until US suddenly pulled out and somehow Imran khan thought, supporting Talibans is a good move.

I think, India needs support on rare-earth minerals for our semi-conductor industry and that’s a potential US$30bn+industry by itself by 2030. Hence, all this show pieces.

But the problem is that one cannot influence a regime change unless the people themselves want it. Its upto people of Afghanistan to rise up against extremism.
You can influence it but chose not to influence it. India abstained form vital UN notes because Afghanistan was their only remaining ally after the failure of Operation Sindoor.

It's all well and good blaming Imran Khan. But he didn't give the Taliban a VIP tour of India. That's your guys. Take some responsibility for once instead of finding conspiracy theories.
 
You can influence it but chose not to influence it. India abstained form vital UN notes because Afghanistan was their only remaining ally after the failure of Operation Sindoor.

It's all well and good blaming Imran Khan. But he didn't give the Taliban a VIP tour of India. That's your guys. Take some responsibility for once instead of finding conspiracy theories.

India needs to take some responsibility for better relations with Pakistan as well. They like to think of themselves as the biggest player inside South Asia, so they should be more proactive in bringing Pakistan onboard. If China can do it, why not India?

Indians can blame Pakistan military until the cows come home, but that effectively means Pakistan establishment is calling the shots. Pakistan is financially strapped, India should have plenty of leverage if they chose to exercise it wisely. But instead it seems that India is the one always pushing the hostility and we see this in cutting off even non-political engagement like sports events. This shows that the ill will is being generated from the Indian side relentlessly since the ascent of Modi's BJP.
 
You can influence it but chose not to influence it. India abstained form vital UN notes because Afghanistan was their only remaining ally after the failure of Operation Sindoor.

It's all well and good blaming Imran Khan. But he didn't give the Taliban a VIP tour of India. That's your guys. Take some responsibility for once instead of finding conspiracy theories.
I agree this is a mistake to court Afghanistan now with the blatant violation of women rights.

India supported previous Afghan government and many PPers here have celebrated Taliban coming into power and claimed that Indian investments in Afghanistan has gone down the drain.

It is also a fact that Imran supported Taliban. What conspiracy theory that I have put here?
 
India needs to take some responsibility for better relations with Pakistan as well. They like to think of themselves as the biggest player inside South Asia, so they should be more proactive in bringing Pakistan onboard. If China can do it, why not India?

Indians can blame Pakistan military until the cows come home, but that effectively means Pakistan establishment is calling the shots. Pakistan is financially strapped, India should have plenty of leverage if they chose to exercise it wisely. But instead it seems that India is the one always pushing the hostility and we see this in cutting off even non-political engagement like sports events. This shows that the ill will is being generated from the Indian side relentlessly since the ascent of Modi's BJP.
If there are no skirmishes on the border, that will be a good result.

All it takes is one radical organization to conduct terrorist activities like in 2019 and 2025 to bring the progress to square one. Lots of energies being wasted on both sides but what can we do. You forget that Pakistanis are as much hostile to Modi and Hindus in India. Issue is on both sides.
 
Many liberal-minded Afghans, especially the women, have expressed deep disappointment over India’s unprecedented decision to allow the Taliban to engage openly with the Deoband seminary. Never before has the Taliban been accorded such legitimacy and public warmth, not even within Afghanistan itself. The sight of crowds showering rose petals on Taliban representatives on Indian soil marks a striking and controversial moment, one that will likely be remembered as a turning point in India’s regional diplomacy.

Yet, it would be naive to assume that the Government of India is unaware of the dangers arising from the Armageddon monster it is conjuring. It is a desperate and calculated move that shows India has finally concluded that its traditional channels of influence in Afghanistan have always been outdone and disrupted by competing regional powers, leaving India with little real leverage despite decades of goodwill and investment.

Activating the Deoband-Taliban connection is India’s last and most desperate throw of the dice.

If India cannot outspend or outmuscle Americans and Chinese in Afghanistan, might as well just flip the script by awakening an ancient ideological force that the Americans and the Chinese have no answer to. It’s a dangerous play, one that could either give India renewed influence in the Afghan theatre or unleash unpredictable consequences far beyond its borders.

