Memogate Scandal

[ahsan88]

Asma Jahangir has decided to represent Hussain Haqqani saab in the memogate scandal.

She's got balls.

Army is in power, not the PPP.

 

[Law]

Nawaz Sharif is going to be a worried man very soon...

 

[12cavalry]

Not surprising at all. Liberals are behind Haqqani for some reason and Asma would have jumped at this opportunity.

Anyway PPP is visibly flustered at the moment. Today's press conference was such an over reaction. Maybe there is some truth to memogate after all.

 

[ahsan88]

'Husain Haqqani's resignation does not prove the charges levelled against him.' Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chahudhry

Even Mansoor Ijaz has changed his statements many times over, ever since his first article appeared.

 

[Looney]

i just hope this government stays till the end of their term


the conspiracy theorist in me says dono hi amreeki paidawar haiN

 

[ahsan88]

^^ Same.

System must continue, only then it will evolve.

 

[insaftak]

even PTI needs more time.

PML(N) is trying to dislodge the system to stop defections from their party towards PTI. But as soon as they dislodge the government PTI will file a petition asking supreme court to delay the election until all votes are registered and they won't be registered till May 31st, 2012.

So dislodging the government before that time will bring up a technocrats that will hold the power as long as they want with permission of SC. (I can see Nazria-Zaroorat Popping up again)

I hope this does not happen.

 

[ahsan88]

Yar pata nai what afwaj-e-pakistan want, kyun nai jaan chor detay.

 

[insaftak]

Yar pata nai what afwaj-e-pakistan want, kyun nai jaan chor detay.

it's useless to just blame the Fauj.

The idiots in civilian government have once again showed how incompetent and refuse to take responsibility of anything that is going on in pakistan.

This voter registration issue could have been solved easily but the zardari government has once again delayed everything.

It seems they don't want to do anything unless there is a danda right behind them.

 

[waqar_ahmad]

Yar pata nai what afwaj-e-pakistan want, kyun nai jaan chor detay.

Zardari had the perfect opportunity to strengthen civilian institutions once and for all. And look what he did

Yes, army has too much power in pakistan, but civilian leadership's incompetence is one of the reasons for this

 

[ahsan88]

it's useless to just blame the Fauj.

The idiots in civilian government have once again showed how incompetent and refuse to take responsibility of anything that is going on in pakistan.

This voter registration issue could have been solved easily but the zardari government has once again delayed everything.

It seems they don't want to do anything unless there is a danda right behind them.

Yar, not talking about the incompetency of the current nincompoops.

They are hell bent on de-stabilizing the civies and the current system. Not that the government needs any help in this regard.

About the voter registration issue, jab awaam hi itni zaada hai aur staff sirf 6000, tw delay tw hoga hi.

Besides, i thought the current ECP setup was formed after all parties agreed to it.

 

[ahsan88]

Zardari had the perfect opportunity to strengthen civilian institutions once and for all. And look what he did

Yes, army has too much power in pakistan, but civilian leadership's incompetence is one of the reasons for this

True.

Major disappointment, last May.

But if the army had any sharam tw they won't try and de-stabilize the system further.

 

[Looney]

even if the army steps in , it may not last long causing further destabilization . reason being lack of trust from the public right now .

 

[insaftak]

Yar, not talking about the incompetency of the current nincompoops.

They are hell bent on de-stabilizing the civies and the current system. Not that the government needs any help in this regard.

About the voter registration issue, jab awaam hi itni zaada hai aur staff sirf 6000, tw delay tw hoga hi.

Besides, i thought the current ECP setup was formed after all parties agreed to it.

ISLAMABAD:
The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) has described the delay in the appointment of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the passage of the accountability bill as an ‘utter administrative failure’ on the part of the government.

The ruling PPP had tried to shift the blame for the delay on the PML-N.

“I see it as an utter administrative and intellectual bankruptcy on the government’s part,” said Engineer Khurram Dastgir Khan of the PML-N on Sunday.

The Accountability Bill is pending in the National Assembly for over two years and the ECP is also awaiting appointments and both the parties are holding each other responsible for the delay.
Earlier in the day, three key representatives of the PPP – Information Minister Dr Firdous Ashiq Awan, Information Secretary of the PPP Qamar Zaman Kaira and former law minister Babar Awan – had censured the PML-N for allegedly misleading the masses to provoke them against the government.

In addition, Babar Awan held the PML-N responsible for creating hurdles in adoption of a unanimous resolution by the parliament and delay in ECP appointments. Awan had referred to a recent statement by the Leader of the Opposition, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, in which he had opposed the nominations floated by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani.

“We will oppose the government tooth and nail in the passage of finance bill,” Khan said when asked about his party’s strategy during the budget session of the Parliament. “Last year, we had introduced 71 amendments in the finance bill, and will give the government a tough time again,” he said

The PML-N is in the process of evolving a decisive protest plan and Chaudhry Nisar is scheduled to meet other opposition leaders in the Parliament here on Monday (today), he said.

Khurram Dastgir said the government had to take the initiative, but they “are outsourcing governance”.

“The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is (actually) devising the (country’s) economic policies whereas defence and foreign policy guidelines were being given by the army,” he explained.

“It is unfortunate and shocking…when I, as a citizen, observe that we have the most incompetent government at the most crucial time in the country’s history,” he added.

Appreciating the PPP for being “good negotiators”, at least when it “comes to making alliances”, Khan said that it was incompetent when it came to governance.

Raja Zafarul Haq of the PML-N rejected the PPP’s assertions and said that his party would press the government to honour its commitments.

Government failed to appoint NAB chief and Election commissioner and kept delaying everything. They are the ones that gave extensions to morons like Kiyani and Pasha. They are the ones that refused to fire them after OBL Fiasco when the whole country was asking for their head. Now they are paying the price for their incompetence and I have zero sympathy for them.

 

[ahsan88]

^^ Which is why people have doubts over this memo scandal.

Why would the most shrewd politician in Pakistan, worry about an Army takeover when the public opinion against it was at it worst in the last 40 years, due to the OBL and Mehran Base attacks?

Doesn't make any sense at all.

 

[ahsan88]

Government failed to appoint NAB chief and Election commissioner and kept delaying everything.

The above article is dated????

NAB Chief is understandable, but both parties agreed upon the formula to appoint the EC.

They are the ones that gave extensions to morons like Kiyani and Pasha. They are the ones that refused to fire them after OBL Fiasco when the whole country was asking for their head. Now they are paying the price for their incompetence and I have zero sympathy for them.

Don't think PPP had a choice but to extend their tenure. Army chiefs appoint themselves in Pakistan

Jahangir Karamat jaise COAS bht kam hotay hain.

I could careless about the current buffons in power, whats worrying is the constant efforts by the deep state to undermine the current system.

 

[12cavalry]

Yar pata nai what afwaj-e-pakistan want, kyun nai jaan chor detay.

lalay kadi te fauj nu baksh dea kar

Blame the army/establishment, it is the easiest thing to do. Yes, army is involved in Haqqani episode. But its a jamhori party who has gone to the court.Infact Army would like PPP to complete its term. Its not a fan of Nawaz any more.

But man your PPP hasnt made life easier for themselves. From power outages to gas load shedding, the ordinary man is sick of this govt.
Railways, Steel Mills, PIA...you name it and every institution in this country has gone to the dogs. Its wouldn't be wrong to say that Zardari today is the most hated man in the country.

 

[ahsan88]

lalay kadi te fauj nu baksh dea kar

Blame the army/establishment, it is the easiest thing to do. Yes, army is involved in Haqqani episode. But its a jamhori party who has gone to the court.Infact Army would like PPP to complete its term. Its not a fan of Nawaz any more.

But man your PPP hasnt made life easier for themselves. From power outages to gas load shedding, the ordinary man is sick of this govt.
Railways, Steel Mills, PIA...you name it and every institution in this country has gone to the dogs. Its wouldn't be wrong to say that Zardari today is the most hated man in the country.

Bhai jaan tussi ghalat samjh raye ho.

Like i said, the current federal government does not deserve any sympathy. Only worry is that current system must not be derailed.

