The Origins of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with the U.S.A

[smoothcriminal]

http://zehnighulami.blogspot.com/2010/12/origins-of-pakistans-foreign-policy.html


On October 22nd, 2010 it was announced that Washington would be providing the Pakistan military with a new $2 billion military aid package in a joint effort to combat extremism in Afghanistan (And North-West regions of Pakistan). The general consensus amongst Pakistanis has not been one of enthusiasm as they generally feel that the United States/Pakistan military diplomacy cripples not only Pakistan’s future as a stable state but also appears contrary to Pakistan’s identity. The people of Pakistan have also questioned the United States and their intentions in regards to being engaged in a fragile relationship with Pakistan. If one is to understand whether our current diplomacy with the United States appears contrary to our identity, one has to examine the origins of not only our current foreign policy with the United States, but the origins of diplomacy with the United States and what caused that diplomacy to connect.

The origin of Pakistan’s foreign policy has not been shaped by Pakistan’s quest for imperial dominance or a sense of commercial expansionism. It has rather been shaped by one factor. Pakistan’s struggle for survival originated itself in the late 1940’s and has characterized Pakistani diplomacy ever since. The partition of India made sure that Pakistan inherited problems that would quite simply be impossible to tackle. Pakistan inherited three main problems.

1. India’s reluctance to initially accept Pakistan: Husain Haqqani, in his book “Between Mosque and Military” and Stephen Cohen in his book “ The Idea of Pakistan” share similar sentiments in regards to how India and its leaders perceived the independence of Pakistan. According to Haqqani, “when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country.” Cohen shares similar sentiments. “ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”



2. Pakistan’s non-existent Economy due to partition: Cohen and Haqqani also share similar viewpoints in regards to how the partition adversely affected Pakistan’s economy. Haqqani, in analyzing the newly established Pakistan industries, writes, “Pakistan produced 75 percent of the world’s jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India’s cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had ‘only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills… The flight of capital was attributed to ‘uncertainties about Pakistan’s capacity to survive and the communal disturbances…within days of independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India’s assets, both financial and military. India’s decision to delay transferring Pakistan’s share of assets increased the bitterness of partition.” Infact, Stephen Cohen writes critically that the obvious detrimental effects of partition were so incriminating against India that “ it was Gandhi who undertook a fast unto death to protest India’s retention of Pakistan’s assets and Hindu and Sikh attacks on Muslims in India.”

3. Kashmir: Perhaps what the final striking blow between India and Pakistan was Pakistan’s notion that India (Nehru) had refused to fulfill his promise of a Kashmir plebiscite in 1947. Hari Singh, who was a Hindu ruler of a Muslim-majority Kashmir in 1947, had to chose on whether to accede to Pakistan, India or stay independent. The Maharaja was primarily interested in economic benefits and was not influenced by the emotions of partition, as he had enjoyed a great level of autonomy during Colonial rule in India. The Maharaja was motivated essentially by economic stability, thus he decided to accede to India in return for commercial/economic benefits( due to partition favoring India in terms of stable institutions). The Muslims in Pakistan felt betrayed, and thus tribal groups from NWFP tried to restore Kashmir under Muslim rule. Due to lack of co-ordination between Pakistan’s (new formed) army and the rebel fighters, they were not successful, and thus Kashmir’s proposed elections went into a state of limbo. What ignited furor amongst Pakistanis was also the fact was Junagarh’s(Hindu majority state) assimilation with India, even though it had a Muslim ruler.

Pakistan’s viewpoint of India deceiving them with promised plebiscites only ensured their perspective that India was “against” Pakistan. Pakistan’s frustration only grew as time went by due to their lack of political influence over the region. Walter Wallbank writes that by the mid 1950’s the Kashmir’s “ development had been in India’s favor. A constituent assembly had been elected which had ensured Sheikh Abdullah’s pro-Indian part, the National Conference, of overwhelming control of the country. To all intents and purposes only one party had been allowed to participate in this selection.” Kashmir would become Pakistan’s core issue for decades to come.



Pakistan was essentially a ticking time bomb. Its economy was dismantling before it could stand on its own two feet, while a bigger/more powerful nation was waiting for its imminent demise. While Pakistan was figuring out its internal problems, it had to set a mandate for its external policies, namely its diplomacy. Driven primarily by economic interests along with security against India, Pakistan went out to take advantage of the Cold War syndrome. As the weaker nation, Pakistan’s establishment decided to seek alliance with the Western world. Perhaps what is most interesting is the fact that even though Pakistan’s diplomacy with the United States was shaped primarily after Jinnah’s death, Jinnah would have envisioned the same kind of foreign policy as that employed by the leaders that succeeded him.

