King Abdullah and The War of 1948...

[shaykh]

One of the traditional Israeli narratives is one of overcoming a unified 5 nation Arab army attacking them from all sides...

Israel likes to present its David and Goliath story for the most part but in reality it was disunified Arab leaders who all had conflicting plans for the Middle East...

How is it that 5 conventional armies were defeated?...

I'll examine each countries aims separately...but for today i'll focus on the most significant and that is Jordan and King Abdullah...

Abdullah and the Zionist Movement

From the beginning of his rule in Transjordan he had relations with the Zionists mainly because Jordan was a land of few resources and had little cash...he wanted to attract Jewish capital for development...which he did in areas such as mining and electricity...

Abdullah also crucially was the only Arab head of state who had supported the 1937 Peel Commission partition plan...

The Jewish Agency met Abdullah twice in 1946...the idea was a partition plan which would lead to the creation of a Jewish state with the annexation of Arab lands to Transjordan...

Abdullah followed the Arab league in opposition to partition which is why a second meeting occurred...17th November 1947 in a meeting with Golda Meir...both sides had similar visions and were both opposed to Palestinian nationalism and a Palestinian state...and both were opposed to the mufti of Jerusalem Husayni...

This idea got British backing in the form of Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin...when the British mandate would end then Jordan can occupy the part of Palestine awarded to the Arabs...

British withdrawal was due on the 15th May 1948...and conflict had kicked off big time in Palestine...and Abdullah found that he needed to match the belligerence of the Arab League especially as Jordan had the best Arab army...it couldnt be seen to be abandoning the Palestinians...

Meir met Abdullah again on the 11th May...Abdullah said he had to engage but would not engage his forces beyond the lines stipulated by the UN partition resolution...

Relations with the Arab League

The other heads of state weren't stupid...they believed Abdullah supported the partition plan and were aware of his desires for territorial expansion...

They therefore didn't want Abdullahs Arab legion in Palestine...Husayni also didnt want the Arab legion...nor did the Syrian government...

The Arab league however especially after the massacre at Dayr Yasin felt it had to commit regular troops and with Jordan having the best army that they should also...

In short these concerns about Abdullah were fair...he had no interest in preserving Palestine for Palestinians but wanted it for himself...

And the Arab league actually then did quite the shafting job on Jordan...Abdullah was commander in chief of the Arab forces but all the national forces operated under their own commanders...the Arab league was supposed to give Jordan $3m in financial assistance and instead gave them $250k...and the Egyptian government was confiscating their arms shipments...

So in short the best Arab army had allies that werent allies, little ammunition or supplies, and no budget...

Post British Withdrawal

The Arab legion entered the West Bank...and the Jewish armies had no problem with that..however problems did arise when the Jewish army tried to take Jerusalem...part of the failed UN resolution was that Jerusalem would remain an international zone and not be part of either state...

Abdullah then ordered his troops into Jerusalem...now they were at war with Israel...they managed to secure the Old City...however an arms embargo was introduced and Britain adhered to it...so after 1 month of fighting the Arab Legion found itself 20% down in terms of soldiers, low ammunition and no chances of resupply...

Abdullah didnt want this battle...the Israelis had managed to get around the arms embargo...Jordan had taken Lydda and Ramla prior but then withdrew its forces pragmatically...Arab public opinion after this became opposed to Transjordan and the Arab legion weren't viewed as saviours of Palestine...the Egyptian government even accused them of withdrawing to put pressure on the Egyptian fighters...

Relations were strained between Egypt and Jordan so when the Egyptians requested help from the Legion and didnt really receive it...

Armistice at Rhodes...

Israelis with their growing success were becoming more demanding and Abdullah tried negotiation again...he wanted to 'unite' the remainder of Arab Palestine with Transjordan...and also sought Lydda and Ramla...the Arab part of Jerusalem would go to them and the Jewish part to the Jews...other areas were up for negotiation...what was interesting was his wording "any unacceptable results from these negotiations will bring trouble from OUR political enemies on the Arab side worse than you can imagine"...Abdullah was starting to realise how weak his position was...

This was happening as the Egyptians were getting battered...and this what eventually lead to the armistice agreement brokered by the British...the Jordanians wanted the Egyptians to lose and sign the agreement...it would mean the elimination of two rivals, King Faruq of Egypt and Husayni...also it would be good on the PR side because the Egyptians would have to be the first to openly come to terms with Israel...

Abdullah had two aims as the war was reaching its end...he wanted to retain the territory under Legion control...and wanted to extend control of the Northern part of the West Bank which at that point was being held by the Iraqi army...

It was quite successful...they made sure the Iraqis didnt provoke the Israelis and then negotiated a handover by the Iraqis to them...the Iraqis having seen what happened to Egypt preferred to return home without being defeated, without recgnising Israel and without having to negotiate an armistice...

Transjordan argued with Israel over the Negev desert...this was assigned to Israel in the Partition resolution but was under Transjordan control...Abdullah though realised he wasnt in a position to call the shots with the Israelis being stronger and the Legion withdrew...it didnt have much of a population so it didnt raise a furore...

Abdullah also gave up the area North of Tel-Aviv...this unlike Negev had 35,000 people...and this did lead to fury in the Arab world and Palestine because it was another occasion that Transjordan gave up without a fight...and allowed for people to be turned into refugees...