 

[12cavalry]

Bhai jaan tussi ghalat samjh raye ho.

Like i said, the current federal government does not deserve any sympathy. Only worry is that current system must not be derailed.

I probably agree with you..shayyad...pata nahi

Maybe for the greater good it should.

 

[ahsan88]

^^

Koi nai koi nai, aap isi kashmakash mai 1 saal 4 mahenay aur laga lein. Koi jaldi nahi

 

[Savak]

lalay kadi te fauj nu baksh dea kar

Blame the army/establishment, it is the easiest thing to do. Yes, army is involved in Haqqani episode. But its a jamhori party who has gone to the court.Infact Army would like PPP to complete its term. Its not a fan of Nawaz any more.

But man your PPP hasnt made life easier for themselves. From power outages to gas load shedding, the ordinary man is sick of this govt.
Railways, Steel Mills, PIA...you name it and every institution in this country has gone to the dogs. Its wouldn't be wrong to say that Zardari today is the most hated man in the country.

Well no sympathies, people voted for PPP in 2008 inspite of its track record. Everyone knew that voting for the PPP would in high probability bring Zardari close to the govt. The people voted for the govt for 5 long years. Now they should deal with the consequences rather than complaining about Zardari has done to the country.

 

[waqar_ahmad]

Bhai jaan tussi ghalat samjh raye ho.

Like i said, the current federal government does not deserve any sympathy. Only worry is that current system must not be derailed.

I agree, the current system must not be derailed. The reason, for me, is that when
PPP fails, and it is failing right now, it should not come back and say that they
were not given enough time, and blame "undemocratic forces" for everything as they always do.
I want them to be voted out.

As for the "mamoo scandal" no one is sure. It might very well have happened.
Remember the reymond davis case. The govt wanted to let him go, the army didnt.
The army was right. But he was let go. So, zardari isnt happy with the army
stopping him from doing everyhting he wants.

Now, as for the army taking over, it aint happening. Right now, the army is under a lot of pressure,
specially from the US. Army wants a govt that can shield them, and deal with the US, instead of trasferring
everything to the army. that is one of the reasons, I think, they might be backing PTI. Coz PTI
will not let them open more fronts in the war on terror.

 

[ahsan88]

I agree, the current system must not be derailed. The reason, for me, is that when
PPP fails, and it is failing right now, it should not come back and say that they
were not given enough time, and blame "undemocratic forces" for everything as they always do.
I want them to be voted out.

As for the "mamoo scandal" no one is sure. It might very well have happened.
Remember the reymond davis case. The govt wanted to let him go, the army didnt.
The army was right. But he was let go. So, zardari isnt happy with the army
stopping him from doing everyhting he wants.

Now, as for the army taking over, it aint happening. Right now, the army is under a lot of pressure,
specially from the US. Army wants a govt that can shield them, and deal with the US, instead of trasferring
everything to the army. that is one of the reasons, I think, they might be backing PTI. Coz PTI
will not let them open more fronts in the war on terror.

Bolded part is where i will differ.

It was after all the Army which let him go - albeit after gaining some concessions from the US (CIA contractors leave Pak, change in visa policy), when Pasha visited Punjab and Ray was released in the next 48 hours.

 

[waqar_ahmad]

Bolded part is where i will differ.

It was after all the Army which let him go - albeit after gaining some concessions from the US (CIA contractors leave Pak, change in visa policy), when Pasha visited Punjab and Ray was released in the next 48 hours.

The army let him go coz they didnt have support of the civilian govt. The govt wanted to let him go from the very beginning. Yes, the army could have acted on its own, but right now, given the situation, the army can not, and will not, take such decisions without having the civilian govt on board.

As I said, right now, the army needs the govt to shield it from US pressure. It will not take any decisions where the civilian govt cant be brought on board, by hook or by crook

SMQ's stand on Davis was on the directives of the army too, some say. Dont forget that.

 

[ahsan88]

The army let him go coz they didnt have support of the civilian govt. The govt wanted to let him go from the very beginning. Yes, the army could have acted on its own, but right now, given the situation, the army can not, and will not, take such decisions without having the civilian govt on board.

As I said, right now, the army needs the govt to shield it from US pressure. It will not take any decisions where the civilian govt cant be brought on board, by hook or by crook

SMQ's stand on Davis was on the directives of the army too, some say. Dont forget that.

Andheray mai teer chalaaya aur nishanay par lag gaya.

I think we are forgetting that the Army has been given free reign by the PPP. The decision makers are in Rawalpindi vis a vis SP and FP. Zardari is like a, 'YES MAN' for both Pindi and Washington, with no real authority of his own.

Civies wanted to release him immediately and Army used the situation to their advantage and then released him. Would have been released anyway, Jernails are just smarter than the civies, they created a hungama, and pressured Washington into giving in to their demands.

SMQ, was also a yes man (infact all our FM's are), but he had good relations with the Amreekis, which went sour after the Davis affair.

 

[saadibaba]

I gave Haqqani the benefit of doubt after the memogate scandal broke but after reading the following article by Ikram Sehgal, I am having doubts about the role he played in this fiasco.

When ‘friends’ fall out over the memo

Ikram Sehgal

Thursday, November 24, 2011

By all accounts Husain Haqqani and Mansoor Ijaz were good friends, and the tone and tenor of the BlackBerry exchanges between them clearly show they made for a lethal combination. The May 10 memo was meant to be a specially crafted “neutron bomb” to (1) change the present national security parameters in Pakistan and bring it into line with long-term US policy imperatives, and (2) enable the present rulers to exercise absolute control of the military. An inquiry would identify and punish the officials responsible for “harbouring bin Laden,” replacing them with a new Pakistani national security leadership that would (1) bring “transparency” and “discipline” to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, (2) eliminate Section S of the ISI, which is “charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban’s Haqqani network” and other rogue elements, and (3) work with the Indian government to punish the perpetrators of the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai.”

When any businessman, not excluding Mansoor Ijaz, engage in backchannel diplomacy, they run the risk of becoming controversial if things go wrong. Friend Husain Haqqani falls frequently in that category with respect to his credibility. The memo was meant to spook the Americans into pre-emptive action: “Civilians cannot withstand much more of the hard pressure being delivered from the army to succumb to wholesale changes. If civilians are forced from power, Pakistan (will) become a sanctuary for OBL’s [Osama bin Laden’s] legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of Al-Qaeda’s brand of fanaticism and terror. A unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the OBL matter.” Mansoor Ijaz states: “Haqqani believed he and the President (Zardari) could redraft the architectural blueprint of how Pakistan should be governed in the future — with civilians in command of the armed forces and intelligence services. A “new national security team” would see Haqqani as the “National Security Advisor.” Over the years many others have harboured that ambition.

While the principal motivating the memo’s creation remains unnamed, “this commitment has the backing of the top echelon on the civilian side of our house.” Everyone and his uncle knows that Haqqani reports directly to the Presidency, either directly to Zardari or through Salman Faruqi. The prime minister and/or the foreign office only come into the loop by default on routine matters, or when their coming into the loop suits Haqqani. The hoopla about the 18th Amendment notwithstanding, Zardari remains an all-powerful president and Salman Faruqi the de facto prime minister, in all but name.

How did Mansoor Ijaz take to being used as a conduit for this rather explosive document that seems to resemble the intent of the Kerry-Lugar Bill? “Haqqani was likely the sole architect of the backchannel intervention and needed a plausibly deniable go-between to make it work. I fit that bill perfectly because he knew the Pakistanis, who have been assassinating my character and diminishing my person for decades, would have at him (Haqqani) with glee if things went wrong. If a leak occurred purposely or accidentally, there was an orchestration to cover our tracks even at that moment because there was always a possibility this could get out.” Mansoor Ijaz confirmed “Haqqani’s reputation as ambassador as being more of America’s ambassador to Pakistan than Pakistan’s ambassador to America.” But he believes “his motives were patriotic,” and saw Haqqani as someone who was much needed in the troubled US-Pakistan relationship.