The dangers are well known but Modi has chosen to go all-in.
It's tough to know when you're joking but this sounds fair.

India's taking quite a risk (and one I thoroughly disagree with) by getting into the dance with these radical religious extremists. I'm not sure any amount of influence in Afghanistan and the corresponding impact on Pakistan is worth risking connections building between these crazies and Indian local religious institutions that have been sensible.
 
The Islamophobe Yogi giving so much respect and love for Taliban.

My my. I am all for supporting the will of Afghanistan people and their living ways, but I do not approve this level of legitimization of Taliban ways in India.

It is shameful and the sufferings of Afghan women and youth who have to bow down to the Taliban government is getting swept away under the rug.

Most Indians support Afghanistan for sure. But not Taliban and their rules. The distinction should be maintained. Right now, the lines are being blurred by the Hindutva BJP. :rolleyes:
 
As indicted in post #1, the origins of the Deoband movement can be traced to the profound dislocations that arose in the colonial era. How could a Muslim society be sustained and an Islamic identity preserved now that India was ruled emphatically by non-Muslims? For the Deobandis the answer lay in a renewed emphasis on individual moral responsibility and an adherence to the teachings of the Qur’an and the hadith. There was an inward turn. They sought to reform individual Muslim practice in order to fashion a Muslim society. In the absence of state patronage and power, individual self-conscience and knowledge of God’s word, mediated by Deobandi ulama themselves, was the ultimate guarantor of an Islamic society. In other words the Deobandi movement pointed to ways of being Muslim, which did not rest on a reliance on possessing state power.

The movement largely eschewed politics in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century this changed, which caused some debate within the Deobandi ranks. We can see this through the positions of its two most eminent personalities: Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi (1863-1943).

Madani’s eminence in Deobandi circles is due to political activism. He was known for his anti-colonialism. He was also a vociferous - and at times vituperative - opponent of Jinnah the Muslim League and a strong supporter of muttahida qawmiyyat (‘composite nationalism’). In his mind it was to be a united India of federal communities, or as Peter Hardy’s described it, a sort of ‘jurisprudential apartheid’.

Thanvi’s stature on the other hand was linked to a much greater degree to his religious scholarship and his influence as a Sufi. Unlike Madani, Thanvi was far less interested in political activism. Thanvi saw the Deobandi mission as one of guiding people to reform their individual lives, so that they were lived in closer proximity to religious norms rather than one of seeking political influence through holding political posts. In the end Thanvi did see some benefit in there being a Muslim ‘markaz’ in India and to this end he offered some support for the Muslim League, but it was tepid support - the Muslim League, in his words, was preferable to the Congress like a one-eyed person was preferable to a blind person.

Ironically, in India after Independence, Madani who had been the preeminent political activist amongst the ulama, turned apolitical. He announced that the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind would withdraw from politics to focus on “the religious, cultural and educational rights and duties of Muslims.” In his later life he was especially supportive of the Tablighi Jamaat. The Tablighis escalate the original Deobandi focus on individual moral transformation, which does not rely on the state. They, in the words of historian Barbara Metcalf, “put their weight wholly towards the end of reshaping individual lives.” In a sense, Madani returned to the original impulse that had animated the Deobandi mission.

In Pakistan, ‘Thanvite’ influence is perhaps most clearly discerned through the Darul Uloom Karachi, which was founded by Muhammad Shafi who was a disciple of Thanwi. His son Taqi Usmani has become one of the leading Deobandi voices. Though Usmani sees politics as a means, not an end, he is less apolitical than Thanvi. Whereas Thanvi advocated distance from political power, fearing its potential to corrupt religious norms, Usmani participates in governance.