Conclusion

In return Abdullah was allowed to keep the West Bank...or occupy it...the Palestinians had no choice but to seek refuge in Jordan and unlike the other Arab countries they were given refuge...

Transjordan became a bi-national state with Abdullah claiming the West Bank and the refugees who settled...there was therefore a concerted effort to build unity between the two factions...

The Arab nationalist narrative has naturally attacked Abdullah for his secret dealings with Israel...some others view him as a pragmatist and realist...territorial expansion wasn't just Abdullahs aim...the other Arab nations had their own national interests too...

Unfortunately the story of Arab nations colluding against each other is as old as these nations themselves and continues to this day...

1948 and the creation of Israel was made possible due to this fact...

 

[shaykh]

Iraq and the War of 1948...

They were among the first to advocate intervention in the war by Arab states yet their own army did very little in the war...

They called for the boycott of oil but didnt actually implement anything...and as i mentioned in my piece on Jordan they seemed to be happy at the end to just retreat...to not engage is to not be defeated and they stayed away from the armistice talks...

So what was their deal?...

Prelude to War...

In 1946 Iraqis were discussing the possibility of war with the partition of Palestine seeming ever more likely...

They sought a balance of power...they knew about Abdullah's ambitions and they knew about Husaynis...an independent Palestine wasn't on their agenda...

They also had internal issues...issues of inequality and unemployment and a growth of Kurdish nationalism and the Iraqi Communist Party..

Nuri Said stepped in and largely repressed opposition...they were focused on domestic disorder and their concern with Palestine was focused on observing the behaviour of the other Arab states...

Publicly the narratives were very pro-Palestinian...criticism of the White Paper, the calls for boycotts of oil to the US and Britain...they were also the first to suggest sending a joint Arab force to Palestine...and if the British didn't improve then the Arabs should arm the Palestinians...

In 1947 they also recommended the Arab armies go to the borders of Palestine and that Arab air forces be prepared to attack Zionist supply lines...

British Withdrawal...

Said had done a lot of talking but little action...when the British withdrew there protest in Iraq so Abdullah was approached and was asked if Transjordan would allow some Iraqi troops to be sent to the Palestinian frontier...this was a symbolic move...to look like they were doing something...Abdullah refused...

Nuri Said at a December 1947 Arab League meeting berated the other Arab nations for doing little to help the Palestinians...they again suggested they all boycott...but again it seemed that Iraq would only boycott if other nations would...

Salih Jabr at that time was also negotiating the Anglo-Iraqi treaty so whilst there was all this bluster publicly...Iraq was doing nothing on the economic nor military front...

They did however link Zionism to communism and this allowed them to clamp down on communists internally...they were using the issue of Palestine to assist them internally...

Abdullahs Offer

Abdullah tried to encourage Iraq to unify with Transjordan as part of a Hashemite kingdom...and the idea a joint Iraqi-Transjordanian occupation of Palestine...

So whilst Jabr was publicly opposing the partition plan...he was telling British officials he was happy to cooperate with Abdullah and take over Palestine...

One can argue that Jabr did indeed have a lot on his plate...he was trying to negotiate the British withdrawal from Iraq...and naturally this meant not doing anything that would anger Britain...luckily for them the British were happy with Abdullahs plan...

The Coup...

January 1948 the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi deal were revealed...while Britain would withdraw all its forces the British would oversee Iraqs military planning and the British could return to their air bases in time of war...the treaty was also given a 15 year extension from its original planned end...

This led to riots in the streets...and the end of Jabrs government with Muhammad al Sadr taking over...he was mainly focused on domestic issues...the British therefore communicated with the Regent Abd al'Ilah on Palestine...

1948

Calls for intervention by Arab countries was getting louder internally...thing is the Iraqi government werent too enthused...they knew they would be involving themselves on Abdallahs terms and felt they would be fighting Abdallahs war...

That said they did get Abdullah to agree via the regent to allows Iraqi troops enter Transjordanian territory...they then dispatched 3,000 of their men...

The War

Abdullah was commander of the army but as mentioned previously most of the nations were doing their own thing...the Iraqis followed Abdullahs lead though...for instance when Abdullah wanted his forces to fight in Jerusalem the Iraqis were asked to relieve the Legion in the northern part of the West Bank...the Iraqi army was given a purely defensive role...

There weren't to be any offensive attacks on Galilee for instance because this had been designated to Israel by the UN...and even though there was fighting in Jerusalem Abdullah still wanted relations with the Israelis...

The Israelis didnt really touch the West Bank...so the Iraqis by this time had 18,000 soldiers doing nothing at all...Egypt was busy losing and Jordan and Iraq werent intervening...when Lydda and Ramle were being lost the Iraqis werent intervening...the soldiers some of whom did want to save Palestine were furious...

The government continued with their double rhetoric...they recognised Husaynis government symbolically whilst supporting Abdullah...and they helped him consolidate his control of the West Bank...when the war was being lost Egypt blamed Iraq in addition to Jordan...

Syria

Quite a minor player...played second fiddle Hashemites to Abdullah...the end result for them was ok...Abdullah got control of the West Bank which none of the Iraqi establishment had any real objection to...they were more concerned about the other Arab countries gaining power who werent fans of the Hashemites...

The Iraqi establishment were also happy for Abdullah to get preoccupied with Palestine because they had some territorial ambitions of their own...namely Syria...

Iraqi Withdrawal...