In an interview with Life Magazine in 1947, Jinnah claimed that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America…Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed…. [on] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Centering Pakistan as a pivotal geographical location for the chess game between the United States and Russia, Jinnah claimed that “America is now awakened,” and “ if Russia walks in here, the whole world is menaced.” Jinnah would finally assert; “surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in.” Thus, Pakistan’s diplomacy in the 1950’s was in actuality a mere continuation of what her Founder had envisioned. Jinnah understood Pakistan’s vulnerability, and he understood that Pakistan’s geographical position could be pivotal in securing its economic/military interest for the future.

The unofficial war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir in 1948 created paranoia amongst Pakistani leaders that India would seize upon any opportunity to purposely weaken Pakistan and its sovereignty. Pakistan army’s (alleged) use of irregular forces in 1948 only raised the question as to how strong the Pakistan army really was, and whether it could sustain a possible attack from India. Besides, Pakistan’s military institution never wanted to create an illusion that they were militarily weaker than India(even though India’s population alone makes a striking case against Pakistan’s military). Kashmir as an issue was far from solved for Pakistani leaders in the 1950’s, and thus they envisioned foreign assistance that would strengthen their military institution for a possible future operation in Kashmir.

According to historian Walter Walbank, Liaqat Ali Khan enforced Jinnah’s viewpoint in 1951. “ Liaquat Ali Khan…went to the United States and Canada. Apparently it was the prime minister’s tactic to use the possibility of Russian ties as a means of exerting pressure on Western nations, especially in obtaining support in Kashmir… Pakistan definitely moved away from a position of non-alignment in the direction of closer relations with the West, especially the Untied States.” Pakistan’s defense treaty with the United States ensured that a substantial amount of military equipment be made available to Pakistan[Some estimates claim that United States covered 50% expense of Pakistan’s total budget of defense]. The strong ties between the United States and Pakistan would also be shown in Pakistan’s association with The Baghdad Pact of 1955, which assured Pakistan’s strong link with the United States in fighting Soviet Communism in Central Asia.

As Stephen Cohen notes, “ From 1954 to 1965 Pakistan was allowed to purchase weapons and received a mixture of military assistance in the form of grants and aid…This enabled it to build a modern army and a very efficient air force whose quality was enhanced by cooperative arrangement with several Gulf States.” The magnitude of United States’ military assistance to Pakistan is clearly evident by the fact that General Ayub Khan in 1965 launched “Operation Gibralter” to liberate Kashmir. The failure of Operation Gibraltar, combined with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s policy of alienation towards the United States ended the first term of military assistance by the United States to Pakistan. The second Phase would start in 1979 with Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s foreign relations in the late 1940’s and 1950’s were formed primarily by its internal dilemmas that it faced. Fear from India’s superior military institution( due to partition and population) combined with the unfortunate state of the economy due to the 1947 partition made Pakistan rely on a foreign entity that would ensure its survival. The United States required Pakistan as an ally in order to combat possible Soviet influence in Middle East/Asia, while Pakistan required the United States as an ally in order to essentially give her breathing space against its nemesis India. Pakistan’s diplomacy in the late 1940’s and the decade of 1950’s was one structured by practicality. This practicality was essential to make a nation so hard-struck by partition survive. Perhaps what it is most ironic is the fact that 63 years later Pakistan is still in a rather similar state of “survival”, while its biggest military benefactor still remains the United States and India remains Pakistan’s biggest foe.

 

[Jadz]

Great article. Very well-written and researched, Ma Sha Allah. Hope to add more later, In Sha Allah Ta'aala.

Keep writing.

 

[FastBowler]

Quaid's views (obviously versed to promote Pakistan's importance) are very interesting. What would he do now, I wonder, in relation to the alliance with the US and the drone attacks and the WoT?

 

[ShehryarK]

http://zehnighulami.blogspot.com/2010/12/origins-of-pakistans-foreign-policy.html

Very interesting article. Are you the author?

1. India’s reluctance to initially accept Pakistan: Husain Haqqani, in his book “Between Mosque and Military” and Stephen Cohen in his book “ The Idea of Pakistan” share similar sentiments in regards to how India and its leaders perceived the independence of Pakistan. According to Haqqani, “when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country.” Cohen shares similar sentiments. “ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”

Very true. Alhamdolillah that we have been proving these naysayers and ill-wishers wrong for over 60 years and will continue to do so, Inshallah.