Haqqani says he did not write or deliver the memo, nor authorised anyone to do so. He does not explain what the Pakistani ambassador to the US was doing in London on a private visit talking to senior British government officials, including Chief of the General Staff Sir David Richards and Mr Tobias Ellwood, then parliamentary secretary for defence, during a most critical time in US-Pakistan relations? To avoid any linkages Haqqani may have tried to route his initiative initially through the British. When the British did not respond, he turned to Mansoor Ijaz and the US route. While the memo was being crafted by Mansoor Ijaz on Haqqani’s prompting, there were calls between Haqqani’s room in Park Lane Intercontinental London and Monaco, where Mansoor Ijaz has a home.

When the Financial Times article brought the memo to light, ISI chief Shuja Pasha went to London and satisfied himself that Mansoor Ijaz’s evidence was prima-facie credible. Thereafter, extensive forensic tests must have verified its credibility before Gen Pasha took the evidence to Gen Kayani. The material being explosive, the COAS must have independently satisfied himself about its contents before he went to the president with the findings.

The real question is whether Haqqani did all this with the permission of his “boss,” or was it an individually conceived “rogue operation”? The data on his many Blackberries and SIMs will likely reveal a treasure trove of information about his various machinations.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sacked Lt Gen Gul Hasan as army chief on Mar 3, 1972. Until July 5, 1977. when Bhutto was overthrown, the military (and by extension the ISI) was very much under civilian (i.e., Bhutto’s) control. Bhutto was a civilian dictator in all but name and not many know that it was his initiative to make the political cell in the ISI into a regular entity. With the army in the dumps after the May 2 Obama bin Laden raid like it was on the ropes after 1971, Haqqani probably saw this as a golden opportunity to cut the national security apparatus down to size.

Over the years misunderstandings have been deliberately created by motivated individuals to exacerbate the US-Pakistan relationship and build up their own nuisance value. Haqqani has “Haqqani” as priority over everyone and everything else. Haqqani finessed such manipulation into a fine art, exploiting it to his advantage. Bad-mouthing the army and the ISI comes naturally to him. His appointment as Pakistan’s ambassador to the US was a godsend for him, allowing him secondarily to protect the interests of his mentor, Asif Ali Zardari.

The red herring about a possible army coup was pure fabrication, and the overkill is probably why Mullen claims he ignored it. The gist of the memo’s thrust has persisted. A few months later, out of the blue, Mullen accused the ISI of being complicit with the Haqqani network in the attack on the US embassy in Kabul. When every Pakistani was actively condemning Mullen’s statement, including Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN Hussain Haroon, how come “patriot” Husain Haqqani remained absolutely silent?

Haqqani’s resignation should not close the case; he has much to answer for. Moreover Haqqani could not have risked all this without adequate backing. As the Rasputin who runs things for Zardari in Pakistan, the cutout in the Presidency is believed to be Salman Faruqi. Asked on primetime TV a few weeks ago what the army should do to dismantle the Haqqani network in Fata, I said what was really needed was to dismantle the “Haqqani network” in Washington DC.

Now that the US portion has been dealt with, it is time to dismantle the “Haqqani network” in the Presidency.

The writer is a defence and political analyst.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=79098&Cat=9

 

[Vegitto1]

RE: Memogate *Updates*

The Memogate is currently the most important issue on the political scene in Pakistan So what exactly was in the Memorandum.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BRIEFING FOR ADM. MIKE MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

During the past 72 hours since a meeting was held between the president, the prime minister and the chief of army staff, there has seen a significant deterioration in Pakistan's political atmosphere. Increasingly desperate efforts by the various agencies and factions within the government to find a home - ISI and/or Army, or the civilian government - for assigning blame over the UBL raid now dominate the tug of war between military and civilian sectors. Subsequent ***-for-tat reactions, including outing of the CIA station chief's name in Islamabad by ISI officials, demonstrates a dangerous devolution of the ground situation in Islamabad where no central control appears to be in place.

Civilians cannot withstand much more of the hard pressure being delivered from the Army to succumb to wholesale changes. If civilians are forced from power, Pakistan becomes a sanctuary for UBL's legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of al Qaeda's brand of fanaticism and terror. A unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the UBL matter.

Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington's demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus - that this is a 1971 moment in Pakistan's history.

Should you be willing to do so, Washington's political/military backing would result in a revamp of the civilian government that, while weak at the top echelon in terms of strategic direction and implementation (even though mandated by domestic political forces), in a wholesale manner replaces the national security adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that include ex-military and civilian leaders favorably viewed by Washington, each of whom have long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities. Names will be provided to you in a face-to-face meeting with the person delivering this message.

In the event Washington's direct intervention behind the scenes can be secured through your personal communication with Kayani (he will likely listen only to you at this moment) to stand down the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the civilian apparatus, to do the following:

1. President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL and other senior Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example.

2. The inquiry will be accountable and independent, and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting detail those elements responsible for harboring and aiding UBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan's Government (civilian, intelligence directorates and military). It is certain that the UBL Commission will result in immediate termination of active service officers in the appropriate government offices and agencies found responsible for complicity in assisting UBL.

3. The new national security team will implement a policy of either handing over those left in the leadership of Al Qaeda or other affiliated terrorist groups who are still on Pakistani soil, including Ayman Al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani, or giving US military forces a "green light" to conduct the necessary operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil. This "carte blanche" guarantee is not without political risks, but should demonstrate the new group's commitment to rooting out bad elements on our soil. This commitment has the backing of the top echelon on the civilian side of our house, and we will insure necessary collateral support.

4. One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan's nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government - initially civilian but eventually all three power centers - to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan's nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.

5. The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.

6. We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team's guidance with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This includes handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services.
Pakistan faces a decision point of unprecedented importance. We, who believe in democratic governance and building a much better structural relationship in the region with India AND Afghanistan, seek US assistance to help us pigeon-hole the forces lined up against your interests and ours, including containment of certain elements inside our country that require appropriate re-sets and re-tasking in terms of direction and extent of responsibility after the UBL affair.

We submit this memorandum for your consideration collectively as the members of the new national security team who will be inducted by the President of Pakistan with your support in this undertaking.

ON 2nd December 2011 the Supreme Court made the following Order

ORDER
IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ. -These petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have been instituted on behalf of the petitioners belonging to political parties and others hailing from all the federating units of Pakistan including Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit & Baltistan, in the wake of the confidential memorandum of 10th May, 2011, which was handed over by one Mansoor Ijaz, an American businessman of Pakistani origin to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States through former US National Security Advisor James John. Mansoor Ijaz disclosed in an article published in the Financial Times London on 10th October, 2011. He claimed that the memorandum containing message from the Pakistan Government was handed over to him by the then Pakistan Ambassador Hussain Haqqani. According to him, both Mike Mullen and James John confirmed the contents of the memorandum. Upon such disclosure, there was unrest amongst the political government and the defence agencies as according to the contents of the memorandum, which has now been published in the foreign as well as local media, prima facie, there was highly objectionable material relating to compromising the sovereignty, security and independence of Pakistan. The contents of the memorandum, which have been incorporated in most of the petitions, are reproduced hereinbelow: *

SEE ABOVE FOR MEMORANDUM TEXT

2. It is significant to note that the issue of confidential memorandum was highlighted after 21st November, 2011. In the meanwhile, the then Ambassador of Pakistan to the USA, was summoned who tendered his resignation as per undisputed reports aired on electronic media. It may not be out of context to observe here that as per media reports, the ISI had also collected SMS messages exchanged between the former Ambassador of Pakistan and Mr. Mansoor Ijaz, extracts of which have been incorporated in the petitions.

3. It is to be noted that not only in the publication of the 'Financial Times' of 10th October, 2011, but subsequent thereto, material was published in the print media on behalf of Mr. Mansoor Ijaz, who emphasized that "Mr. Mullen insisted on having the Ambassador's offers to be put in writing because the US Government had been repeatedly deceived by Pakistan's verbal offers of action in the recent past." "He also insisted that I obtain the Ambassador's assurance that President Zardari had approved the offers contained in the memorandum. I did exactly those two things," he told The News. Speaking after Admiral Mullen confirmed the Memo, Mansoor said at 09:06:16 hours, "I spoke to Amb Haqqani at his London hotel (Park Lane Intercontinental Room 430) in a call lasting 11:16 minutes." "During this call, he confessed that the final text of the memo was OK and that he had 'the boss' approval' that the memorandum could be sent to Admiral Mullen. The boss was an obvious reference to President Zardari," Mansoor insisted."