With Nuri Said at the helm again repression increased...with leftists being accused of supporting Zionism...and being arrrested and executed...if they couldnt fight Zionists in Israel they would do so at home...this was also the beginning of the Iraqi Jew exodus...

Said also proposed plans during negotiations between Israel and the Arab states that would never have been accepted by Israel...it was a return to symbolism again...more an attempt to convince Iraqis that they had tried the best they could for Palestine...

Conclusion

The Iraqi role can generally be described as a lot of talk and symbolic action devoid of any real substance...even when they sent their military it was largely theatre...they did nothing to prevent the establishment of Israel, nor did they want a Palestinian state which might potentially be hostile to the Hashemites as Husayni was...the Hashemite alliance it is argued is one of the key factors behind the failure of the Palestinian state emerging...they were also working within constraints relating to Britain and seeking their own national interests...Palestine was at the bottom of their list...

 

[shaykh]

Might as well put them all in one thread...

EGYPT

Egypt like Jordan is deemed as another country that placed their national interests over that of Palestine...

Why did they intervene?

The general consensus in Egypt prior to the war was that it was a bad idea to send their regular army to go and fight...

Egypt was busy revising its treaty with Britain and their military was known tobe inexperienced...

The issue much like the other countries in question as mentioned is that the Arab masses in their countries were unhappy with the partition of Palestine...

The Muslim Brothers had already sent fighters to Palestine and the public sentiment at the time is what swayed Faruq and his premier Nuqrashi to intervene...

They also noticed that Abdullah was making his play...and like Abdullah...Faruq had dynastic ideas...and whilst public opinion was one of the reasons its argued that the main reason for intervention was to contain Abdullah...

And with that Faruq decided to enter...they were extremely unprepared and underestimated what they deemed Zionist 'gangs'...one general trend it seems with all Arab propaganda was general underestimation of the Zionists and overestimation of their own abilities...'all the Arabs needed was three or four thousand fighters to throw Jews in the sea'...

That said they weren't intending on the long haul...Nuqrashi stated as much by calling it a military 'demonstration'...Faruq also wasnt all that committed in reality...he felt the British would prevent Egypt from entering Palestine so if they didnt participate they could blame it on the British...

Nasser was quite vocal about this...he said they had no troops mobilised, no preparations for weapons and ammo, and no plans in general...

While the Jordanian army was actually a capable army the general consensus is the Egyptian one was a shambles...

First Round of Fighting

Well they entered anyway with 10,000 incapable troops...with no real military aim beyond trying to undermine Abdullah...

They went through the Sinai and then advanced North...just North of Gaza there were complaints by some clued up officers that there were risks of overextension but they were instructed to continue...those in control didn't really have their heart in it...

The Minister of War Haydar said 'i opposed entering the war but they forced us to fight'...

Second Round

The fall of Lydda and Ramle led to the Egyptians accusing Jordan of treachery...and they didnt work together...

The army continued to complain about their lack of resources but they were also victim to the aforementioned lack of organisation...and they started getting battered by the Israelis...

Rather than assisting each other the Arab nations resorted to trying to ascribe blame...they would bicker over things like the size of each others flags in Palestinian territories...eg Faruq complained to the UN that the Jordanian flag in one of the controlled territories is a few centimetres larger than the Egyptian one...

Egyptian units also fell out with the Palestinians on the ground...

Palestinian Self Determination

Egypt proposed the creation of an 'all Palestine government' in Gaza...this had little to do with Israel and more to do with their inter-arab rivalry...this was their way of opposing Abdullah...

Nuqrashi said as much by saying Jordan annexing Palestine would affect the balance of power...

Next Round

Egypt to their credit were doing a lot of fighting...they were just never winning...in the Negev as mentioned they requested assistance from Jordan and Iraq and got none...Egyptian forces were battered again...its worth noting that Egypt didnt collaborate militarily with Jordan or Iraq either when asked...

Israel was also well aware of this division and used it to their advantage throughout...they could have expanded themselves into Egypt if the British hadn't jumped in...

Rhodes

And with that came the armistice...Israel agreed to let the Egyptians have a presence in Gaza...Faruq made a lot of concessions to make that happen because Israel could quite easily have given it to Abdullah...

This led to Nuqrashi being assassinated by a Muslim Brother who said Nuqrashi had collaborated with the Jews...

The monarchy and the military were opposed...both blaming each other for the disasters in Palestine...

Conclusion

For Faruq his plan seriously backfired...considering he wanted to intervene in Palestine to solidify his authority...it is this war which led the way to the coup that followed...

This is just another example of how division between the Arab nations not only brought these nations to intervene when they didnt want to...but undermine each other on the battlefield...

Egypt though in comparison to Jordan had the added problem of just being a useless army...

 

[shaykh]

Iraq and the War of 1948...

They were among the first to advocate intervention in the war by Arab states yet their own army did very little in the war...

They called for the boycott of oil but didnt actually implement anything...and as i mentioned in my piece on Jordan they seemed to be happy at the end to just retreat...to not engage is to not be defeated and they stayed away from the armistice talks...

So what was their deal?...

Prelude to War...

In 1946 Iraqis were discussing the possibility of war with the partition of Palestine seeming ever more likely...

They sought a balance of power...they knew about Abdullah's ambitions and they knew about Husaynis...an independent Palestine wasn't on their agenda...

