One thing has not changed in the many years that I have visited this forum: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto continues to evoke strong and passionate reactions from supporters and opponents alike.
I have contributed many posts over many years on Bhutto. I am not sure the whole is better than the sum of the parts, but nevertheless here I try to bring them together in some sort of synthesis. I know it makes for very long post but there is even more that could be said of Bhutto.
‘Conflicts in me’: A Man of Contradictions
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was full of contradictions. He was aware of it. In 1972 in an interview he acknowledged “There are many conflicts in me - I’m aware of that. I try to reconcile them, overcome them, but I don’t succeed and I remain this range mixture of Asia and Europe. I have a layman’s education and a Muslim upbringing. My mind is Western and my soul Eastern.”
‘I am your voice’: The People
Bhutto pronounced that he was different from the standard ‘drawing room’ politicians that were in abundance in Pakistan. Bhutto in contrast evoked the power of the people, rhetorically claiming to stand for the underprivileged. As he said in a speech in Abbottabad in April 1970: “I am your voice, the people’s voice.”
Yet, Bhutto, who it must be remembered was a key figure in the authoritarian and undemocratic regime of Ayub Khan, more often spoke of “‘The People’ in the abstract’” as Phillip Jones noted. For Jones, “there is no evidence, outside his political life, that he ever involved himself in the activities or organisations dedicated to ameliorating the sufferings of actual individuals.”
Even so, there is no denying that he and the PPP inspired a critical mass to vote with their conscience in 1970, pressing politics much deeper into Pakistani society. Political consciousness was deepened and the marginalised, such as peasants and labourers, were able to assert their rights. As Jones states: “No longer could the big landlord, the clan leader, or the urban trade union chief count on the automatic support of his vote bank. Now he had to listen to voters’ demands and produce real results.”
‘Zulfiqar-i-Haidari’: Symbolic Appeal
There was a poster during the 1970 elections, which is quite revealing in pointing to the sources of Bhutto's appeal in those elections, especially in the Punjab. On the poster, Bhutto appears in a Western suit wearing the ‘Jinnah cap’. He is on a bounding horse, PPP flag in his hand, sword and shield by his side. The sword of the fourth caliph was called Zulfiqar; it is a symbol rich in meaning for Muslims, embodying not just a military spirit but also justice. ‘Zulfiqar-i-Haidari’ appears at the top of the poster and just below it is a picture of a sword that spans the width of the poster, with a Qur’anic reference contained in it - ‘with the help of Allah, victory is near’. Elsewhere on the poster, there is a picture of the Kaaba. There is the Muslim attestation of faith upon which Bhutto pledges that he will sacrifice his life for the people. There is also a prayer to the Sufi saint, Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, that may Bhutto live for a thousand years. At the bottom of the poster a popular couplet from Iqbal is reproduced - ‘China and Arabia are ours, Hindustan is ours; we are Muslims, the whole world is ours’.
There is so much here in one poster: religious symbolism, folk tradition, Pakistani nationalism, an appeal to social justice. Bhutto was projected in the poster not only as a warrior for Islam but a folk hero - manly, strong and brave; fighter against cruelty and oppression, fighter for egalitarianism and justice. Such an image had a particular resonance within Punjabi folk tradition - think for example of Maula Jatt and the films it inspired during the 1980s.
The poster provides clues as to why Bhutto and his vision of Pakistan resonated with many Punjabis leading to a deeply felt religious and cultural bond in the elections of 1970.
‘He would literally go mad’: The Break-up of Pakistan
A fierce nationalist, his role in the break-up of Pakistan is controversial. I don’t think he is blameless. Ambitious and thirsting for power, Sisson and Rose in their work on the events of 1971, report that a senior minister had observed to Yahya Khan that if Bhutto “did not assume power within a year he would literally go mad.” Others have suggested that Bhutto was motivated by a fear, shared by senior leadership of the PPP, that the party would become divided if it did not achieve a share of power at the centre. The PPP was a broad based movement, encompassing a range of interests, rather than a class based party. This gave it certain fragility and limited Bhutto’s room for manoeuvre. He also was wary of losing support in West Pakistan if he was seen to cave in too readily to Mujib’s demands.