By contrast, the ’Madanite’ legacy took an even more surprising turn in Pakistan. The influence is most marked when we consider the Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak - this is the seminary that was associated with training of the Taliban. As Brannon Ingram - an expert on the Deobandi movement - notes, despite Madani’s robust denouncement of the Pakistan movement, “The legacy of Husain Ahmed Madani, rather than Ashraf Ali Thanawi, towers over the works of the Haqqani scholars.” The madrassa in Akora Khattak was established by Abd al-Haqq (d. 1988) a devoted follower of Madani. Abd al-Haq’s son, Sami al-Haq (1937-2018), who succeeded his father as chancellor, in Ingram’s words, “praised Madani’s immense knowledge and unassailable virtue.”

More generally, historian, Muhammad Qasim Zaman has noted, that “Madani is … held in considerably higher esteem in militant Deobandi circles today than is Thanawi.” To quote Ingram again, “Madanī has become, for many Deobandis in Pakistan, the paragon of the politically engaged activist scholar who stood up to the British, and Ashraf ʿAlī Thānawī has become his foil, the hermetic mystic-scholar who actively shunned politics and critiqued ulama who did not, especially under the aegis of Indian nationalism.”

So we have a few ironies here: Madani the fierce political activist, became an apolitical advocate as India became independent. In Pakistan, Madani, the fiery opponent of Pakistan, became an inspiration for the most militant of Deobandi tendencies in Pakistan. Finally, followers of Thanvi have been less apolitical and have viewed politics as less suspect than their great inspiration. The Deobandi moral vision is not therefore anchored to a single political form. And for all the traditionalism and conservatism that marks the movement, it has shown an ability to adapt to external circumstances.
 
As indicted in post #1, the origins of the Deoband movement can be traced to the profound dislocations that arose in the colonial era. How could a Muslim society be sustained and an Islamic identity preserved now that India was ruled emphatically by non-Muslims? For the Deobandis the answer lay in a renewed emphasis on individual moral responsibility and an adherence to the teachings of the Qur’an and the hadith. There was an inward turn. They sought to reform individual Muslim practice in order to fashion a Muslim society. In the absence of state patronage and power, individual self-conscience and knowledge of God’s word, mediated by Deobandi ulama themselves, was the ultimate guarantor of an Islamic society. In other words the Deobandi movement pointed to ways of being Muslim, which did not rest on a reliance on possessing state power.

The movement largely eschewed politics in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century this changed, which caused some debate within the Deobandi ranks. We can see this through the positions of its two most eminent personalities: Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi (1863-1943).

Madani’s eminence in Deobandi circles is due to political activism. He was known for his anti-colonialism. He was also a vociferous - and at times vituperative - opponent of Jinnah the Muslim League and a strong supporter of muttahida qawmiyyat (‘composite nationalism’). In his mind it was to be a united India of federal communities, or as Peter Hardy’s described it, a sort of ‘jurisprudential apartheid’.

Thanvi’s stature on the other hand was linked to a much greater degree to his religious scholarship and his influence as a Sufi. Unlike Madani, Thanvi was far less interested in political activism. Thanvi saw the Deobandi mission as one of guiding people to reform their individual lives, so that they were lived in closer proximity to religious norms rather than one of seeking political influence through holding political posts. In the end Thanvi did see some benefit in there being a Muslim ‘markaz’ in India and to this end he offered some support for the Muslim League, but it was tepid support - the Muslim League, in his words, was preferable to the Congress like a one-eyed person was preferable to a blind person.

Ironically, in India after Independence, Madani who had been the preeminent political activist amongst the ulama, turned apolitical. He announced that the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind would withdraw from politics to focus on “the religious, cultural and educational rights and duties of Muslims.” In his later life he was especially supportive of the Tablighi Jamaat. The Tablighis escalate the original Deobandi focus on individual moral transformation, which does not rely on the state. They, in the words of historian Barbara Metcalf, “put their weight wholly towards the end of reshaping individual lives.” In a sense, Madani returned to the original impulse that had animated the Deobandi mission.

In Pakistan, ‘Thanvite’ influence is perhaps most clearly discerned through the Darul Uloom Karachi, which was founded by Muhammad Shafi who was a disciple of Thanwi. His son Taqi Usmani has become one of the leading Deobandi voices. Though Usmani sees politics as a means, not an end, he is less apolitical than Thanvi. Whereas Thanvi advocated distance from political power, fearing its potential to corrupt religious norms, Usmani participates in governance.

