Time Pass & Sports POTW : shaykh

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These are tragic times where the Palestinians are being subjected to unimaginable atrocities but this week's POTW is a good way to try and understand the basis of this conflict

Many thanks and congratulations to [MENTION=133972]shaykh[/MENTION]


http://www.pakpassion.net/ppforum/s...l-Aqsa-scores-injured&p=11199250#post11199250

In regards to your question about how Arabs lost the war...it’s a common Arab story of them being too busy battling each other...they all wanted their piece of Palestine...I wrote a piece on it a while back...

One of the traditional Israeli narratives is one of overcoming a unified 5 nation Arab army attacking them from all sides... Israel likes to present its David and Goliath story for the most part…and while it was a resounding victory for Israel there is a lot to be said about the disunified Arab leaders who all had conflicting plans for the Middle East...

How is it that 5 conventional armies were defeated?... I'll examine each countries aims separately...

JORDAN

Abdullah and the Zionist Movement

From the beginning of his rule in Transjordan he had relations with the Zionists mainly because Jordan was a land of few resources and had little cash...he wanted to attract Jewish capital for development...which he did in areas such as mining and electricity...

Abdullah also crucially was the only Arab head of state who had supported the 1937 Peel Commission partition plan... The Jewish Agency met Abdullah twice in 1946...the idea was a partition plan which would lead to the creation of a Jewish state with the annexation of Arab lands to Transjordan... Abdullah followed the Arab league in opposition to partition which is why a second meeting occurred...17th November 1947 in a meeting with Golda Meir...both sides had similar visions and were both opposed to Palestinian nationalism and a Palestinian state...and both were opposed to the mufti of Jerusalem Husayni...

This idea got British backing in the form of Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin...when the British mandate would end then Jordan can occupy the part of Palestine awarded to the Arabs... British withdrawal was due on the 15th May 1948...and conflict had kicked off big time in Palestine...and Abdullah found that he needed to match the belligerence of the Arab League especially as Jordan had the best Arab army...it couldn’t be seen to be abandoning the Palestinians... Meir met Abdullah again on the 11th May...Abdullah said he had to engage but would not engage his forces beyond the lines stipulated by the UN partition resolution...

Relations with the Arab League

The other heads of state weren't stupid...they believed Abdullah supported the partition plan and were aware of his desires for territorial expansion... They therefore didn't want Abdullah’s Arab legion in Palestine...Husayni also didn’t want the Arab legion...nor did the Syrian government...

The Arab league however especially after the massacre at Dayr Yasin felt it had to commit regular troops and with Jordan having the best army that they should also... In short these concerns about Abdullah were fair...he had no interest in preserving Palestine for Palestinians but wanted it for himself... And the Arab league actually then did quite the shafting job on Jordan...Abdullah was commander in chief of the Arab forces but all the national forces operated under their own commanders...the Arab league was supposed to give Jordan $3m in financial assistance and instead gave them $250k...and the Egyptian government was confiscating their arms shipments...

So in short the best Arab army had allies that weren’t allies, little ammunition or supplies, and no budget...

Post British Withdrawal

The Arab legion entered the West Bank...and the Jewish armies had no problem with that..however problems did arise when the Jewish army tried to take Jerusalem...part of the failed UN resolution was that Jerusalem would remain an international zone and not be part of either state... Abdullah then ordered his troops into Jerusalem...now they were at war with Israel...they managed to secure the Old City...however an arms embargo was introduced and Britain adhered to it...so after 1 month of fighting the Arab Legion found itself 20% down in terms of soldiers, low ammunition and no chances of resupply...

Abdullah didn’t want this battle...the Israelis had managed to get around the arms embargo...Jordan had taken Lydda and Ramla prior but then withdrew its forces pragmatically...Arab public opinion after this became opposed to Transjordan and the Arab legion weren't viewed as saviours of Palestine...the Egyptian government even accused them of withdrawing to put pressure on the Egyptian fighters... Relations were strained between Egypt and Jordan so when the Egyptians requested help from the Legion and didn’t really receive it...

Armistice at Rhodes...

Israelis with their growing success were becoming more demanding and Abdullah tried negotiation again...he wanted to 'unite' the remainder of Arab Palestine with Transjordan...and also sought Lydda and Ramla...the Arab part of Jerusalem would go to them and the Jewish part to the Jews...other areas were up for negotiation...what was interesting was his wording "any unacceptable results from these negotiations will bring trouble from OUR political enemies on the Arab side worse than you can imagine"...