4. We note that exchange of messages has also been admitted as is reported in the UK Financial Times of 10th October, 2011. The Federal Interior Minister Mr. Rahman Malik had, however, admitted that Mr. Hussain Haqqani was involved in communication of voice/text messages with an American national, but there was no written letter, either from the Presidency or from any other agency of the Government. Mr. Malik is reported to have said that no doubt Mr. Haqqani was a close aide of the President, but this communication through SMS (text message) was between two individuals - one American national and the second was our Ambassador.

5. The material available was exchange of SMS messages and blackberry messages and we have to examine as to who had initiated these messages. It is clear that the matter is open for investigation.

6. All the petitioners were asked their opinion as to the objects and purposes for which the confidential memorandum in question attributed to the then Ambassador of Pakistan was sent to the US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by handing it over to James John and also utilizing the services of a businessman Mansoor Ijaz, particularly in the wake of the incident of Abbottabad of 2nd May, 2011. According to them, if the allegations contained hereinabove are established, then the culprits whosoever are involved, should be held liable for action and a Commission be constituted to probe into the memorandum scandal. Whereas the learned Attorney General for Pakistan stated that he is not against the probe, but as the matter is pending before the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, therefore, we should wait for the result of the Committee's proceedings. In our opinion, both the forums are not against probe into the matter and subject to constitutionality of the Committee, proceeding can be taken up simultaneously.

7. It may be observed that under Article 5 of the Constitution, it is the basic duty of every citizen to be loyal to the State and to be obedient to the Constitution and law, being inviolable obligation wherever he may be and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan.

8. The memorandum, issuance whereof, prima facie, seems to be established, has posed immediately two questions - one with regard to civil/constitutional liability with its consequences as envisaged by Article 6 of the Constitution, and the second, the criminal liability as well. We are conscious of the fact that the respondents who include the President of Pakistan, the Army Chief, ISI, etc., have to file their replies to explain their position. However, we may, at this stage, refer to the case of United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States [418 US 683] wherein the then President of the United States was facing proceedings before the Committee of the Senate, and at the same time, pretrial evidence was being collected by a special prosecutor general, which was objected to by him and the matter went up to the US Supreme Court and ultimately it was resolved that such pretrial evidence could be collected. Similarly, there are so many other cases, including the case of Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan (1994 SC 2142) wherein collection of pretrial evidence against persons who are found guilty ultimately is not prohibited.

9. We are told that the Prime Minister of Pakistan has also announced that the Parliamentary Committee on National Security will probe into the matter. We do not know the mandate of the Committee. However, we have been informed that as far as this Committee is concerned, it has no constitutional backing, i.e. it has not been constituted under any provision of the Constitution. Be that as it may, if any incriminating evidence is collected by the Committee both for civil and criminal action by probing into the matter, we would welcome the same. During the pendency of the proceedings, we would appreciate if the outcome of the proposed inquiry by the Committee is shared with us, if possible. Similarly, if the local Commission, which we are contemplating to constitute, succeeds in collecting forensic or other physical evidence, we would also be sharing the same with the Parliamentary Committee because the object and purpose both of the Parliament and of this Court is that there should not be any compromise on the sovereignty, security and independence of the country.

10. The petitioners, however, undoubtedly had to discharge their burden while arguing their cases with regard to the remedy, which they have invoked under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, however, it is considered appropriate that in the meantime, the respondents may file their replies to all the petitions within 15 days of the passing of this order. To protect and preserve the evidence, we would like to appoint a Commission comprising a competent officer for the purpose of collecting evidence on the issues, which have been highlighted hereinabove, including the question of authenticity of the memorandum, and the circumstances under which it was sent and the object behind addressing such memorandum to the high ups of a foreign country, and whether such an act is tantamount to compromising the sovereignty, security and independence of Pakistan.

11. The Registrar of the Court is directed to address a letter on behalf of the Court to Mr. Tariq Khosa, a former PSP officer, who had worked as Secretary Norcotics, DG, FIA as well as Inspector General/PPO, Balochistan to obtain his consent whether he agrees to perform this national duty. On receipt of his consent, the matter shall be handed over to him. The Commission shall be entitled to the remuneration, TA/DA and other perks, which Mr. Tariq Khosa was receiving at the time of his retirement. If need be, Mr. Tariq Khosa may travel outside Pakistan for the purposes of collecting evidence as this Court had allowed such practice in the case of Benazir Bhutto v. State (PLD 1999 SC 937). As far as the expenditures of the Commission are concerned, those shall be borne by the Foreign Affairs, Interior, Cabinet and Defence Divisions.

12. In the meanwhile, we direct that all the concerned authorities of the Federal and the Provincial Governments shall extend their full cooperation to Mr. Tariq Khosa in collecting evidence. He would be free to associate with him any other sitting and/or retired officer of the police or any other technical person to collect evidence. He would be holding the probe in the Cabinet Division. The Cabinet Secretary shall provide him all logistic support for the purpose of performing the function on behalf of the Court. He is required to complete this task as early as possible, preferably within a period of three weeks from the receipt of this order. It is to be noted that in case Mr. Tariq Khosa declines to act as the Commission, he may inform the Registrar who shall place the matter in Chambers for passing of appropriate order for taking up the matter either in the Court or holding proceedings in the Chambers.

13. We may also observe here that no sooner the issue of memorandum came to limelight, the former Ambassador of Pakistan tendered his resignation. We do not want to attribute to him anything adverse about his involvement and he is entitled to due respect. But, we desire that he should fully cooperate with the Commission and during the pendency of the cases before this Court, he would not be leaving the country without prior permission of this Court. This order should be communicated to the Secretaries of the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs with the direction that if Mr. Hussain Haqqani violates the terms of this order and goes abroad, they shall be held personally responsible. At this juncture, we would expect from all the foreign agencies that they will extend full cooperation to the Commission as it is an issue of utmost importance for the sovereignty, security and independence of the country.

14. Adjourned to a date in office.


Sd/*IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ
Sd/-Sd/*MIAN SHAKIRULLAH JAN, J. TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI, J.
Sd/-Sd/*JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J. TARIQ PARVEZ, J.
Sd/-Sd/*MAIN SAQIB NISAR, J. AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J.
Sd/-Sd/*EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J. IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, J.
Islamabad, the 1st December, 2011
APPROVED FOR REPORTING

 

[Vegitto1]

An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate'
Dec 5, 2011 12:00 AM EST

In an analysis of Pakistan’s ‘Memogate,’ Mansoor Ijaz, a key player in the controversy, offers his interpretation of the actions of Islamabad’s erstwhile ambassador in Washington—actions that led to an uproar in Pakistan and the envoy’s ouster.

“This FT op-ed of yours is a disaster,” read a BlackBerry message to me on the night of Oct. 10. The sender, Husain Haqqani, was still Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington at the time. Earlier in the evening, the Financial Times had posted my column—“Time to Take On Pakistan’s Jihadist Spies”—on its website, unleashing a political firestorm in Pakistan over my disclosure of a memorandum Haqqani had asked me to help him prepare and deliver to Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the memorandum, Haqqani asked the admiral for help in calming Pakistan’s restive Army chief as fears of an alleged coup whipped through Islamabad in the tense days that followed Osama bin Laden’s death in a Pakistani garrison town. In return, he offered the United States nothing short of a wholesale paradigm shift in Pakistani governance that would transfer essential powers from the Army to civilian leaders, giving Pakistan the veneer of civilian legitimacy that has eluded it since partition from India.