Pakistan wasn't expected to survive a few months.

Yet, not only have we survived, in so many ways we have also thrived.

 

[moumotta]

The Maharaja was motivated essentially by economic stability, thus he decided to accede to India in return for commercial/economic benefits( due to partition favoring India in terms of stable institutions). The Muslims in Pakistan felt betrayed, and thus tribal groups from NWFP tried to restore Kashmir under Muslim rule.​

That is clearly an incorrect sequence of events. The tribals invaded Kashmir first. While there is debate on what part Pakistan government played in initiating the attacks and organising the tribals it is widely accepted that they were at the least provided with logistic support, transport and supplies by offcials.

Hari Singh signed accession only after the invaders were closing in on his capital.

 

[ShehryarK]

While there is debate on what part Pakistan government played in initiating the attacks and organising the tribals it is widely accepted that they were at the least provided with logistic support, transport and supplies by offcials.

Agreed with this. And I don't think the article explicitly denies that.

Hari Singh signed accession only after the invaders were closing in on his capital.

But he was dithering till that point, needlessly delaying it and it was felt by Pakistan that he had all but done a deal with India and was waiting for the right moment to formalise it - ie a 'double game' where the outcome was already sealed.

 

[moumotta]

Agreed with this. And I don't think the article explicitly denies that.

But he was dithering till that point, needlessly delaying it and it was felt by Pakistan that he had all but done a deal with India and was waiting for the right moment to formalise it - ie a 'double game' where the outcome was already sealed.

Thats all conjecture that most historians would disagree with. For the article to state that the tribal attack was in response to maharaja's decision to accede to India is factually inaccurate.

 

[ShehryarK]

Thats all conjecture that most historians would disagree with.

Most Indian historians.

Its not conjecture - its the only logical and sensible conclusion.

 

[moumotta]

Most Indian historians.

Its not conjecture - its the only logical and sensible conclusion.

Please quote me any non-indian (and non-pakistani if you may) historians who say that the maharaja had already made up his decision to join India and the tribal attacks were launched as a result of his decision.

 

[KB]

That is clearly an incorrect sequence of events. The tribals invaded Kashmir first. While there is debate on what part Pakistan government played in initiating the attacks and organising the tribals it is widely accepted that they were at the least provided with logistic support, transport and supplies by offcials.

This is I agree with, but it is not the full story. In Jammu there was ethnic cleansing of brutal proportions carried out by state forces on Muslims. Historian Ian Talbot notes that Indian authors are "generally reticent" to acknowledge the "orgy of communal violence in Jammu province which was orchestrated by the state police and Dogra armed forces," which sparked a "flood" of fleeing Muslim refugees to Sialkot and the West Punjab.

He goes on to write, "their miserable conditions undoubtedly encouraged support for the subsequent Pakhtun incursion among some Pakistani officials. They saw the jihad as not only avenging the Muslim victims, but as the best means of preventing further mass migrations into Pakistan. They quite rightly saw that the killings [by the state police and Dogra armed forces] were not random but formed a policy of 'ethnic cleansing'."

As for Pakistani government involvement, Talbot says "The balance of evidence seems to indicate that the Pakistan Government did not instigate the tribal incursion which was a spontaneous jihad. Nevertheless provincial officials and politicians in NWFP and West Punjab sympathised with the action and on occasions assisted the transit of the tribesman. British officials' testimonies tend to support the 'official' Pakistani line that attempts to halt the tribesman would have resulted in widespread violence."

On the issues raised by smoothcriminal, Pakistan began life with two hundred million rupees in its treasury and debts if four hundred million. The cost of armed forces alone was 50 million a month. Pakistan also started with a very low industrial base. It also clearly perceived a threat to its existence from India and inherited the frontier regions.

Therefore there was clearly no way for Pakistan to square the financial resource base with defence requirements, without looking for outside help. Britain is broke after the War, so it is America that many Pakistani official look to. This also created tension between Bengal and West Pakistani officials and politicians. The former were less keen on a pro-US foreign policy, whereas the latter much more inclined towards it.