By contrast, the ’Madanite’ legacy took an even more surprising turn in Pakistan. The influence is most marked when we consider the Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak - this is the seminary that was associated with training of the Taliban. As Brannon Ingram - an expert on the Deobandi movement - notes, despite Madani’s robust denouncement of the Pakistan movement, “The legacy of Husain Ahmed Madani, rather than Ashraf Ali Thanawi, towers over the works of the Haqqani scholars.” The madrassa in Akora Khattak was established by Abd al-Haqq (d. 1988) a devoted follower of Madani. Abd al-Haq’s son, Sami al-Haq (1937-2018), who succeeded his father as chancellor, in Ingram’s words, “praised Madani’s immense knowledge and unassailable virtue.”

More generally, historian, Muhammad Qasim Zaman has noted, that “Madani is … held in considerably higher esteem in militant Deobandi circles today than is Thanawi.” To quote Ingram again, “Madanī has become, for many Deobandis in Pakistan, the paragon of the politically engaged activist scholar who stood up to the British, and Ashraf ʿAlī Thānawī has become his foil, the hermetic mystic-scholar who actively shunned politics and critiqued ulama who did not, especially under the aegis of Indian nationalism.”

So we have a few ironies here: Madani the fierce political activist, became an apolitical advocate as India became independent. In Pakistan, Madani, the fiery opponent of Pakistan, became an inspiration for the most militant of Deobandi tendencies in Pakistan. Finally, followers of Thanvi have been less apolitical and have viewed politics as less suspect than their great inspiration. The Deobandi moral vision is not therefore anchored to a single political form. And for all the traditionalism and conservatism that marks the movement, it has shown an ability to adapt to external circumstances.
I disagree with the assessment regarding the militant Deobandees holding "Madani" higher than "Thanwi thought" because of a few reasons:
  1. The entire rejection of Pakistani state machinery is based on their rejection of "democracy" which directly results from Fatwas of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (RA) and they even quote him directly in their Fatwaas and talks
  2. They directly challenge and refute the idea of "Watan" based on son of the soil concept Maulana Madani and base it on "Al-Wala Wal-Bara (loyalty and disavowal)" based on Eemaan but they borrow this from Ibn Taymiyyah
1 & 2 are core tenants of Deobandi militancy and "Takfeeri" ideology flows from it. Even normative Deobandees (some even inside India) accept that Maulana Madani's position was incorrect.

Btw as you know "Deobandi" isn't a sect but used here to frame an argument.
 
I disagree with the assessment regarding the militant Deobandees holding "Madani" higher than "Thanwi thought" because of a few reasons:
  1. The entire rejection of Pakistani state machinery is based on their rejection of "democracy" which directly results from Fatwas of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (RA) and they even quote him directly in their Fatwaas and talks
  2. They directly challenge and refute the idea of "Watan" based on son of the soil concept Maulana Madani and base it on "Al-Wala Wal-Bara (loyalty and disavowal)" based on Eemaan but they borrow this from Ibn Taymiyyah
1 & 2 are core tenants of Deobandi militancy and "Takfeeri" ideology flows from it. Even normative Deobandees (some even inside India) accept that Maulana Madani's position was incorrect.

Btw as you know "Deobandi" isn't a sect but used here to frame an argument.
This is an interesting and thoughtful response, which focuses on theological content and especially the theological sources of militant Deobandi critiques of democracy.

But my point was different: I was not arguing that those that operate within the Deobandi militant strand in Pakistan follow Madani’s theology wholesale. Rather it is Madani as a potent symbol of a “politically engaged activist scholar” that they especially admire in comparison with Thanvi’s more quietist style.