Abdullah was starting to realise how weak his position was... This was happening as the Egyptians were getting battered...and this what eventually lead to the armistice agreement brokered by the British...the Jordanians wanted the Egyptians to lose and sign the agreement...it would mean the elimination of two rivals, King Faruq of Egypt and Husayni...also it would be good on the PR side because the Egyptians would have to be the first to openly come to terms with Israel...

Abdullah had two aims as the war was reaching its end...he wanted to retain the territory under Legion control...and wanted to extend control of the Northern part of the West Bank which at that point was being held by the Iraqi army... It was quite successful...they made sure the Iraqis didn’t provoke the Israelis and then negotiated a handover by the Iraqis to them...the Iraqis having seen what happened to Egypt preferred to return home without being defeated, without recognising Israel and without having to negotiate an armistice... Transjordan argued with Israel over the Negev desert...this was assigned to Israel in the Partition resolution but was under Transjordan control...

Abdullah though realised he wasn’t in a position to call the shots with the Israelis being stronger and the Legion withdrew...it didn’t have much of a population so it didn’t raise a furore... Abdullah also gave up the area North of Tel-Aviv...this unlike Negev had 35,000 people...and this did lead to fury in the Arab world and Palestine because it was another occasion that Transjordan gave up without a fight...and allowed for people to be turned into refugees...

Conclusion

In return Abdullah was allowed to keep the West Bank...or occupy it...the Palestinians had no choice but to seek refuge in Jordan and unlike the other Arab countries they were given refuge...

Transjordan became a bi-national state with Abdullah claiming the West Bank and the refugees who settled...there was therefore a concerted effort to build unity between the two factions... The Arab nationalist narrative has naturally attacked Abdullah for his secret dealings with Israel...some others view him as a pragmatist and realist...territorial expansion wasn't just Abdullah’s aim...the other Arab nations had their own national interests too... the story of Arab nations colluding against each other is as old as these nations themselves and continues to this day... 1948 and the creation of Israel was made possible due to this fact...

IRAQ

They were among the first to advocate intervention in the war by Arab states yet their own army did very little in the war... They called for the boycott of oil but didn’t actually implement anything...and as i mentioned in my piece on Jordan they seemed to be happy at the end to just retreat...to not engage is to not be defeated and they stayed away from the armistice talks... So what was their deal?...

Prelude to War...

In 1946 Iraqis were discussing the possibility of war with the partition of Palestine seeming ever more likely... They sought a balance of power...they knew about Abdullah's ambitions and they knew about Husayni’s...an independent Palestine wasn't on their agenda... They also had internal issues...issues of inequality and unemployment and a growth of Kurdish nationalism and the Iraqi Communist Party.. Nuri Said stepped in and largely repressed opposition...they were focused on domestic disorder and their concern with Palestine was focused on observing the behaviour of the other Arab states... Publicly the narratives were very pro-Palestinian...criticism of the White Paper, the calls for boycotts of oil to the US and Britain...they were also the first to suggest sending a joint Arab force to Palestine...and if the British didn't improve then the Arabs should arm the Palestinians... In 1947 they also recommended the Arab armies go to the borders of Palestine and that Arab air forces be prepared to attack Zionist supply lines...

British Withdrawal...

Nuri Said had done a lot of talking but little action...when the British withdrew their protest in Iraq so Abdullah was approached and was asked if Transjordan would allow some Iraqi troops to be sent to the Palestinian frontier...this was a symbolic move...to look like they were doing something...Abdullah refused...

Nuri Said at a December 1947 Arab League meeting berated the other Arab nations for doing little to help the Palestinians...they again suggested they all boycott...but again it seemed that Iraq would only boycott if other nations would... Salih Jabr at that time was also negotiating the Anglo-Iraqi treaty so whilst there was all this bluster publicly...Iraq was doing nothing on the economic nor military front... They did however link Zionism to communism and this allowed them to clamp down on communists internally...they were using the issue of Palestine to assist them internally...

Abdullahs Offer …

Abdullah tried to encourage Iraq to unify with Transjordan as part of a Hashemite kingdom...and the idea a joint Iraqi-Transjordanian occupation of Palestine... So whilst Jabr was publicly opposing the partition plan...he was telling British officials he was happy to cooperate with Abdullah and take over Palestine... One can argue that Jabr did indeed have a lot on his plate...he was trying to negotiate the British withdrawal from Iraq...and naturally this meant not doing anything that would anger Britain...luckily for them the British were happy with Abdullah’s plan...