I have a history of involvement in back-channel diplomacy, particularly between the governments of Pakistan and India on the subject of Kashmir and nuclear proliferation, but it is still important to ask why, in this instance, Haqqani chose to come to me. Perhaps because he had tried other interlocutors to deliver the same message and had been refused. Perhaps because the basis of his request—an alleged coup plot—was only a concocted threat and he needed someone who couldn’t verify the postulation in the short time frame required by the ambassador for action. What I am certain of is that Haqqani believed I was the most plausibly deniable back channel he could use. He knew I was disliked by many in Islamabad’s power circles for my strong anti-establishment views. Haqqani also knew I had the connections to get the message quickly and quietly to Mullen. He knew I maintained friendships with former CIA director James Woolsey, former U.S. national-security adviser Gen. James L. Jones, Reagan “Star Wars” commander Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, and others.

Before I had a chance to read and reply to his BlackBerry message, the ambassador called—“Is there anyone else in Isloo [slang for Islamabad] you know who is a ‘senior Pakistani diplomat’?” he asked hurriedly. This was the phrase I’d used in the op-ed to describe the author of the memo to Mullen. Not wanting to be “outed” as the memo’s author, Haqqani insisted that without another name—any name—that might put Pakistan’s press hounds on another diplomat’s scent, all trails emanating from the memorandum would soon lead back to him—or, worse, to his boss, President Asif Ali Zardari.

The cover-up had begun.

Haqqani would orchestrate denials by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry and President’s House in the days after the FT column was published. When those didn’t douse the flames, he had the gall to warn me that he was about to orchestrate a U.S. denial as well—“Are you sure your side won’t deny?” he wrote by BlackBerry to me at 10:38 p.m. on Nov. 1, a week before Admiral Mullen’s unwitting spokesman issued a confused denial that was later retracted. At 10:39, he all but confirmed his complicity when he wrote, “Is it not the nature of a private mission that officials deny it?”

President Zardari confers with former ambassador Haqqani, B.K.Bangash / AP

In Islamabad, he was telling Zardari that he had it all under control and that the memo flap would disappear in a few days once all the denials were in place. If the acceptance of multiple petitions by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on Dec. 1 is any indication of the seriousness with which Pakistan’s entire governmental infrastructure takes this issue, the memorandum is not going away anytime soon. Certainly not until the full truth comes out.

A few days before the Mullen denial was posted on Foreign Policy’s blog, The Cable, Haqqani changed his BlackBerry handset for the third time since May. Maybe he hoped that changing PINs would erase his damning conversations from my handset. Unfortunately for him, they remain preserved—now in a bank vault—in exactly their original form on my original device as he and I exchanged them. The constant changing of handsets raised the disturbing specter that Haqqani had persuaded his friends in the U.S. intelligence community to assist him in “scrubbing” his BlackBerry records because my disclosures were not just about to lose him his job, but could potentially uncover sensitive matters of U.S. national interest as well. After all, I was not the only entry on Haqqani’s BlackBerry contact list. Other BlackBerry chats could prove highly embarrassing or prove complicity and culpability if they were made public by Supreme Court action in Pakistan.

Why the cover-up? For the record, Haqqani approached me on May 9; I did not approach him. He asked me to assist him in delivering a message (initially verbal) to Mullen. He now denies this. The message’s content and structure were entirely conceived by him and dictated to me in broad form during our initial 16-minute telephone call, with further refinements during the day by telephone, text, and BlackBerry. He received an initial draft of the memorandum from me by email that evening, “tweaked it” (see image below), said he would call the next morning, and then did so at exactly 9:06:16 for 11 minutes to confirm the final draft I had sent him 15 minutes earlier. He then gave me the required consent to proceed. He denies these facts, but facts do not lie. The message, ultimately delivered in writing rather than verbally due to U.S. skepticism about the verbal utterances of Pakistani officials, was sent by General Jones to Admiral Mullen. Haqqani had assured me that he had his “boss’s approval” near the end of that 9:06 a.m. phone call. I in turn assured General Jones in writing that the memorandum had the approval of the highest political level in Pakistan. The “boss” was an obvious reference to Zardari. Haqqani vehemently denies this. In his resignation offer to Zardari, Haqqani said, “At no point was I asked by you or anyone in the Pakistani government to draft a memo and at no point did I draft or deliver such a memo.”

Screen shots of the author’s BlackBerry. (Note: 6/22/2011 is the date of his last communication with Haqqani.), Courtesy of Mansoor Ijaz

The investigatory commission ordered by Pakistan’s Supreme Court will soon determine whether Zardari was (a) the progenitor of his trusted protégé’s elaborate scheme; (b) an after-the-fact approver; or (c) completely out of the loop. My bet is that Zardari initiated the plan, gave Haqqani a blanket power of attorney to handle operational details, and, when it was done, gave him a pat on the back when he returned to Islamabad on May 12 with evidence of the job completed.

Haqqani is now trying to deflect attention, and possible culpability, away from Zardari. But why would he fall on his sword for the man he once dubbed “Mr. 10 Percent”? In my opinion, with the benefit of facts that have come to my attention in the days since my FT column appeared, Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to launch a stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. They may have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakistan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive’s location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result in a nation blaming its armed forces and intelligence services for culpability in harboring bin Laden for so many years. They planned to use the Pakistani public’s hue and cry to force the resignations of Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence chief Gen. Shuja Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed.

If it all went wrong, the Pakistanis could unite in their hatred of America for violating their nation’s sovereignty, with Zardari leading the chorus aimed at Washington. If it went to plan, the long-sought aim of putting civilians (i.e., Zardari & Co.) in charge of the Army would be complete. Washington would have bin Laden’s scalp; Zardari would have Kayani’s and Pasha’s. And U.S. taxpayer-funded aid would flow unabated under the Kerry-Lugar bill in which Haqqani had pushed so hard to include civilian-supremacy language as a sine qua non.

Not a bad plan. Really, not a bad plan.

Unfortunately, plans leave footprints. Consider that Operation Neptune Spear was approved by President Obama at 8:20 a.m. on April 29. After waiting one day for bad weather, the operation commenced. Ask Haqqani where he was during those fateful days prior to, and on the day of, the bin Laden raid. Answer: London. Coincidentally, he would have left at just about the same time Obama gave the green light. Why? Whom did he meet? What did he discuss with his British hosts? Why was he back for another round of meetings with the same people—Sir David Richards, chief of the Defense Staff (Admiral Mullen’s British equivalent), and Tobias Ellwood, parliamentary private secretary to the defense secretary—a week later? For what were characterized as private visits, Haqqani’s appointment agenda was pretty hefty—an agenda that only one man knew about beforehand: Asif Ali Zardari.

What private matter could be so important that it required Pakistan’s eyes and ears in America to be away from his desk on the very day his host country was about to execute one of the most daring military missions in history to kill the world’s most-wanted terrorist on Pakistani soil? Was Haqqani in London so he could plausibly deny having any knowledge of the bin Laden raid on the day it occurred, having just conveyed Zardari’s approval for the raid to the Obama national-security team? Or was he tasked with informing Pakistan’s key allies to keep everyone in the loop—playing the role of a back channel within his own government?

Haqqani made just one critical mistake—seconding me into his scheme. I dislike the brinksmanship and heavy-handed role that Pakistan’s military and intelligence organizations have played throughout the nation’s history, and have said so over and over again. Democracy cannot exist in a police state managed by a thuggish intelligence agency. But I dislike even more feudal civilian cabals that feign love for democracy only to orchestrate their grandiose schemes on important security issues through abuses of power that simply cannot be tolerated in an open society.

Pakistan is much stronger as a result of the disclosures that have arisen after the memorandum became the unintended focus of global media attention. Its frenetic, even chaotic media did their jobs well. Some suffered threats. Yet Pakistani reporters toughed it out. They saw a smokescreen and decided to disperse it. It is this hunger for transparency that the people of Pakistan will now use to choose leaders who serve only the people, not themselves.

Pakistan’s military men may not allow civilian supremacy just yet, but a serious transition seems to be underway to at least make civilian institutions strong enough to coexist on an even footing with the Army in the intermediate term. One day, those civilian institutions may indeed be strong enough to protect Pakistan’s truest national interests: not Kashmir, Afghanistan, and nuclear bombs, but the availability of education, the expansion of trade ties, and the provision of energy to a frustrated nation eager to find prosperity.