I will quote more fully, the scholar, Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age):

“Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, the influential Deobandi scholar of colonial India, had consistently argued that it was illegitimate even to subvert British colonial rule because the inhabitants of India had entered into an implicit “contract” with the foreign masters. This position was in marked contrast with Husayn Ahmad Madani’s…In its implications, it is easy to see that Thanawi's position would not recommend itself to the neo-Taliban. An essay on Madani's political thought by Mufti Muhammad Zahid, a professor of hadith at a Deobandi madrasa in Faisalabad in the Punjab, acknowledges that Madani is, indeed, held in considerably higher esteem in militant Deobandi circles today than is Thanawi. Yet precisely what Madani's legacy amounts to in the contemporary Pakistani context is a matter of some debate among the Deobandis. As Zahid presents it, there are those who hold that Madani was the politically engaged `alim par excellence, one who challenged the might of the English, suffered imprisonment and other hardships in the course of his political struggle, and eventually helped dislodge infidel rule. Implicit in this view is a criticism of those who would identify themselves most comfortably with Thanawi's teachings rather than with Madani's politics. Because Madani was a bitter opponent not just of the British but also of the westernized leadership that spearheaded the demand for Pakistan, taking Madani as an “ideal” is also a none too subtle indictment of Pakistan itself."
 
This is an interesting and thoughtful response, which focuses on theological content and especially the theological sources of militant Deobandi critiques of democracy.

But my point was different: I was not arguing that those that operate within the Deobandi militant strand in Pakistan follow Madani’s theology wholesale. Rather it is Madani as a potent symbol of a “politically engaged activist scholar” that they especially admire in comparison with Thanvi’s more quietist style.

I will quote more fully, the scholar, Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age):

“Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, the influential Deobandi scholar of colonial India, had consistently argued that it was illegitimate even to subvert British colonial rule because the inhabitants of India had entered into an implicit “contract” with the foreign masters. This position was in marked contrast with Husayn Ahmad Madani’s…In its implications, it is easy to see that Thanawi's position would not recommend itself to the neo-Taliban. An essay on Madani's political thought by Mufti Muhammad Zahid, a professor of hadith at a Deobandi madrasa in Faisalabad in the Punjab, acknowledges that Madani is, indeed, held in considerably higher esteem in militant Deobandi circles today than is Thanawi. Yet precisely what Madani's legacy amounts to in the contemporary Pakistani context is a matter of some debate among the Deobandis. As Zahid presents it, there are those who hold that Madani was the politically engaged `alim par excellence, one who challenged the might of the English, suffered imprisonment and other hardships in the course of his political struggle, and eventually helped dislodge infidel rule. Implicit in this view is a criticism of those who would identify themselves most comfortably with Thanawi's teachings rather than with Madani's politics. Because Madani was a bitter opponent not just of the British but also of the westernized leadership that spearheaded the demand for Pakistan, taking Madani as an “ideal” is also a none too subtle indictment of Pakistan itself."
I now understand where you are coming from and indeed I was arguing from a theological content point of view. Its clear who militant Deobandees follow by reading their respective writings, for contrast:

Ashraf Ali Thanwi (RA) -(Politics & Islam Page 212):


Some Muslims, due to their close association with Hindus, choose not to slaughter cows or eat their meat. They claim that Islam is not dependent on meat consumption and that eating or abstaining from meat is equal in the Sharīʿah. They argue that refraining from beef while consuming goat or lamb poses no issue, asserting that eating cow meat is not obligatory.

What a shame! These people have invented a rule of their own in direct opposition to the Divine Sharīʿah, a rule borrowed straight from Hindu customs. The underlying reality is that the cow is revered and worshiped by Hindus, hence they detest its slaughter. The shame lies in the fact that some Muslims, fully aware of this, still choose to align themselves with them on an issue that is rooted in shirk.

Anything that draws a clear line between Islam and disbelief becomes, by its very nature, a symbol of Islam. And in the Indian subcontinent, one of the most evident distinctions between Muslims and Hindus has long been the slaughter of cows and the eating of their meat. History has shown that many of those who abandoned this emblem of Islamic identity slid, step by step, into fitnah and outright apostasy. In contrast, those who remained steadfast upon this distinctive sign were not only left unshaken but emerged as defenders of the Islamic way of life.

Hussain Ahmed Madani (RA) generally argued in favor of composite Nationalism and stated on multiple occasions:

All should endeavor jointly for such a democratic government in which Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Parsis are included. Such a freedom is in accordance with Islam.

 
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