They also had internal issues...issues of inequality and unemployment and a growth of Kurdish nationalism and the Iraqi Communist Party..

Nuri Said stepped in and largely repressed opposition...they were focused on domestic disorder and their concern with Palestine was focused on observing the behaviour of the other Arab states...

Publicly the narratives were very pro-Palestinian...criticism of the White Paper, the calls for boycotts of oil to the US and Britain...they were also the first to suggest sending a joint Arab force to Palestine...and if the British didn't improve then the Arabs should arm the Palestinians...

In 1947 they also recommended the Arab armies go to the borders of Palestine and that Arab air forces be prepared to attack Zionist supply lines...

British Withdrawal...

Said had done a lot of talking but little action...when the British withdrew there protest in Iraq so Abdullah was approached and was asked if Transjordan would allow some Iraqi troops to be sent to the Palestinian frontier...this was a symbolic move...to look like they were doing something...Abdullah refused...

Nuri Said at a December 1947 Arab League meeting berated the other Arab nations for doing little to help the Palestinians...they again suggested they all boycott...but again it seemed that Iraq would only boycott if other nations would...

Salih Jabr at that time was also negotiating the Anglo-Iraqi treaty so whilst there was all this bluster publicly...Iraq was doing nothing on the economic nor military front...

They did however link Zionism to communism and this allowed them to clamp down on communists internally...they were using the issue of Palestine to assist them internally...

Abdullahs Offer

Abdullah tried to encourage Iraq to unify with Transjordan as part of a Hashemite kingdom...and the idea a joint Iraqi-Transjordanian occupation of Palestine...

So whilst Jabr was publicly opposing the partition plan...he was telling British officials he was happy to cooperate with Abdullah and take over Palestine...

One can argue that Jabr did indeed have a lot on his plate...he was trying to negotiate the British withdrawal from Iraq...and naturally this meant not doing anything that would anger Britain...luckily for them the British were happy with Abdullahs plan...

The Coup...

January 1948 the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi deal were revealed...while Britain would withdraw all its forces the British would oversee Iraqs military planning and the British could return to their air bases in time of war...the treaty was also given a 15 year extension from its original planned end...

This led to riots in the streets...and the end of Jabrs government with Muhammad al Sadr taking over...he was mainly focused on domestic issues...the British therefore communicated with the Regent Abd al'Ilah on Palestine...

1948

Calls for intervention by Arab countries was getting louder internally...thing is the Iraqi government werent too enthused...they knew they would be involving themselves on Abdallahs terms and felt they would be fighting Abdallahs war...

That said they did get Abdullah to agree via the regent to allows Iraqi troops enter Transjordanian territory...they then dispatched 3,000 of their men...

The War

Abdullah was commander of the army but as mentioned previously most of the nations were doing their own thing...the Iraqis followed Abdullahs lead though...for instance when Abdullah wanted his forces to fight in Jerusalem the Iraqis were asked to relieve the Legion in the northern part of the West Bank...the Iraqi army was given a purely defensive role...

There weren't to be any offensive attacks on Galilee for instance because this had been designated to Israel by the UN...and even though there was fighting in Jerusalem Abdullah still wanted relations with the Israelis...

The Israelis didnt really touch the West Bank...so the Iraqis by this time had 18,000 soldiers doing nothing at all...Egypt was busy losing and Jordan and Iraq werent intervening...when Lydda and Ramle were being lost the Iraqis werent intervening...the soldiers some of whom did want to save Palestine were furious...

The government continued with their double rhetoric...they recognised Husaynis government symbolically whilst supporting Abdullah...and they helped him consolidate his control of the West Bank...when the war was being lost Egypt blamed Iraq in addition to Jordan...

Syria

Quite a minor player...played second fiddle Hashemites to Abdullah...the end result for them was ok...Abdullah got control of the West Bank which none of the Iraqi establishment had any real objection to...they were more concerned about the other Arab countries gaining power who werent fans of the Hashemites...

The Iraqi establishment were also happy for Abdullah to get preoccupied with Palestine because they had some territorial ambitions of their own...namely Syria...

Iraqi Withdrawal...

With Nuri Said at the helm again repression increased...with leftists being accused of supporting Zionism...and being arrrested and executed...if they couldnt fight Zionists in Israel they would do so at home...this was also the beginning of the Iraqi Jew exodus...

Said also proposed plans during negotiations between Israel and the Arab states that would never have been accepted by Israel...it was a return to symbolism again...more an attempt to convince Iraqis that they had tried the best they could for Palestine...

Conclusion

The Iraqi role can generally be described as a lot of talk and symbolic action devoid of any real substance...even when they sent their military it was largely theatre...they did nothing to prevent the establishment of Israel, nor did they want a Palestinian state which might potentially be hostile to the Hashemites as Husayni was...the Hashemite alliance it is argued is one of the key factors behind the failure of the Palestinian state emerging...they were also working within constraints relating to Britain and seeking their own national interests...Palestine was at the bottom of their list...

 

[shaykh]

Syria

As mentioned the primary concern for the Arab states was disputes with each other...for Syria their concern was the Hashemites becoming a dominant power...

For the Arabs Palestine was mainly about balance of power...in Syria Quwwatli the President was interested in protecting his countries independence...

They were worried about Abdullah not the Israelis...Abdullah wanted to unite the Arab lands of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan...with the capital being Damascus...