The Coup...

January 1948 the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi deal were revealed...while Britain would withdraw all its forces the British would oversee Iraq’s military planning and the British could return to their air bases in time of war...the treaty was also given a 15 year extension from its original planned end... This led to riots in the streets...and the end of Jabr’s government with Muhammad al Sadr taking over...he was mainly focused on domestic issues...the British therefore communicated with the Regent Abd al'Ilah on Palestine...

1948

Calls for intervention by Arab countries was getting louder internally...thing is the Iraqi government weren’t too enthused...they knew they would be involving themselves on Abdallah’s terms and felt they would be fighting Abdallah’s war... That said they did get Abdullah to agree via the regent to allows Iraqi troops enter Transjordanian territory...they then dispatched 3,000 of their men...

The War

Abdullah was commander of the army but as mentioned previously most of the nations were doing their own thing...the Iraqis followed Abdullah’s lead though...for instance when Abdullah wanted his forces to fight in Jerusalem the Iraqis were asked to relieve the Legion in the northern part of the West Bank...the Iraqi army was given a purely defensive role... There weren't to be any offensive attacks on Galilee for instance because this had been designated to Israel by the UN...and even though there was fighting in Jerusalem Abdullah still wanted relations with the Israelis... The Israelis didn’t really touch the West Bank...so the Iraqis by this time had 18,000 soldiers doing nothing at all...Egypt was busy losing and Jordan and Iraq weren’t intervening...when Lydda and Ramle were being lost the Iraqis weren’t intervening...the soldiers some of whom did want to save Palestine were furious... The government continued with their double rhetoric...they recognised Husayni’s government symbolically whilst supporting Abdullah...and they helped him consolidate his control of the West Bank...when the war was being lost Egypt blamed Iraq in addition to Jordan...

Syrian Relations…

Quite a minor player...played second fiddle Hashemites to Abdullah...the end result for them was ok...Abdullah got control of the West Bank which none of the Iraqi establishment had any real objection to...they were more concerned about the other Arab countries gaining power who weren’t fans of the Hashemites... The Iraqi establishment were also happy for Abdullah to get preoccupied with Palestine because they had some territorial ambitions of their own...namely Syria...

Iraqi Withdrawal...

With Nuri Said at the helm again repression increased...with leftists being accused of supporting Zionism...and being arrested and executed...if they couldn’t fight Zionists in Israel they would do so at home...this was also the beginning of the Iraqi Jew exodus... Said also proposed plans during negotiations between Israel and the Arab states that would never have been accepted by Israel...it was a return to symbolism again...more an attempt to convince Iraqis that they had tried the best they could for Palestine...

Conclusion…

The Iraqi role can generally be described as a lot of talk and symbolic action devoid of any real substance...even when they sent their military it was largely theatre...they did nothing to prevent the establishment of Israel, nor did they want a Palestinian state which might potentially be hostile to the Hashemites as Husayni was...the Hashemite alliance it is argued is one of the key factors behind the failure of the Palestinian state emerging...they were also working within constraints relating to Britain and seeking their own national interests...Palestine was at the bottom of their list...

SYRIA

As mentioned the primary concern for the Arab states was disputes with each other...for Syria their concern was the Hashemites becoming a dominant power... For the Arabs Palestine was mainly about balance of power...in Syria Quwwatli the President was interested in protecting his countries independence... They were worried about Abdullah not the Israelis...

Abdullah wanted to unite the Arab lands of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan...with the capital being Damascus... Abdullah had encouraged dissent in Syria and Quwwatli was understandably worried about what a victory for Jordan would bring...Syria also had no great power to protect it as the French left them in 1946...independence made Syria vulnerable... They therefore joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia and formed the anti-Hashemite bloc...all of Syria’s actions during the war were related to protecting its independence...the Palestinians and Jews didn’t matter...

Internal Problems …

Abdullah had fomented dissension in the Syrian military so Quwwatli doubted their loyalty...the army built by the French was formed from Syria’s minorities as they were more likely to fight the nationalists that the French opposed...Quwwatli a Sunni didn’t trust this army... He slashed the army from 30,000 to 6,000 and slashed any goodwill along with it...and actually decided against arming his army...he couldn’t get rid of his army but also feared strengthening it lest they remove him through a coup... Consequently there were those in the army who did start looking towards Abdullah...and in 1947 British sources suggest that 50-75% of the Syrian military supported Abdullah’s Greater Syria plan...