Mansoor Ijaz, an American of Pakistani ancestry, negotiated Sudan's offer of counterterrorism assistance to the Clinton administration in 1997. He was also involved in the negotiation of the ceasefire in Kashmir between militants backed by ISI and Pakistan's armed forces and Indian security forces in August 2000.

(Source) http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/04/an-insider-analysis-of-pakistan-s-memogate.html

 

[smoothcriminal]

An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate'
Dec 5, 2011 12:00 AM EST

In an analysis of Pakistan’s ‘Memogate,’ Mansoor Ijaz, a key player in the controversy, offers his interpretation of the actions of Islamabad’s erstwhile ambassador in Washington—actions that led to an uproar in Pakistan and the envoy’s ouster.

“This FT op-ed of yours is a disaster,” read a BlackBerry message to me on the night of Oct. 10. The sender, Husain Haqqani, was still Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington at the time. Earlier in the evening, the Financial Times had posted my column—“Time to Take On Pakistan’s Jihadist Spies”—on its website, unleashing a political firestorm in Pakistan over my disclosure of a memorandum Haqqani had asked me to help him prepare and deliver to Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the memorandum, Haqqani asked the admiral for help in calming Pakistan’s restive Army chief as fears of an alleged coup whipped through Islamabad in the tense days that followed Osama bin Laden’s death in a Pakistani garrison town. In return, he offered the United States nothing short of a wholesale paradigm shift in Pakistani governance that would transfer essential powers from the Army to civilian leaders, giving Pakistan the veneer of civilian legitimacy that has eluded it since partition from India.

I have a history of involvement in back-channel diplomacy, particularly between the governments of Pakistan and India on the subject of Kashmir and nuclear proliferation, but it is still important to ask why, in this instance, Haqqani chose to come to me. Perhaps because he had tried other interlocutors to deliver the same message and had been refused. Perhaps because the basis of his request—an alleged coup plot—was only a concocted threat and he needed someone who couldn’t verify the postulation in the short time frame required by the ambassador for action. What I am certain of is that Haqqani believed I was the most plausibly deniable back channel he could use. He knew I was disliked by many in Islamabad’s power circles for my strong anti-establishment views. Haqqani also knew I had the connections to get the message quickly and quietly to Mullen. He knew I maintained friendships with former CIA director James Woolsey, former U.S. national-security adviser Gen. James L. Jones, Reagan “Star Wars” commander Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, and others.

Before I had a chance to read and reply to his BlackBerry message, the ambassador called—“Is there anyone else in Isloo [slang for Islamabad] you know who is a ‘senior Pakistani diplomat’?” he asked hurriedly. This was the phrase I’d used in the op-ed to describe the author of the memo to Mullen. Not wanting to be “outed” as the memo’s author, Haqqani insisted that without another name—any name—that might put Pakistan’s press hounds on another diplomat’s scent, all trails emanating from the memorandum would soon lead back to him—or, worse, to his boss, President Asif Ali Zardari.

The cover-up had begun.

Haqqani would orchestrate denials by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry and President’s House in the days after the FT column was published. When those didn’t douse the flames, he had the gall to warn me that he was about to orchestrate a U.S. denial as well—“Are you sure your side won’t deny?” he wrote by BlackBerry to me at 10:38 p.m. on Nov. 1, a week before Admiral Mullen’s unwitting spokesman issued a confused denial that was later retracted. At 10:39, he all but confirmed his complicity when he wrote, “Is it not the nature of a private mission that officials deny it?”

President Zardari confers with former ambassador Haqqani, B.K.Bangash / AP

In Islamabad, he was telling Zardari that he had it all under control and that the memo flap would disappear in a few days once all the denials were in place. If the acceptance of multiple petitions by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on Dec. 1 is any indication of the seriousness with which Pakistan’s entire governmental infrastructure takes this issue, the memorandum is not going away anytime soon. Certainly not until the full truth comes out.

A few days before the Mullen denial was posted on Foreign Policy’s blog, The Cable, Haqqani changed his BlackBerry handset for the third time since May. Maybe he hoped that changing PINs would erase his damning conversations from my handset. Unfortunately for him, they remain preserved—now in a bank vault—in exactly their original form on my original device as he and I exchanged them. The constant changing of handsets raised the disturbing specter that Haqqani had persuaded his friends in the U.S. intelligence community to assist him in “scrubbing” his BlackBerry records because my disclosures were not just about to lose him his job, but could potentially uncover sensitive matters of U.S. national interest as well. After all, I was not the only entry on Haqqani’s BlackBerry contact list. Other BlackBerry chats could prove highly embarrassing or prove complicity and culpability if they were made public by Supreme Court action in Pakistan.

Why the cover-up? For the record, Haqqani approached me on May 9; I did not approach him. He asked me to assist him in delivering a message (initially verbal) to Mullen. He now denies this. The message’s content and structure were entirely conceived by him and dictated to me in broad form during our initial 16-minute telephone call, with further refinements during the day by telephone, text, and BlackBerry. He received an initial draft of the memorandum from me by email that evening, “tweaked it” (see image below), said he would call the next morning, and then did so at exactly 9:06:16 for 11 minutes to confirm the final draft I had sent him 15 minutes earlier. He then gave me the required consent to proceed. He denies these facts, but facts do not lie. The message, ultimately delivered in writing rather than verbally due to U.S. skepticism about the verbal utterances of Pakistani officials, was sent by General Jones to Admiral Mullen. Haqqani had assured me that he had his “boss’s approval” near the end of that 9:06 a.m. phone call. I in turn assured General Jones in writing that the memorandum had the approval of the highest political level in Pakistan. The “boss” was an obvious reference to Zardari. Haqqani vehemently denies this. In his resignation offer to Zardari, Haqqani said, “At no point was I asked by you or anyone in the Pakistani government to draft a memo and at no point did I draft or deliver such a memo.”

Screen shots of the author’s BlackBerry. (Note: 6/22/2011 is the date of his last communication with Haqqani.), Courtesy of Mansoor Ijaz

The investigatory commission ordered by Pakistan’s Supreme Court will soon determine whether Zardari was (a) the progenitor of his trusted protégé’s elaborate scheme; (b) an after-the-fact approver; or (c) completely out of the loop. My bet is that Zardari initiated the plan, gave Haqqani a blanket power of attorney to handle operational details, and, when it was done, gave him a pat on the back when he returned to Islamabad on May 12 with evidence of the job completed.

Haqqani is now trying to deflect attention, and possible culpability, away from Zardari. But why would he fall on his sword for the man he once dubbed “Mr. 10 Percent”? In my opinion, with the benefit of facts that have come to my attention in the days since my FT column appeared, Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to launch a stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. They may have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakistan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive’s location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result in a nation blaming its armed forces and intelligence services for culpability in harboring bin Laden for so many years. They planned to use the Pakistani public’s hue and cry to force the resignations of Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence chief Gen. Shuja Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed.

If it all went wrong, the Pakistanis could unite in their hatred of America for violating their nation’s sovereignty, with Zardari leading the chorus aimed at Washington. If it went to plan, the long-sought aim of putting civilians (i.e., Zardari & Co.) in charge of the Army would be complete. Washington would have bin Laden’s scalp; Zardari would have Kayani’s and Pasha’s. And U.S. taxpayer-funded aid would flow unabated under the Kerry-Lugar bill in which Haqqani had pushed so hard to include civilian-supremacy language as a sine qua non.

Not a bad plan. Really, not a bad plan.

Unfortunately, plans leave footprints. Consider that Operation Neptune Spear was approved by President Obama at 8:20 a.m. on April 29. After waiting one day for bad weather, the operation commenced. Ask Haqqani where he was during those fateful days prior to, and on the day of, the bin Laden raid. Answer: London. Coincidentally, he would have left at just about the same time Obama gave the green light. Why? Whom did he meet? What did he discuss with his British hosts? Why was he back for another round of meetings with the same people—Sir David Richards, chief of the Defense Staff (Admiral Mullen’s British equivalent), and Tobias Ellwood, parliamentary private secretary to the defense secretary—a week later? For what were characterized as private visits, Haqqani’s appointment agenda was pretty hefty—an agenda that only one man knew about beforehand: Asif Ali Zardari.