 

[Krishnan]

Contradictions from the first point

“ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”

If indian national congress had expected a immediate collapse,they should have accepted partition happily and not grudgingly, as they would have easily integrated the area into the indian union.There were leaders who wanted partition,there were some who dint not want.Gandhi desperately try to salvage the situation without partition,but once the riots happened he accepted it grudgingly.The first part of statement is right,the second part is wrong .

Point 2-Vice versa,in india we had only 25 percent of raw material(both cotton and jute).Ask any country in the world whether you would prefer huge amounts of raw material,or huge amounts of mills,you would get the answer.Today these mills serve no use,most of them are rotting.Everyone had to upgrade technology,bring in new machines,ultimately due to escalating cost and competition from foreign markets,many of them shut down.

But most of the raw materials will be forever valuable

Point 3 would take huge writing-there were sure mistakes on both sides.


But these are the sort of articles which will further widen the gap between india and pakistan.Any article should indicate both positives and negatives(like india agreed partition of bengal,nwfp,sindh etc.Even these points should be mentioned.Not just india is wrong,india dint offer plebiscite to kashmir,etc etc.Similarly our articles too contain less references to contributions of jinnah,iqbal,syed ahmad khan to the country).

 

[KB]

Pakistan wasn't expected to survive a few months.

This is a key point. There was to quote Ayesha Jalal, a widespread view that Pakistan would collapse within 6 months. Its problems were massive. This is something that Pakistanis forget.

Clearly Pakistan's present problems are huge, but no one really expects it to collapse within 6 months.

 

[moumotta]

This is I agree with, but it is not the full story. In Jammu there was ethnic cleansing of brutal proportions carried out by state forces on Muslims. Historian Ian Talbot notes that Indian authors are "generally reticent" to acknowledge the "orgy of communal violence in Jammu province which was orchestrated by the state police and Dogra armed forces," which sparked a "flood" of fleeing Muslim refugees to Sialkot and the West Punjab.

He goes on to write, "their miserable conditions undoubtedly encouraged support for the subsequent Pakhtun incursion among some Pakistani officials. They saw the jihad as not only avenging the Muslim victims, but as the best means of preventing further mass migrations into Pakistan. They quite rightly saw that the killings [by the state police and Dogra armed forces] were not random but formed a policy of 'ethnic cleansing'."

As for Pakistani government involvement, Talbot says "The balance of evidence seems to indicate that the Pakistan Government did not instigate the tribal incursion which was a spontaneous jihad. Nevertheless provincial officials and politicians in NWFP and West Punjab sympathised with the action and on occasions assisted the transit of the tribesman. British officials' testimonies tend to support the 'official' Pakistani line that attempts to halt the tribesman would have resulted in widespread violence."

Without appearing reticent about the miseries of any section of people let me point out that 1947 was a difficult period in the history of the subcontinent. Orgies of violence in the name of religion were taking place every where. Jammu and Poonch were no exceptions. The refugees you refer to were probably muslims from Poonch but they were not the only refugees arriving in Pakistan (let us leave the refugees arriving in India as they have no relevance to this thread) with horrific tales of death and destruction. It is debateable if organised tribal armies would have descended on Kashmir if there was no political angle to it, if the prize catch of plucking a ripe fruit was not on offer.

The debate among historians is whether Pakistan government organised these tribal armies or merely facilitated their advance. I don't know the answer but I find it interesting that proxy wars have become the corner stone of Paksitan's Kashmir policy ever since. Was 1947 the start of this policy or did it just happen and then became an example for future regimes.

 

[Sameer K]

Very interesting article. Are you the author?
Very true. Alhamdolillah that we have been proving these naysayers and ill-wishers wrong for over 60 years and will continue to do so, Inshallah.

Pakistan wasn't expected to survive a few months.

Yet, not only have we survived, in so many ways we have also thrived.

I don't know what that means. After the violence on both sides after the partition there was noway India and Pakistan could unite. So what does not survive mean? There will always be a pakistan.

 

[KB]

Orgies of violence in the name of religion were taking place every where. Jammu and Poonch were no exceptions.

This post has nothing to do with the thrust of your argument, but there are a couple of points I would like to make arising from this statement.

It would be an exaggeration to say that violence was taking place "everywhere." The whole of Punjab – the province most associated with violence in 1947 - leave alone South Asia, was not ablaze with displaced people and violence. We must keep a sense of perspective, without of course overlooking the horrors that were taking place.