Abdullah had encouraged dissent in Syria and Quwwatli was understandably worried about what a victory for Jordan would bring...Syria also had no great power to protect it as the French left them in 1946...independence made Syria vulnerable...

They therefore joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia and formed the anti-Hashemite bloc...all of Syrias actions during the war were related to protecting its independence...the Palestinians and Jews didnt matter...

Internal Problems

Abdullah had fomented dissension in the Syrian military so Quwwatli doubted their loyalty...the army built by the French was formed from Syrias minorities as they were more likely to fight the nationalists that the French opposed...Quwwatli a Sunni didnt trust this army...

He slashed the army from 30,000 to 6,000 and slashed any goodwill along with it...and actually decided against arming his army...he couldnt get rid of his army but also feared strengthening it lest they remove him through a coup...

Consequently there were those in the army who did start looking towards Abdullah...and in 1947 British sources suggest that 50-75% of the Syrian military supported Abdullahs Greater Syria plan...

Druze

One of those groups that approached Abdullah were the Druze...they had it good under the French but less so post independence...where Quwwatli quite carelessly tried to repress them...consequently the Druze chieftains asked Abdullah to abbex the Druze region and to go further into Damascus...

Encirclement

So the army was weak...and if anything Quwwatli declaring his support for Husayni was nothing more than expressing support for the enemies opponent...

Abdullah had also encircled Syria with alliances...Trukey and Iraq had expressed support for the Greater Syria plan...

Alliance


Syria requested assistance from the Saudis...they said they werent willing to ruin their friendship with Britain for the sake of Syria...the same with Faruq in Egypt...however they did eventually form a military alliance...the Saudis massed troops on the Jordanian border as a response...

Public Opinion

Like all the Arab countries the public were quite vociferous in their opposition to what was happening in Palestine...many Syrian volunteers were fighting in Palestine...

The Syrian army was weak and unprepared...but much like Faruk the main goal for intervention by Quwwatli was to protect Syria from Abdullah...

Aims of War

Prior to the British leaving Palestine Quwwatli had set up and build the Army of Liberation which was an irregular army fighting in Palestine...

The army itself wasn't even there to fight the Jews...it was there to prevent Abdullahs advance...Fawzi al-Qawuqji the commander in chief of the ALA acknowledges this fact...

The War

The ALA soldiers were stationed in the North and in Arab districts which Abdullah planned to annex...they were in the West Bank...they werent going to Jerusalem, Haifa etc...basically where the Palestinians were engaged in the most intense fighting...

With Haifa falling the ALA were given orders to not help the falling areas...the Palestinian irregulars asked Quwwatli for help and Quwwatli refused because like the rest they could all agree on their opposition to Husayni...

Quwwatli tried to ensure his fighters didnt engage with Israeli forces...

The Syrian army did eventually enter the fray and were routed initially but they took Tiberias...they took 66.5km of land in all and thats about all their activity...

Amusingly with the ALA not being given the assistance they wanted they approached Abdullah...Qawugji who was in Palestine to work against Abdullah was now discussing greater Syria...

Syria was the first in and the last out because they felt peace benefited Jordan...

Conclusion

While they didnt directly attack each other the Arabs were busy undermining each other...nowhere is that more evident than in Syria and its fear of Jordan expansion...Palestinians and Jews didnt matter to Quwwatli...

 

[shaykh]

Syria

As mentioned the primary concern for the Arab states was disputes with each other...for Syria their concern was the Hashemites becoming a dominant power...

For the Arabs Palestine was mainly about balance of power...in Syria Quwwatli the President was interested in protecting his countries independence...

They were worried about Abdullah not the Israelis...Abdullah wanted to unite the Arab lands of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan...with the capital being Damascus...

Abdullah had encouraged dissent in Syria and Quwwatli was understandably worried about what a victory for Jordan would bring...Syria also had no great power to protect it as the French left them in 1946...independence made Syria vulnerable...

They therefore joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia and formed the anti-Hashemite bloc...all of Syrias actions during the war were related to protecting its independence...the Palestinians and Jews didnt matter...

Internal Problems

Abdullah had fomented dissension in the Syrian military so Quwwatli doubted their loyalty...the army built by the French was formed from Syrias minorities as they were more likely to fight the nationalists that the French opposed...Quwwatli a Sunni didnt trust this army...

He slashed the army from 30,000 to 6,000 and slashed any goodwill along with it...and actually decided against arming his army...he couldnt get rid of his army but also feared strengthening it lest they remove him through a coup...

Consequently there were those in the army who did start looking towards Abdullah...and in 1947 British sources suggest that 50-75% of the Syrian military supported Abdullahs Greater Syria plan...

Druze

One of those groups that approached Abdullah were the Druze...they had it good under the French but less so post independence...where Quwwatli quite carelessly tried to repress them...consequently the Druze chieftains asked Abdullah to abbex the Druze region and to go further into Damascus...

Encirclement

So the army was weak...and if anything Quwwatli declaring his support for Husayni was nothing more than expressing support for the enemies opponent...

Abdullah had also encircled Syria with alliances...Trukey and Iraq had expressed support for the Greater Syria plan...

Alliance

Syria requested assistance from the Saudis...they said they werent willing to ruin their friendship with Britain for the sake of Syria...the same with Faruq in Egypt...however they did eventually form a military alliance...the Saudis massed troops on the Jordanian border as a response...