What private matter could be so important that it required Pakistan’s eyes and ears in America to be away from his desk on the very day his host country was about to execute one of the most daring military missions in history to kill the world’s most-wanted terrorist on Pakistani soil? Was Haqqani in London so he could plausibly deny having any knowledge of the bin Laden raid on the day it occurred, having just conveyed Zardari’s approval for the raid to the Obama national-security team? Or was he tasked with informing Pakistan’s key allies to keep everyone in the loop—playing the role of a back channel within his own government?

Haqqani made just one critical mistake—seconding me into his scheme. I dislike the brinksmanship and heavy-handed role that Pakistan’s military and intelligence organizations have played throughout the nation’s history, and have said so over and over again. Democracy cannot exist in a police state managed by a thuggish intelligence agency. But I dislike even more feudal civilian cabals that feign love for democracy only to orchestrate their grandiose schemes on important security issues through abuses of power that simply cannot be tolerated in an open society.

Pakistan is much stronger as a result of the disclosures that have arisen after the memorandum became the unintended focus of global media attention. Its frenetic, even chaotic media did their jobs well. Some suffered threats. Yet Pakistani reporters toughed it out. They saw a smokescreen and decided to disperse it. It is this hunger for transparency that the people of Pakistan will now use to choose leaders who serve only the people, not themselves.

Pakistan’s military men may not allow civilian supremacy just yet, but a serious transition seems to be underway to at least make civilian institutions strong enough to coexist on an even footing with the Army in the intermediate term. One day, those civilian institutions may indeed be strong enough to protect Pakistan’s truest national interests: not Kashmir, Afghanistan, and nuclear bombs, but the availability of education, the expansion of trade ties, and the provision of energy to a frustrated nation eager to find prosperity.

Mansoor Ijaz, an American of Pakistani ancestry, negotiated Sudan's offer of counterterrorism assistance to the Clinton administration in 1997. He was also involved in the negotiation of the ceasefire in Kashmir between militants backed by ISI and Pakistan's armed forces and Indian security forces in August 2000.

(Source) http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/04/an-insider-analysis-of-pakistan-s-memogate.html

Is he serious? I'm too exhausted to get into this, but to think that two civilians could strategically co-ordinate a plan with the United States against the "Establishment" without knowledge of any other members of the civilian administration as well is pretty far-fetched. If they did have such a plan in place, the fact that PM Gilani came out two days later in full support of the Establishment shows that it didn't go far at all. Pretty unimaginative plan that had not the slightest notion of being aggressive against the army and the ISI. Also, if this kind of plan was hatched, then Haqqani as an Ambassador had no need to go day in day out on American media defending the Pakistan army. He could have just easily denied to comment on the whole issue or leave something to the imagination of the press.

Zardari's main claim to fame is his ties with the Establishment, and I think he is smart enough to realize that he cant come up with grand conspiracies like these.

 

[Mohsin]

Asma Jahangir....Hussain Haqqani...go hand in hand tbh

 

[Markhor]

Report: Lawyer quits Haqqani defence

http://gulfnews.com/news/world/pakistan/report-lawyer-quits-haqqani-defence-1.959796

Islamabad: Eminent Pakistani lawyer Asma Jahangir has refused to continue representing former ambassador to the US Hussain Haqqani before the Supreme Court in the memo scandal case, she said in an interview to a local television channel yesterday.

Asma, a former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association, alleged that the judges on a nine-member bench hearing the case were under the influence of the establishment, a reference to the powerful military, according to the Dawn News channel.

The bench led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry appointed on Friday a three-member judicial commission to probe the "authenticity and purpose" of an alleged memo in May asking Washington to help avert a feared coup attempt in Pakistan.

US businessman Mansour Ejaz had triggered the scandal in October by claiming the memo was sent through him by Haqqani in May to then US military chief Admiral Mike Mullen, days after the killing of Osama Bin Laden.

Asma told the channel that said she did not trust the commission formed by the bench to investigate the scandal.

She also said Haqqani feared the powerful spy agencies may force him into giving a statement and that was the reason behind the former ambassador's stay at the Prime Minister House since his arrival in Islamabad in November when he resigned.

Maintainability

Asma said that the Supreme Court's decision in favour of maintainability of petitions concerning the memo episode was a victory for the country's establishment. The law was being used to transform the country into a "security state", she said.

The petitions seeking a judicial probe into the scandal had been filed by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, head of the country's main opposition party, as well as a number of other citizens.

The commission, which is due to start its work with a preparatory meeting in Islamabad today, is required to complete its task in one month after which the Supreme Court bench will resume proceedings in the case.

The chief justice of Balochistan High Court, Justice Qazi Faiz Eisa, heads the commission and its members are Islamabad High Court Chief Justice Iqbal Hameed-ur-Rahman and Sindh High Court Chief Justice Mushir Alam.

The channel quoted sources in the judiciary as saying the commission's secretary has issued notices to respondents to the petitions on the memo case, including the ISI chief Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha, Haqqani, Pakistani-American businessman Ejaz, Attorney General Maulvi Anwar-ul-Haq, secretaries of the cabinet, interior and foreign affairs divisions and former US adviser on national security James Jones.

The commission will exercise powers of judicial officers and will be free to obtain services of advocates, forensic and cyber crime experts.

 

[zimmz]

^ main nahi khedna main nahi khedna

 

[Black Zero]

^ main nahi khedna main nahi khedna

ask Kurd or Asima (who fought hard for CJ)
on Azad Adlia

 

[ahsan88]

Asma was dynamite on Dawn last night.

 

[AZ]

ISLAMABAD: Central character of the memogate scandal, Mansoor Ijaz refused to appear before the memo commission on January 9, DawnNews reported on Friday.

In a letter to the memo commission, Mansoor Ijaz placed a total of 19 conditions to be fulfilled before he appears before the commission.

Ijaz said that he would first record a statement in England before coming to Pakistan.

Moreover, he also expressed reservations about his security, and demanded that the commission ensure his protection.

Ijaz also stated that he was unable to appear before the investigative commission before January 15.

Ijaz’s lawyer Akram Sheikh on Friday said that Ijaz would come to Pakistan on the condition that he is provided complete protection.

“Mansoor Ijaz is not the establishment’s ‘favourite’..he should therefore be assured of his security,” said Akram Sheikh.

Speaking to DawnNews, Zahid Bukhari, lawyer for former Ambassador to the US Hussain Haqaani said that Ijaz’s reservations were only “imaginary.”

“This is an excuse. Ijaz is trying to run away from the issue,” said Zahid Bukhari.

http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/06/ijaz...m=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed:+dawn/news+(DAWN)

 

[ahsan88]

^^ Hahaha.

Usay abhi briefing nahi mili on the next move.

 

[AZ]

^ lagta hai uska Blackberry naheen chal raha.

 

[Law]

ISLAMABAD: Central character of the memogate scandal, Mansoor Ijaz refused to appear before the memo commission on January 9, DawnNews reported on Friday.

In a letter to the memo commission, Mansoor Ijaz placed a total of 19 conditions to be fulfilled before he appears before the commission.

Ijaz said that he would first record a statement in England before coming to Pakistan.

Moreover, he also expressed reservations about his security, and demanded that the commission ensure his protection.

Ijaz also stated that he was unable to appear before the investigative commission before January 15.

Ijaz’s lawyer Akram Sheikh on Friday said that Ijaz would come to Pakistan on the condition that he is provided complete protection.

“Mansoor Ijaz is not the establishment’s ‘favourite’..he should therefore be assured of his security,” said Akram Sheikh.

Speaking to DawnNews, Zahid Bukhari, lawyer for former Ambassador to the US Hussain Haqaani said that Ijaz’s reservations were only “imaginary.”

“This is an excuse. Ijaz is trying to run away from the issue,” said Zahid Bukhari.

http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/06/ijaz...m=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed:+dawn/news+(DAWN)

Yar waisay bara hi koi aakhri ontri ka beta hai ye bhi.. Is tarah k bandon ka naam muhallay mein "billu mori" rakha hota hai..