It would also be a mistake to lump the violence that Jammu faced with all violence elsewhere. The point about Jammu was that state forces were actively involved and it had arguably a genocidal dimension and was not just an act of ethnic cleansing. Of course I am not saying violence in Jammu was entirely unique. There may be some other princely states that the violence could be compared to, but I don't think we should just deal with violence under one category and say that it was of exactly the same nature across South Asia.

 

[KB]

There was an interesting document in the National Archives from the British Government in 1947 on the future relations between Pakistan and India:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/topics/analysis-of-future-relations.htm

 

[moumotta]

This post has nothing to do with the thrust of your argument, but there are a couple of points I would like to make arising from this statement.

It would be an exaggeration to say that violence was taking place "everywhere." The whole of Punjab – the province most associated with violence in 1947 - leave alone South Asia, was not ablaze with displaced people and violence. We must keep a sense of perspective, without of course overlooking the horrors that were taking place.

It would also be a mistake to lump the violence that Jammu faced with all violence elsewhere. The point about Jammu was that state forces were actively involved and it had arguably a genocidal dimension and was not just an act of ethnic cleansing. Of course I am not saying violence in Jammu was entirely unique. There may be some other princely states that the violence could be compared to, but I don't think we should just deal with violence under one category and say that it was of exactly the same nature across South Asia.

Violence every where is an exaggeration though I think it is fair to say that sporadic cases of violence, persecution leading to 'forced' evaccuation were widespread in border areas and at times even further away from it.

Accusations of state violence in princely states are also not limited to Jammu. Just from memory, I can remember reading about similar accusations against the states of Hyderabad, Alwar and Bharatpur.

 

[KB]

I don't know what that means. After the violence on both sides after the partition there was noway India and Pakistan could unite. So what does not survive mean?

What Sheryar is saying is that Pakistan was not seen as viable entity because of its weak economic position. Pakistan began life with two hundred million rupees in its treasury and debts if four hundred million. The cost of armed forces alone was 50 million a month. They barely had enough at the start to pay one month of government salaries. It also started with a very low industrial base as most of the industries fell in Indian territory. Pakistan had raw materials but no markets to sell them to, as they were generally in India. Banking, insurance and credit facilities were run by non-Muslims who migrated to India.

Before partition the British Secreatary of State wrote to the British Ambassador that a Pakistan, with partitioned Punjab and Bengal "could not be capable economically of survival as an independent state." This was a widespread view. Many Indians had also hoped it would collapse - see the link on post 16.

The problems were not just economic. Cast as a 'seceding' state, Pakistan had to carve out a system of government from scratch facing immense crippling difficulties - disputes with India, influx of refugees and shortage of funds. In Mountabtten's own language,

"Administratively it is the difference between putting up a permanent building, a nissen hut or a tent. As far as Pakistan is concerned we are putting up a tent. We can do no more."

Mountbatten, who would become head of state of India, had hoped that Pakistan would collapse, declaring in a cabinet meeting, that a speedy partition suited India because if Pakistan was "conceded now [it] was bound to come back later [into the Indian Union]."

A few anecdotes reveal how ill-equipped Pakistan was for independent statehood. Government ministers used wooden boxes as their tables. Pakistan did not even have its own currency for nearly a year. Jinnah had to construct an accounting and financial system by himself from scratch.

In the Life magazine (with a very frail looking Jinnah on front cover) in 1948, under the heading 'Pakistan struggles for survival' there is a picture of tents and livestock in Karachi, with the description below 'Tents. This big settlement takes care of 600 clerks and messenger boys, who are not disturbed by the livestock which wander around the camp.' It described Karachi as a "partly tent city" and a "One-Camel Town" in terms of world capitals.

 

[insaftak]

Pakistan Sovereignty Lost by Shahid Ur Rehman is a good book on this topic.

 

[hasanb]

Pakistan Sovereignty Lost

 

[insaftak]

Bahi I'm just providing more information on this topic. Pakistan Sovereignty lost is actually a book that talks about Pakistan and american relations.

 

[UsmanhailsAfridi]

The Maharaja was motivated essentially by economic stability, thus he decided to accede to India in return for commercial/economic benefits( due to partition favoring India in terms of stable institutions). The Muslims in Pakistan felt betrayed, and thus tribal groups from NWFP tried to restore Kashmir under Muslim rule.​

That is clearly an incorrect sequence of events. The tribals invaded Kashmir first. While there is debate on what part Pakistan government played in initiating the attacks and organising the tribals it is widely accepted that they were at the least provided with logistic support, transport and supplies by offcials.