Public Opinion

Like all the Arab countries the public were quite vociferous in their opposition to what was happening in Palestine...many Syrian volunteers were fighting in Palestine...

The Syrian army was weak and unprepared...but much like Faruk the main goal for intervention by Quwwatli was to protect Syria from Abdullah...

Aims of War

Prior to the British leaving Palestine Quwwatli had set up and build the Army of Liberation which was an irregular army fighting in Palestine...

The army itself wasn't even there to fight the Jews...it was there to prevent Abdullahs advance...Fawzi al-Qawuqji the commander in chief of the ALA acknowledges this fact...

The War

The ALA soldiers were stationed in the North and in Arab districts which Abdullah planned to annex...they were in the West Bank...they werent going to Jerusalem, Haifa etc...basically where the Palestinians were engaged in the most intense fighting...

With Haifa falling the ALA were given orders to not help the falling areas...the Palestinian irregulars asked Quwwatli for help and Quwwatli refused because like the rest they could all agree on their opposition to Husayni...

Quwwatli tried to ensure his fighters didnt engage with Israeli forces...

The Syrian army did eventually enter the fray and were routed initially but they took Tiberias...they took 66.5km of land in all and thats about all their activity...

Amusingly with the ALA not being given the assistance they wanted they approached Abdullah...Qawugji who was in Palestine to work against Abdullah was now discussing greater Syria...

Syria was the first in and the last out because they felt peace benefited Jordan...

Conclusion

While they didnt directly attack each other the Arabs were busy undermining each other...nowhere is that more evident than in Syria and its fear of Jordan expansion...Palestinians and Jews didnt matter to Quwwatli...

 

[shaykh]

Lebanon


National Pact

French rule had meant that a corrupt client system existed here after the first World War...in 1943 the Maronites and the Sunnis formed the National Pact which was an unwritten alliance which set the scene for independence...the deal was that the President would be Maronite, PM a Sunni and the president of the chamber of deputies a Shia...

The idea was Christians would eschew French rule and the Muslims would renounce their goals of becoming part of a Greater Syria...

There was a lot of opposition to this...some of the Christians saw this as a threat to their dominance and thus saw the Jews as allies...some church leaders were openly pro-Zionist...

The Phalange a far right Christian group signed a pact with the Zionists in 1920...and there was a lot of evidence of Christian collusion in general...

The idea of a Christian uprising in Beirut was mentioned dependent on the Israelis invading South Lebanon. in 1948...

Ben-Gurion wasnt sure...because there were plenty of Christians who preferred the National pact...

Other than the Maronites the Druze also associated with Zionists...and worked with the IDF...

Army

The commander was a maronite and the army was a new one...they had four battalions and only one was used in the war...the army was 66% christian...Shias werent educated enough...Sunnis educated and thus boycotted..

They weren't ready for any sort of conflict in 1948 and were still essentially reorganising...the arms embargo and a lack of funding also meant they weren't capable of much...

They were mainly used internally for anti-bandit operations...and were getting battered for the most part...they couldnt handle bandits so how were they gonna handle war?...

They were also somewhat concerned about Syrian expansion into their territory...

And the fact that the army was so Christian the thought process in the UN for instance was that they wouldnt eget involved...

Maronite clergy were opposed to war...unlike the other Arab countries there wasnt so much fervour for war here...

The War

They prevented irregulars from going through Lebanon...they also ruled that they would only attack if foced to reply to Jewish attacks...

Israel did occupy villages on the Lebanese side of the border and the army were instructed to do nothing...

Malikiyya

Galilee which had been allotted to the Arabs in the UN settlement was taken over by the Israelis...the Lebanese were asked to fight by the Arab league and Chehab said they werent strong enough to fight...and in short wouldnt do anything in Palestine...

However with the presence of the ALA, Israel targeting South Lebanon and angry Muslims the ruling elite deiced on a token attack...they had to be seen to be doing something so they did one thing...they took Malikiyya and the Israelis took it back not long after...it was a place that offered not strategic threat to Israel...they handed it over to the ALA and went back to Lebanon...

It was a face saving exercise and like many things during this war...symbolic...their media claimed 100 Israelis dead when in reality it was 8...

Israel Expansion

After Gallilee the Israelis advanced to Lebanon and stopped at the Litani river...they weren't opposed...twfourteen to twenty lebanese villages and the army sat back...

Conclusion

Lebanon didnt confront Israel...nor did it help with the Arab effort...their soldiers had little desire to attack nor to defend...they had one sole symbolic moment in the conflict...

 

[shaykh]

Saudi

Saudi textbooks speak about the wonderful things Ibn Saud did for Palestine...how much of that is true?...

Prewar

For starters the British told Ibn Saud to not side with Husayni...and Ibn Saud responded in the affirmative whilst also stating his concern about the Hashemites...

Also there was the issue of the 'general Arab feeling' about Palestine...

That said Ibn Saud assured Britain he was their friend and said he would advise the Palestinians to remain peaceful...

Partition

Ibn Saud was opposed to the partition of Palestine...he wanted Britain to establish a constitutional government which only included the then current residents of Palestine with protection of the Holy sites...

He was concerned that Abdullah would try and incorporate Jerusalem...if anything he wanted to British mandate to remain...

Saud was seeking legitimacy among the Arabs after the occupation of the Hijaz and threatened other territorial claims namely Aqaba and Maan and enter Abdullahs realm...