 

[AZ]

Mansoor Ijaz not coming back to Pak, according to GEO News.

 

[AZ]

Mian sahab's attorney saying its no big deal, real evidence is BBM transcripts, video conferencing can be done if required too.

HH's lawyer saying its a victory for us, MI is a liar and this proves it

 

[zimmz]

Apparently Zardari left for Dubai once again! Expecting another drama episode out of this news if true.

 

[AZ]

are Kayani and Mushy on good terms?

 

[smoothcriminal]

Both Mansoor Ejaz and HH are not telling the complete truth. They both knew each other pretty well and the BBM transcripts are probably legitimate, however the memo itself is a hard one to SELL/PROVE to a court considering HH's contacts in Washington, it being an unsigned and the fact that both Mullen and Jones refuse to link HH with it( The notion that they have ulterior motives for doing so is irrelevant for evidence sake).

 

[smoothcriminal]

are Kayani and Mushy on good terms?

Cant see why not. Under Mush, Kayani served as both ISI head and then COAS. I'm sure Musharraf carefully planned having Kiyani as COAS preparing him for all contingencies. Also, one of the(few) good qualities about the military's institutional structure is that friction widely goes unreported and is resolved behind closed doors.

 

[Vegitto1]

Mansoor Ejaz is militarys trump card. If army is able to re-conciliate with the government then he will not come to Pakistan and Memogate will be dismissed due to lack of substantial evidence. (i.e. the person who made the accusation failed to turn up)

However, if Government and army carry on down the confrontation path then Mansoor Ejaz will be called upon and that would bring a swift end to PPPs regime.

The NRO and memogate allow room for government to save face, even though it is very limited room and they will come off worse, however the very existence of these get out clauses indicate that Army is trying to avoid having to impose martial law as much as possible.

PS: the sacking of Defence Minister will be used as a cover-story once things patch up between the army and government. All the blame would be put on Defence Minsiter for PM slip of tongue when he called the submissions of Army Cheif and DG ISI to SC illegal and unconstitutional.

 

[ahsan88]

^^ Defense Secretary not Minister.

 

[AZ]

Cant see why not. Under Mush, Kayani served as both ISI head and then COAS. I'm sure Musharraf carefully planned having Kiyani as COAS preparing him for all contingencies. Also, one of the(few) good qualities about the military's institutional structure is that friction widely goes unreported and is resolved behind closed doors.

Pata nai more than a few people are saying that they don't get along any more...

 

[saadibaba]

Looks like the Memogate issue which rocked the foundations of our country have been reduced to ramblings of an unstable and egotistical mind with delusions of grandeur. What a farce. Read this.

ISLAMABAD: The memo conundrum finally seems to head its climax with the testimony of US businessman Mansoor Ijaz submitted to the memo commission by his counsel.

The testimony which is almost the ditto version of Ijaz’s earlier affidavit he tendered before the apex court, however, ends up without establishing ‘incontrovertible’ evidence of Husain Haqqani’s link to the memo, as claimed by Mansoor Ijaz more than once.

It is interesting to note that throughout the period, surrounding the controversy, Mansoor Ijaz had minced no words to claim he would establish the link between the alleged memo and Husain Haqqani, but his claims seems to have boiled down to a bunch of hand written notes he drafted himself but claims these were rather ‘dictated’ to him during a telephonic conversation with Haqqani.

There is no direct reference to any alleged memo in BBM or text messages that took place between the two with most of the traffic originating from Mansoor Ijaz side suggesting Ijaz might have been creating a trail of BBMs to be used for any sinister designs later on.

The electronic time and dates, discernible by default, establish that majority of BBMs have taken place after delivery of alleged memo to Gen James Jones and not the vice versa.In his testimony, nowhere did Ijaz show any BBM or email from Haqqani to Ijaz written before drafting and delivering the memo on 9th May 2011 soliciting Ijaz to write and send the memo if indeed the memo was Haqqani’s idea?

Although Mansoor Ijaz’s statement speaks of his relations with Haqqani, it ends up supporting Haqqani’s version of that relationship which according to Haqqani was only for the sake of courtesy. Haqqani maintains there might have been irregular email contacts but only four meetings between the two.

Ijaz openly acknowledges closer ties with the military-intelligence establishment and all of Ijaz’s trips to Pakistan in the last few years were to meet Pakistani establishment officials.

Mansoor Ijaz in his testimony seems to have denied his own claim he made in his October 10, 2011 ‘op-ed’ in Financial Times that led to a political storm in Pakistan.

In that article Ijaz had claimed from the onset a ‘senior Pakistani’ diplomat had telephoned him on May 9 with an urgent request whereas in his email message to Gen James Jones sent with alleged memo and part of his evidence he avers: “I am attaching herewith a document that has been prepared by senior active and former Pakistani government officials some of whom served at the highest levels of the military-intelligence directorates in recent years and as senior political officers of the civilian government”.

Both the claims made at different point in times appear to contradict each other.Legal experts believe that this gives weight to Gen Jones’ version of events given in his affidavit, where he says Mansoor Ijaz never mentioned Haqqani as the source of the memo and never said anything that would have led Gen Jones to believe that Haqqani had anything to do with the memo.

Although, Mansoor Ijaz claims that Haqqani asked him to call him by sending a BBM when latter arrived in London on 9th May, most phone calls and BBM messages and all emails are from Mansoor Ijaz to Haqqani.

The communications log provided in the witness statement support Haqqani’s version that he kept in touch with Mansoor Ijaz as a courtesy as he made only two short phone calls of less than two minutes each to Mansoor Ijaz without any mention of memo or its contents. The flow of BBM and text messages suggests Ijaz was more inquisitive than Husain Haqqani to ‘keep the ball rolling’ for unknown reasons

.

 

[saadibaba]

The above is from The News. Not some pro government or pro Haqqani media group.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=93330&Cat=2#.Tz9_Po6gMkg.twitter

 

[ahsan88]

Always knew this was a farce, just to get rid of Haqqani.

 

[Savak]

The government has succeeding in scaring Mansoor Ijaz away and for delaying the entire thing long enough for it to lose steam. Just like Zardari telling a geo news reporter "Aap ko lagta ho ga ke PIA or Railways diwalia kee taraf ja raha hai magar mujhe nahee lagta". More like "Yeah i am looting, plundering, destroying the country, what are you going to do about it? Can you stop me? Who says i am a crook, go cry a river somewhere else".

This nation deserves thugs and gangsters ruling it.

 

[Savak]

How did the PPP survive this scandal?

 

[Eagle_Eye]

How did the PPP survive this scandal?

They didn't.... they became irrelevant and will be out of government forever.

Once NS has his comeuppance, Zardari will be next.

 

[Slog]

They didn't.... they became irrelevant and will be out of government forever.

tbh this has been said many times about them before as well...

 

[Mian]

2011: Nawaz Sharif going into SC on a signal from Kayani to derail Zardari govt and to secure Sharifs future, Asma Jahangir coming to rescue Hussain Haqani. Now fast forward to 2014 Dherna and you see Zardari and Nawaz sharing same bed eat 70 dishes in Raiwind and calling IK an army stooge and Asma acting as their spoke person in media!

Pakistan politics is full of fun [MENTION=1269]Bewal Express[/MENTION]

 

[Bewal Express]

2011: Nawaz Sharif going into SC on a signal from Kayani to derail Zardari govt and to secure Sharifs future, Asma Jahangir coming to rescue Hussain Haqani. Now fast forward to 2014 Dherna and you see Zardari and Nawaz sharing same bed eat 70 dishes in Raiwind and calling IK an army stooge and Asma acting as their spoke person in media!

Pakistan politics is full of fun [MENTION=1269]Bewal Express[/MENTION]

So the democratic NS conspires with a corrupt General to overthrow AZ, and apparently IK is the puppet. Noora losers!

 

[LegendInzi]

So the democratic NS conspires with a corrupt General to overthrow AZ, and apparently IK is the puppet. Noora losers!

You're a puppet until you come to power

 

[Bewal Express]

You're a puppet until you come to power

Why didnt NS charge Kayani for subverting the course of justice?