Hari Singh signed accession only after the invaders were closing in on his capital.

lol the war was in 1948...so what was he waiting for? surely it doesn't take a year to figure out which country should a 90% muslim majority state belong to

denial denial...the point is the rule was set...muslim majority states become Pakistan but hey i know how hard that would have been for the Indians to accept that as Kashmir is trivial in which country has the upper hand in strategical military location...but keep on denying

 

[leggie786]

Contradictions from the first point

“ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”

If indian national congress had expected a immediate collapse,they should have accepted partition happily and not grudgingly, as they would have easily integrated the area into the indian union.There were leaders who wanted partition,there were some who dint not want.Gandhi desperately try to salvage the situation without partition,but once the riots happened he accepted it grudgingly.The first part of statement is right,the second part is wrong .

Point 2-Vice versa,in india we had only 25 percent of raw material(both cotton and jute).Ask any country in the world whether you would prefer huge amounts of raw material,or huge amounts of mills,you would get the answer.Today these mills serve no use,most of them are rotting.Everyone had to upgrade technology,bring in new machines,ultimately due to escalating cost and competition from foreign markets,many of them shut down.

But most of the raw materials will be forever valuable

Point 3 would take huge writing-there were sure mistakes on both sides.


But these are the sort of articles which will further widen the gap between india and pakistan.Any article should indicate both positives and negatives(like india agreed partition of bengal,nwfp,sindh etc.Even these points should be mentioned.Not just india is wrong,india dint offer plebiscite to kashmir,etc etc.Similarly our articles too contain less references to contributions of jinnah,iqbal,syed ahmad khan to the country).

Sorry, a lil bit out of topic, but just so you know, mills and plants are actually designed for a 25 yr life, not a 60 yrs one. I assume by your statement of "most of them are rotting", you mean you expect them to work until now?

 

[smoothcriminal]

Thanks so much to those who appreciated my post! I have an immense passion for studying Pak history, and I just hope it doesnt fade away.


I somewhat predicted that this thread would turn into a critique over the history of Kashmir. That was not the thrust of my argument, and I understand that some may say I may have done unjustice to it by not exploring the different perspectives further on this article. However, I deemed to focus more on our Founders and their perceptionss/reasons for allying with the USA. We all could write blogs on the Kashmir issue, since its history also is very controversial.

Thank you for reading my article. It gives me great joy.

 

[smoothcriminal]

Contradictions from the first point

“ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”

If indian national congress had expected a immediate collapse,they should have accepted partition happily and not grudgingly, as they would have easily integrated the area into the indian union.There were leaders who wanted partition,there were some who dint not want.Gandhi desperately try to salvage the situation without partition,but once the riots happened he accepted it grudgingly.The first part of statement is right,the second part is wrong .

Point 2-Vice versa,in india we had only 25 percent of raw material(both cotton and jute).Ask any country in the world whether you would prefer huge amounts of raw material,or huge amounts of mills,you would get the answer.Today these mills serve no use,most of them are rotting.Everyone had to upgrade technology,bring in new machines,ultimately due to escalating cost and competition from foreign markets,many of them shut down.

But most of the raw materials will be forever valuable

Point 3 would take huge writing-there were sure mistakes on both sides.


But these are the sort of articles which will further widen the gap between india and pakistan.Any article should indicate both positives and negatives(like india agreed partition of bengal,nwfp,sindh etc.Even these points should be mentioned.Not just india is wrong,india dint offer plebiscite to kashmir,etc etc.Similarly our articles too contain less references to contributions of jinnah,iqbal,syed ahmad khan to the country).

Bro im not trying to widen any gap. i have used impartial sources to describe what the atmosphere was at partition. I do try to balance my focus so that I dont get called out anti Pakistani as well( a problem I have numerously faced). And if you read my article on Pakistans history of chief of army staffs, I have shown India respect on their stability in that dilemma.

And I agree with above posters that there is a strong case about the issue of Kashmir in regards to Pakistani government aiding the tribal forces before maharajas decision. I did not say Kashmir should belong to Pak or India, I was just trying to keep it very short so that I could show Pakistani agitation that led to US relations. This article is on the standard Pakistani grievaces of partition that led to Us foreign relations. I respect India's dimension of the Kashmir argument as well.

 

[smoothcriminal]

Contradictions from the first point

“ The Indian National Congress had accepted partition grudgingly, expecting a fairly immediate collapse.”