Public Opinion

As odd as this sounds very little for the simple reason that they had little access to external news...Saudi had one newspaper and illiteracy was very high...its bizarre to think most in Saudi had no clue what was happening in Israel...those that did get information probably got it from bedouins or pilgrims...

British Letters

Most of Sauds letters to Britain revealed as mentioned Sauds concern about Abdullah...Palestine was a Saudi-Hashemite rivalry for them...

It also had an internal affect as Saud preferred developing Najd instead of the Hijaz...

1945

Saud starts sending letters complaining about the possible jewish state...he also mentioned how the Ulama were putting him in a tough position...

The War

They opposed the partition...

Saudi sources say that as many as 200,000 Saudis were ready to fight...they sent 1,200...with little equipment or ammo...untrained too...

Most sources for other Arab nations have interpreted or left things out deliberately...Saudi sources have outright created things...

The forces themselves were sent with the Syrians...they didnt want to send them to the Egyptians who were suffering losses by fighting...

There is little on what they actually did...

Conclusion

Its odd because Saudi has almost suggested they did the most...they opposed partition for the same reason as the rest of the nations...the prospect of Hashemite domination...

Lack of involvement in Palestine also relates to the strong relations between the British and Ibn Saud...

 

[cricketfanfirst]

Nice to read, a different perspective...

I guess, since, all these nations were at early stages of military/arms development, so all the armies including Israeli ones were not that much professional.

 

[Mamoon]

Interesting read, thanks. I've been taking keen interest in the history of Middle East lately, fascinating stuff indeed.

 

[shaykh]

Palestine

Now we have focused on the role of the Arab states during this conflict...but i'm gonna look at Palestinian internal division here...

What Israel did Well

It's worth noting that the Israelis meanwhile didn't really have outside support...the British were leaning towards Abdullah whom they felt was a reliable ally in the Middle East...

Also prior to the war the Jewish forces were fighting the British in Palestine...

What they did do well...is they were able to get arms from Czechoslovakia during the arms embargo...and prior to the embargo they had been smuggling arms...they were aware they would eventually be involved in a conflict...

Despite being numerically outnumbered in terms of actual numbers they had much higher numbers in terms of fighters...110,000 to 60,000 by the end...and thats including the external Arab forces...

Unlike the Arabs they were unified...they were organised and they actually had a stronger desire to win...

They negotiated with Abdullah who had the strongest Arab army by far...as mentioned when the Arab Legion did attack as it did in Jerusalem they routed the Israelis...

When they did co-operate with the British this allowed them to get weapons training...the Haganah that fought the British was originally trained by the British...they were originally trained to protect existing Jewish settlements against the growing Arab resentment...

Contrary to popular Arab belief the US and the USSR didn't really support Israel...they didnt send arms or money...

And as I will discuss here they were generally a more unified force...

No Country

One of the most important points regarding the lack of organisation among Palestinians is they werent even recognised as a group...'they were deemed non Jewish'...

Unlike every other Arab state which even when under the British mandate had some sort of indigenous person at the helm...Palestine did not...they were not afforded the right to self determination that the other Arab states or Jews were...this naturally made it difficult to have any form of cohesion...

Pro-Israeli sources point to the fact that Palestine was a melting pot and was a combination of indigenous people Arabs and Jews who had been there for generations and then a lot of new generation from other Arab countries...

That said all nations were young and were attempting to create nationalisms and histories albeit contrived ones but the people in Palestine weren't given that opportunity in an official realm...

First Attack on the British

Shaykh Izz al-din al Qassam initiated the first organised armed revolt against the British in 1935...his death made him a martyr and captivated the Palestinians...it was followed by general strike the largest in history...

When it was decided that the country would be partitioned an armed revolt began...

1936-1939 Arab Revolt

The revolt concluded in the British promising to limit Jewish immigration and that the Palestinians would obtain independence in 10 years...

The British had to now play a strong balancing act...and essentially played both the Zionists and Arabs against each other...this is when the Yishuv were being trained to protect settlements...

However when looking at the future war that was about to come it helps to understand why the Palestinians performed so terribly...they weren't beaten by close competitors but were routed...

During the revolt against the British about 10% of their adult male population was either killed, wounded imprisoned or exiled...many of these casualties were some of the best leaders and fighters the Palestinians had...

They also had their arms confiscated...the Arab revolt had actually benefited the Zionist cause...it weakened the Arabs and that period of 3 years allowed the Zionists to further develop economically...

Palestinian rebels who still weren't organised at this moment revolted against the wealthy Palestinians often extorting them...many of those extorting weren't even revolutionaires...but this was the problem with having a decentralised movement...

Landowners who were suffering from the economy also stepped up efforts to sell land to Jews who were buying land at extortionate rates...

The Palestinians during this 3 year revolt were very much divided...the attempt at the Arab Higher Committee which was supposed to bring the Palestinians together was a disaster with division over tactics and aims...

Husayni

Husayni was the most visible of the Palestinians being the mufti and he did assume a leadership role but he had no interest in the ideas of anyone else...

He saw other Palestinians with different ideas as potential rivals...and actively prevented other Palestinian voices from action...

For instance the White Paper in 1939...most of the other Palestinian leaders although divided favoured acceptance...Husayni refused...and with greater resources and fighters at his disposal he got the final say...