Druze…

One of those groups that approached Abdullah were the Druze...they had it good under the French but less so post independence...where Quwwatli quite carelessly tried to repress them...consequently the Druze chieftains asked Abdullah to annex the Druze region and to go further into Damascus...

Encirclement

So the army was weak...and if anything Quwwatli declaring his support for Husayni was nothing more than expressing support for the enemies opponent... Abdullah had also encircled Syria with alliances...Turkey and Iraq had expressed support for the Greater Syria plan...

Alliance

Syria requested assistance from the Saudis...they said they weren’t willing to ruin their friendship with Britain for the sake of Syria...the same with Faruq in Egypt...however they did eventually form a military alliance...the Saudis massed troops on the Jordanian border as a response...

Public Opinion

Like all the Arab countries the public were quite vociferous in their opposition to what was happening in Palestine...many Syrian volunteers were fighting in the war…The Syrian army was weak and unprepared...but much like Faruk the main goal for intervention by Quwwatli was to protect Syria from Abdullah...

Aims of War

Prior to the British leaving Palestine Quwwatli had set up and build the Army of Liberation which was an irregular army fighting in the war... The army itself wasn't even there to fight the Jews...it was there to prevent Abdullahs advance...Fawzi al-Qawuqji the commander in chief of the ALA acknowledges this fact...

The War

The ALA soldiers were stationed in the North and in Arab districts which Abdullah planned to annex...they were in the West Bank...they weren’t going to Jerusalem, Haifa etc...basically where the Palestinians were engaged in the most intense fighting... With Haifa falling the ALA were given orders to not help the falling areas...the Palestinian irregulars asked Quwwatli for help and Quwwatli refused because like the rest they could all agree on their opposition to Husayni... Quwwatli tried to ensure his fighters didn’t engage with Israeli forces... The Syrian army did eventually enter the fray and were routed initially but they took Tiberias...they took 66.5km of land in all and thats about all their activity... Amusingly with the ALA not being given the assistance they wanted they approached Abdullah...Qawugji who was in Palestine to work against Abdullah was now discussing greater Syria... Syria was the first in and the last out because they felt peace benefited Jordan...

Conclusion

While they didn’t directly attack each other the Arabs were busy undermining each other...nowhere is that more evident than in Syria and its fear of Jordan expansion...Palestinians and Jews didn’t matter to Quwwatli...

LEBANON

National Pact

French rule had meant that a corrupt client system existed here after the first World War...in 1943 the Maronites and the Sunnis formed the National Pact which was an unwritten alliance which set the scene for independence...the deal was that the President would be Maronite, PM a Sunni and the president of the chamber of deputies a Shia... The idea was Christians would eschew French rule and the Muslims would renounce their goals of becoming part of a Greater Syria... There was a lot of opposition to this...some of the Christians saw this as a threat to their dominance and thus saw the Jews as allies...some church leaders were openly pro-Zionist... The Phalange a far right Christian group signed a pact with the Zionists in 1920...and there was a lot of evidence of Christian collusion in general... The idea of a Christian uprising in Beirut was mentioned dependent on the Israelis invading South Lebanon. in 1948... Ben-Gurion wasn’t sure...because there were plenty of Christians who preferred the National pact... Other than the Maronites the Druze also associated with Zionists...and worked with the IDF...

Army

The commander was a Maronite and the army was a new one...they had four battalions and only one was used in the war...the army was 66% Christian...Shias weren’t educated enough...Sunnis educated and thus boycotted.. They weren't ready for any sort of conflict in 1948 and were still essentially reorganising...the arms embargo and a lack of funding also meant they weren't capable of much... They were mainly used internally for anti-bandit operations...and were getting battered for the most part...they couldn’t handle bandits so how were they gonna handle war?... They were also somewhat concerned about Syrian expansion into their territory... And the fact that the army was so Christian the thought process in the UN for instance was that they wouldn’t get involved... Maronite clergy were opposed to war...unlike the other Arab countries there wasn’t so much fervour for war here...

The War

They prevented irregulars from going through Lebanon...they also ruled that they would only attack if forced to reply to Jewish attacks... Israel did occupy villages on the Lebanese side of the border and the army were instructed to do nothing...