If indian national congress had expected a immediate collapse,they should have accepted partition happily and not grudgingly, as they would have easily integrated the area into the indian union.There were leaders who wanted partition,there were some who dint not want.Gandhi desperately try to salvage the situation without partition,but once the riots happened he accepted it grudgingly.The first part of statement is right,the second part is wrong .

Point 2-Vice versa,in india we had only 25 percent of raw material(both cotton and jute).Ask any country in the world whether you would prefer huge amounts of raw material,or huge amounts of mills,you would get the answer.Today these mills serve no use,most of them are rotting.Everyone had to upgrade technology,bring in new machines,ultimately due to escalating cost and competition from foreign markets,many of them shut down.

But most of the raw materials will be forever valuable

Point 3 would take huge writing-there were sure mistakes on both sides.


But these are the sort of articles which will further widen the gap between india and pakistan.Any article should indicate both positives and negatives(like india agreed partition of bengal,nwfp,sindh etc.Even these points should be mentioned.Not just india is wrong,india dint offer plebiscite to kashmir,etc etc.Similarly our articles too contain less references to contributions of jinnah,iqbal,syed ahmad khan to the country).

Bro im not trying to widen any gap. i have used impartial sources to describe what the atmosphere was at partition. I do try to balance my focus so that I dont get called out anti Pakistani as well( a problem I have numerously faced). And if you read my article on Pakistans history of chief of army staffs, I have shown India respect on their stability in that dilemma.

And I agree with above posters that there is a strong case about the issue of Kashmir in regards to Pakistani government aiding the tribal forces before maharajas decision. I did not say Kashmir should belong to Pak or India, I was just trying to keep it very short so that I could show Pakistani agitation that led to US relations. This article is on the standard Pakistani grievaces of partition that led to Us foreign relations. I respect India's dimension of the Kashmir argument as well.

 

[Krishnan]

Sorry, a lil bit out of topic, but just so you know, mills and plants are actually designed for a 25 yr life, not a 60 yrs one. I assume by your statement of "most of them are rotting", you mean you expect them to work until now?

Nope,im sorry for not being precise in the statement.With upgradation in technology and other factors,they can be extended more easily to about 40-50 years,but our looms started rotting long ago due to factors listed below.There are still some mills here running now since they started from that time,but they are in a minority.

Most of the mills here mainly have been stopped not due to shelf life,but due to more or more declining availability of raw material(which inturn was due to failure of monsoon,increasing cost of cotton etc),very very less timely modernization,appearance of large number of synthetic textiles(nylon,rayon,etc),powerlooms to replace handlooms which do work in quick time,competition in global market from cheap goods.Ya but coming again to main issue,raw materials are always more valuable.

 

[Krishnan]

Bro im not trying to widen any gap. i have used impartial sources to describe what the atmosphere was at partition. I do try to balance my focus so that I dont get called out anti Pakistani as well( a problem I have numerously faced). And if you read my article on Pakistans history of chief of army staffs, I have shown India respect on their stability in that dilemma.

And I agree with above posters that there is a strong case about the issue of Kashmir in regards to Pakistani government aiding the tribal forces before maharajas decision. I did not say Kashmir should belong to Pak or India, I was just trying to keep it very short so that I could show Pakistani agitation that led to US relations. This article is on the standard Pakistani grievaces of partition that led to Us foreign relations. I respect India's dimension of the Kashmir argument as well.

Point taken.I am sorry,if i was a bit harsh.

 

[ShehryarK]

What Sheryar is saying is that Pakistan was not seen as viable entity because of its weak economic position. Pakistan began life with two hundred million rupees in its treasury and debts if four hundred million. The cost of armed forces alone was 50 million a month. They barely had enough at the start to pay one month of government salaries. It also started with a very low industrial base as most of the industries fell in Indian territory. Pakistan had raw materials but no markets to sell them to, as they were generally in India. Banking, insurance and credit facilities were run by non-Muslims who migrated to India.

Before partition the British Secreatary of State wrote to the British Ambassador that a Pakistan, with partitioned Punjab and Bengal "could not be capable economically of survival as an independent state." This was a widespread view. Many Indians had also hoped it would collapse - see the link on post 16.

The problems were not just economic. Cast as a 'seceding' state, Pakistan had to carve out a system of government from scratch facing immense crippling difficulties - disputes with India, influx of refugees and shortage of funds. In Mountabtten's own language,

"Administratively it is the difference between putting up a permanent building, a nissen hut or a tent. As far as Pakistan is concerned we are putting up a tent. We can do no more."