He was also exiled by this point...so was unable to see the problems Palestinians were facing on the ground...divisions between individual leaders, rural clans, urban factions and nobility were hurting the Palestinians immensely...but difference always exists in national movements...

Whats problematic is Husaynis stance that anyone who disagreed with him was a traitor...this then meant that Palestinians attacked their own...we can see that same failing idea prevalent today...

The Zionists had a lot of disagreements but this was necessary to decide on the best plan of action...and these disagreements and inclusiveness of different ideas is what helped cohesion...something which had always plagued Arab movements which deem any opposition as treason...

Palestinians were killed by Palestinians and far from bringing Palestinians closer together there was fragmentation with people living in fear of their own...as well as the Zionists...

1947-49

So when war came about the Palestinians were still reeling from the repression of 36-39...

They had no unified leadership...

The most powerful voice was the mufti and he was in exile yet being in exile didnt make him any less opposed to domestic opposition...

There were other leaders Jamal al Husayni (not the mufti), al Khalidi, al Alamai and Nashashibi and not only could they not agree with the mufti they couldnt even agree with each other...

The Zionists were an organised, unified bunch...they had more or less constructed their own economy in this time...

The Palestinians had no institutions, no finances and no centralised military force...

Contrary to the belief that the Zionists were facing strong opposition they really werent...and one can credit the Israelis with being unified and having excellent leadership...basically everything the Palestinians lacked...

Husayni was terrible for the Palestinians frankly...and it is no surprise at all that the Palestinians lost the war...

 

[shaykh]

Nice to read, a different perspective...

I guess, since, all these nations were at early stages of military/arms development, so all the armies including Israeli ones were not that much professional.

Well the Yishuv (Jews who lived in Palestine) were superior militarily in every way...they had enough trained soldiers who were trained when the Arabs revolted a decade earlier...they had built up arms before the 1948 war...

While they had some issues with some of their factions...they were largely unified under Ben-Gurion who was an excellent leader...

They had experts in military strategy during the war...and were able to get around arms boycotts...and importantly they had an objective and a desire to win...

That said the Arab legion of Jordan was stronger but the Zionists negotiated a deal with Abdullah which left them in a good position...

The Arabs were divided in Palestine and outside of it...were poorly organised and other than Jordan had inept militaries..and more importantly their objectives were never Palestine independence but their own national interests...inside Palestine the leaderships were self serving and focused more on undermining other potential national leaders than any real attempts at a unified leadership...

The creation of Israel is impressive but not nearly as impressive as is sold...the David and Goliath story just doesnt ring true because the Arabs were far from being Goliath...

The Israelis didnt narrowly win the war...they routed the Arabs...

Not much has changed regarding unification of the Arabs and Palestinians...the same problems still plague them...

The Arab states had militaries

 

[shaykh]

Interesting read, thanks. I've been taking keen interest in the history of Middle East lately, fascinating stuff indeed.

Youre welcome...

 

[cricketfanfirst]

Well the Yishuv (Jews who lived in Palestine) were superior militarily in every way...they had enough trained soldiers who were trained when the Arabs revolted a decade earlier...they had built up arms before the 1948 war...

While they had some issues with some of their factions...they were largely unified under Ben-Gurion who was an excellent leader...

They had experts in military strategy during the war...and were able to get around arms boycotts...and importantly they had an objective and a desire to win...

That said the Arab legion of Jordan was stronger but the Zionists negotiated a deal with Abdullah which left them in a good position...

The Arabs were divided in Palestine and outside of it...were poorly organised and other than Jordan had inept militaries..and more importantly their objectives were never Palestine independence but their own national interests...inside Palestine the leaderships were self serving and focused more on undermining other potential national leaders than any real attempts at a unified leadership...

The creation of Israel is impressive but not nearly as impressive as is sold...the David and Goliath story just doesnt ring true because the Arabs were far from being Goliath...

The Israelis didnt narrowly win the war...they routed the Arabs...

Not much has changed regarding unification of the Arabs and Palestinians...the same problems still plague them...

The Arab states had militaries

I see, thanks for the info.

 

[Mamoon]

Youre welcome...

Since you appear to be quite knowledge on this subject, I have a couple of questions that might appear off-topic but I feel it's the best place to ask for it, and they were not covered in depth in the literature I consulted.

Why do you think the UAR failed and secondly, is it fair to lay all the blame of the Six-Day War on Nasser and obviously, the disaster that it turned out to be for Arab countries? How has it impact his legacy in Egypt today?

 

[shaykh]

Since you appear to be quite knowledge on this subject, I have a couple of questions that might appear off-topic but I feel it's the best place to ask for it, and they were not covered in depth in the literature I consulted.

Why do you think the UAR failed and secondly, is it fair to lay all the blame of the Six-Day War on Nasser and obviously, the disaster that it turned out to be for Arab countries? How has it impact his legacy in Egypt today?

Was gonna give a short reply on the UAR...but decided on a longer one...so I created a thread...

As for Nasser and the 6 Day War...he's not 'all' to blame...i'm gonna be writing something about the '67 war this weekend...

Nasser is still romanticised depending on who you speak to...the nationalising of the Suez canal is his crowning moment...

Muslims Brotherhood of course hate him for repressing them...so his legacy is very dependent on who one speaks to...he certainly seems a love him or hate him type of guy...

What are your own thoughts?...