Malikiyya

Galilee which had been allotted to the Arabs in the UN settlement was taken over by the Israelis...the Lebanese were asked to fight by the Arab league and Chehab said they weren’t strong enough to fight...and in short wouldn’t do anything in Palestine... However with the presence of the ALA, Israel targeting South Lebanon and angry Muslims the ruling elite decided on a token attack...they had to be seen to be doing something so they did one thing...they took Malikiyya and the Israelis took it back not long after...it was a place that offered no strategic threat to Israel...they handed it over to the ALA and went back to Lebanon... It was a face saving exercise and like many things during this war...symbolic...their media claimed 100 Israelis dead when in reality it was 8...

Israel Expansion

After Gallilee the Israelis advanced to Lebanon and stopped at the Litani river...they weren't opposed...fourteen to twenty Lebanese villages and the army sat back...

Conclusion

Lebanon didn’t confront Israel...nor did it help with the Arab effort...their soldiers had little desire to attack nor to defend...they had one sole symbolic moment in the conflict...

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi textbooks speak about the wonderful things Ibn Saud did for Palestine...how much of that is true?...

Prewar

For starters the British told Ibn Saud to not side with Husayni...and Ibn Saud responded in the affirmative whilst also stating his concern about the Hashemites... Also there was the issue of the 'general Arab feeling' about Palestine... That said Ibn Saud assured Britain he was their friend and said he would advise the Palestinians to remain peaceful...

Partition

Ibn Saud was opposed to the partition of Palestine...he wanted Britain to establish a constitutional government which only included the then current residents of Palestine with protection of the Holy sites... He was concerned that Abdullah would try and incorporate Jerusalem...if anything he wanted the British mandate to remain... Saud was seeking legitimacy among the Arabs after the occupation of the Hijaz and threatened other territorial claims namely Aqaba and Maan and enter Abdullahs realm...

Public Opinion

As odd as this sounds very little for the simple reason that they had little access to external news...Saudi had one newspaper and illiteracy was very high...its bizarre to think most in Saudi had no clue what was happening in Israel...those that did get information probably got it from bedouins or pilgrims...

British Letters

Most of Sauds letters to Britain revealed as mentioned Sauds concern about Abdullah...Palestine was a Saudi-Hashemite rivalry for them... It also had an internal affect as Saud preferred developing Najd instead of the Hijaz...

1945

Saud starts sending letters complaining about the possible Jewish state...he also mentioned how the Ulama were putting him in a tough position...

The War

They opposed the partition... Saudi sources say that as many as 200,000 Saudis were ready to fight...they sent 1,200...with little equipment or ammo...untrained too... Most sources for other Arab nations have interpreted or left things out deliberately...Saudi sources have outright created things... The forces themselves were sent with the Syrians...they didn’t want to send them to the Egyptians who were suffering losses by fighting... There is little on what they actually did...

Conclusion

Its odd because Saudi has almost suggested they did the most...they opposed partition for the same reason as the rest of the nations...the prospect of Hashemite domination... Lack of involvement in Palestine also relates to the strong relations between the British and Ibn Saud...
 
Really informative post providing some crucial context on a shameful part of Middle Eastern history. I'd be interested in reading more on the Egyptian perspective as well.
 
Really informative post providing some crucial context on a shameful part of Middle Eastern history. I'd be interested in reading more on the Egyptian perspective as well.

I wonder what the general public thinks of Nasser today and his legacy in Egypt, particular his failed ambition to unite the Arabs which dragged Egypt into regional conflicts that were of little interest to them.

Ultimately, his aggression did little good for the political stability of the Middle-East and socioeconomic status of Egypt.
 
Really informative post providing some crucial context on a shameful part of Middle Eastern history. I'd be interested in reading more on the Egyptian perspective as well.

Oops I just realised I forgot to add a specific part about the Egyptians...and their role was also quite important as you can imagine...

But I still have my notes...so here's a bit of a breakdown...

Naqrashi

Naqrashi was the PM of Egypt and didn't want to intervene...partly cos he was in the process of revising a treaty with Britain...thing is though there were a lot of students protesting at the UN Partition plan and when war was intensifying in 1948 he had to do something...

The MB had sent volunteers and in terms of PR Naqrashi said he was in favour of the war and said anyone who refused to fight was a traitor...so Naqrashi encouraged volunteers to go and fight...

Faruq

So as you can tell from whats written in the Jordan section Egypt and Jordan were competitors first and foremost...King Faruq's main concern was Abdullah's greater Syria plan which included Lebanon and Arab Palestine...

So intervention itself when it did eventually come was to actually prevent Abdullah from achieving his plan...