Mountbatten, who would become head of state of India, had hoped that Pakistan would collapse, declaring in a cabinet meeting, that a speedy partition suited India because if Pakistan was "conceded now [it] was bound to come back later [into the Indian Union]."

A few anecdotes reveal how ill-equipped Pakistan was for independent statehood. Government ministers used wooden boxes as their tables. Pakistan did not even have its own currency for nearly a year. Jinnah had to construct an accounting and financial system by himself from scratch.

In the Life magazine (with a very frail looking Jinnah on front cover) in 1948, under the heading 'Pakistan struggles for survival' there is a picture of tents and livestock in Karachi, with the description below 'Tents. This big settlement takes care of 600 clerks and messenger boys, who are not disturbed by the livestock which wander around the camp.' It described Karachi as a "partly tent city" and a "One-Camel Town" in terms of world capitals.

Brilliant post KB and thank you for answering on my behalf, that too far more eloquently and knowledgeably than I ever could have!

 

[moumotta]

lol the war was in 1948...so what was he waiting for? surely it doesn't take a year to figure out which country should a 90% muslim majority state belong to

denial denial...the point is the rule was set...muslim majority states become Pakistan but hey i know how hard that would have been for the Indians to accept that as Kashmir is trivial in which country has the upper hand in strategical military location...but keep on denying

Sorry friend, you are wrong on all counts. We are talking here about the events of October 1947 and no, there were no such rules set for princely states.

 

[moumotta]

Thanks so much to those who appreciated my post! I have an immense passion for studying Pak history, and I just hope it doesnt fade away.


I somewhat predicted that this thread would turn into a critique over the history of Kashmir. That was not the thrust of my argument, and I understand that some may say I may have done unjustice to it by not exploring the different perspectives further on this article. However, I deemed to focus more on our Founders and their perceptionss/reasons for allying with the USA. We all could write blogs on the Kashmir issue, since its history also is very controversial.

Thank you for reading my article. It gives me great joy.

The discussion has gone wider but my point was simply that there is a factual inaccuracy in your article. There is always room for difference of opinions but there is no reason to twist facts in an otherwise serious attempt.

 

[KB]

But he was dithering till that point, needlessly delaying it and it was felt by Pakistan that he had all but done a deal with India and was waiting for the right moment to formalise it - ie a 'double game' where the outcome was already sealed.

Some academics have certainly shown that there were good grounds for Pakistan to be suspicious.

Robert Wirsing wrote that "had Pakistani leaders been less suspicious of New Delihi's motives, the eventual outcome in Kashmir might have been less in Pakistan's interest than what actually occurred...There were a number of good reasons for them [Pakistan] to do the things they did, even if they did them poorly."

Firstly the outcome of the Radcliffe award left them deeply suspicious – a view justified with the passage of time. Secondly, changes in key officials in the Maharaja’s government suggested influence from New Delhi. Thirdly, Sardar Patel's papers reveal ample correspondence which demonstrates Indian interest in Kashmir and planning for some kind of military intervention. Fourthly, there was already - before the invasion of Pashtun tribes - a battalion of infantry and mountain artillery loaned to the Maharaja by the Sikh Maharaja of Patiala.

The Indian author, AG Noorani, also wrote "there were systematic efforts by the ruler to forge links with India [before the invasion of the tribes]." He also notes, "even the postal links with Pakistan were being gradually cut, though Kashmir had a stand-still agreement with Pakistan; not with India."

Alastair Lamb also argues that there were plenty of reasons for Pakistan to be suspicious.

Victoria Schofield notes that in the weeks following independence, "clear steps were being taken to improve communications with India, by telegraph, telephone, wireless and roads."

She also notes that a boat bridge was being constructed to over the Ravi river to facilitate access from Gurdaspur.

There were also reports that the "Kashmir government was contructing an all weather road linking the valley of Kashmir with Jammu via Poonch instead of the Banihal Road which was impassable in winter."

Pakistan also objected Kashmir being included in the Indian postal system, viewing this as a violation of the stand-still agreement.

Lastly, as I have mentionbed before, there was the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Jammu.

 

[Major]

Imran Khan has destroyed our relations with USA by releasing that letter.

After helping the US with the pull out in Afghanistan, Pakistan could had established better relations with USA, but now as Imran has become desperate to save his seat after MQM left him, he decided to show the letter.

There goes Pakistan and USA relations down the drain for the next few months. Shame on this power hungry pm.