Competence

When Faruq decided to go to war it was with 4 days notice...much is noted in Arab sources about how poorly trained soldiers were, how poorly equipped they were unprepared...and there was no actual strategy...

Faruq declared himself commander in chief and Haydar as war minister...neither knew a thing about military strategy yet had given themselves the roles...Haydar was previously a director of prisons but was the King's friend so got the role of war minister...

Role of the Army

Egypt only sent 10,000 soldiers...the reason being and this is still relevant today...the role of the army has never really been about attacking externally...its always been about protecting whoevers ruling internally...

What didn't help btw is the likes of Husayni saying 3000-4000 soldiers is enough to beat the Jews...

15th May - 10th June fighting

The aim of the army was to work it's way up from Rafah on the border upto Tel-Aviv...there was a genuine belief that they would simply come up against 'Zionist gangs' and that the Jews would simply flee when they saw the Egyptians...the Jordanians were significantly more well informed...

So the Egyptian army took Gaza...pushed north and found the Jewish forces to be more competent than they perceived...so they failed to take any Jewish settlements and simply pushed forward when they failed...

11th June - Truce

So the UN passed a resolution calling for a truce and at this point the army was 14 miles north of Gaza...the Egyptian field commander told his superiors in Cairo that they didnt have enough men, equipment and couldn't advance without endangering their strategic position...this stance was fair...many of those who joined the Free Officers movement later were soldiers who held the King and his cronies responsible for the eventual defeat...and its cos those on the ground had little support from Cairo...there's even a suggestion that many of their weapons were deficient...

Fall of Lydda/Ramla

So the Zionists took these places above...and Egyptian commanders complained that there was little to no co-ordination with the other Arab armies...'the Arab-Israeli war devolved into an Israeli-Egyptian struggled with the rest merely looking on from the sidelines.'

All Palestine Government

So what could Faruq do next? He proposed 'the All-Palestine' government...this had little to do with Palestinians though...Nuqrashi made it clear to the UN that any settlement which allowed Abdullah to annex Arab Palestine would destroy the Arab balance of power...

The Jordanians knew this suggestion was aimed at their territorial ambition so rejected it...

October - December

Israeli forces broke a truce and went in on Egyptian forces...their air raids were successful...Egyptian army requested support from the Jordanians and Iraqis who didn't intervene...and that wasn't the first time either...Egypt lost the Negev...the Israeli forces were unified, had a strategy, good weaponry...everything the Egyptians didn't...

Israeli forces were also well aware of the schism between Egypt and Jordan...to put it bluntly they had free reign on the Egyptians...

The Israeli forces launched another offensive in December and it actually needed British intercession to ensure Israeli forces didnt advance into Egypt...which added to the humiliation...

Defeat

In January Faruq disengaged completely and begun bilateral negotiations with Israel...and Faruq hoped he could gain something from the conflict...the Israeli forces released an Egyptian brigade and also gave them Gaza...the reason Faruq wanted Gaza is cos he didnt want Abdullah to get it...and also he didn't want Transjordan to share a border with Egypt...

Aftermath

Nuqrashi was assassinated by the MB for collaborating with the Jews...Egypts army was now directed at dealing with internal backlash...

Faruq was worried the returning soldiers would rebel...and didnt allow them to return to their bases...had some arrested on collusion with the MB...the blowback from the failed war would eventually lead to Faruq being removed by the 'Free Officers'...
 
These are tragic times where the Palestinians are being subjected to unimaginable atrocities but this week's POTW is a good way to try and understand the basis of this conflict

Many thanks and congratulations to [MENTION=133972]shaykh[/MENTION]


http://www.pakpassion.net/ppforum/s...l-Aqsa-scores-injured&p=11199250#post11199250

Reading this it seems that the Arab leaders were all in it for themselves. They were all trying to get the maximum advantage for themselves rather than trying to fight for the Palestinians. This is what happens when you have dictators and kings, they perpetually have to worry about being overthrown so their actions are mostly determined by self-interest.
 
I wonder what the general public thinks of Nasser today and his legacy in Egypt, particular his failed ambition to unite the Arabs which dragged Egypt into regional conflicts that were of little interest to them.

Ultimately, his aggression did little good for the political stability of the Middle-East and socioeconomic status of Egypt.

Well if you look at who preceded him and who followed him then it's not too difficult to understand the reverance for him...

But obviously that's dependent on who one is...the MB and Communists most certainly won't for example...and he was a lot more than his pan-Arabism and foreign policy...the winners and losers of his internal reforms will either hate him or revere him...
 
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