Yet, for all this, others have pointed out that playing a game of divide and rule the army were reluctant to transfer power in any way which undermined their dominance. The leading Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, wrote that “Even if they wanted to, Mujib and Bhutto could not palpably arrive at any formula to share power without the implicit approval of the praetorian guard and mandarins.” Ultimately, it was Yahya that took the fateful decision to order a military crackdown on 25th of March.
Whichever way we choose to point the finger at the main players in 1971, we should also not lose sight of the medium term and events of the 1960s. Military rule under Ayub had exacerbated tensions between the two wings.
‘Citadel of Islam in Asia’: Foreign Affairs
During his rule he was more adept with foreign affairs than the handling of domestic issues. The 1972 Simla Summit was his high point, where from position of weakness he managed to negotiate what was described in Pakistan as a triumph. It was a great contrast with the Tashkent summit that stained Ayub Khan’s reputation. He also chose shrewdly the right time to recognise Bangladesh, without facing calls of a “sell-out”, which was reciprocated by Mujib in the dropping of criminal cases against 195 prisoners of war. There were also closer ties with West Asia which were crucial for the Pakistani economy. Prior to Bangladesh achieving independence, 50 per cent of West Pakistan's exports were to East Pakistan. Now Pakistan had to seek new markets and restructure its trade and one market that Pakistan sought to develop was West Asia. By 1981, 30 per cent of Pakistan's exports and imports were with the Organisation of Islamic Conference states. There was also a security dimension. Closer diplomatic ties with the Arab world facilitated inflow of Libyan and Saudi money which was necessary for the nuclear programme.
The loss of the eastern wing damaged national pride. Turning to the Arab world represented, at least in part, an effort to restore national self-esteem. The world spotlight turned to Pakistan when the Islamic summit in 1974 was held in Lahore. A euphoric crowd in Lahore turned up to hear Colonel Qaddafi claim that Pakistan was the “citadel of Islam in Asia.”
‘Iron fist’: An Authoritarian
Unfortunately, he was not so adroit on the domestic front. He was a half-hearted democrat at best. Perhaps, most damagingly, he perpetuated the tradition in Pakistani political culture of authoritarianism and the viewing of opposition as illegitimate. As Salman Taseer put it: ‘He ruled his own party with an iron fist and proved pathologically incapable of sharing power in any form.”
He could be ruthless with opposition. Measures such as the High Treason Act, Prevention of Anti-National Activities Ordinance and Press and Publications Ordinance, were used to tame civil society and strangle dissent. In the party, he attempted to surround himself with sycophants and dispensed with those that questioned him. (One example being the arrest and jailing of Mukhtar Rana and Mairaj Mohammad Khan without formal charges being brought against them.) He further politicized the Civil Service, by introducing lateral entry administered by the politicised Establishment Division. He set up a Federal Security Force (FSF) as almost his personal army. The FSF was widely viewed as becoming involved in a murky world of murder, intimidation and false imprisonments. His treatment of opposition dissent was arguably the most damaging aspect of his regime.
Bhutto also enhanced the role of Intelligence agencies. Those agencies were used to undermine opposition politicians. “If there is a ‘deep state’ in Pakistan,” writes Jones, “we may fairly mark its origins to the country’s first democratically elected leader.”
‘This is all Politics’: Domestic Affairs
The main achievement on the domestic front was to get agreement on the constitution in 1973 with no one in the National Assembly voting against it. A more damaging legacy was caving in to the Islamists and declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslim.
He is reported to have said to Abdus Salam, “This is all politics…give me time and I will change it.”
‘I am the PPP’: Decline of the PPP
The PPP could also not transform itself from a popular movement to a political party. The PPP’s patronage politics and factional rivalries ensured that it remained institutionally weak. The fact that the PPP came to rely more on opportunistic landlords (who in the Punjab were welcomed into the party after the PPP succeeded in the elections in 1970 in West Pakistan), summed up the extent to which the party was weak as an organisation.
Bhutto was a major part of the problem. After all, it was Bhutto himself who once said: “I am the PPP.”
“Once in power,” says Phillip Jones, “the chairman largely ignored the question of party organisation.” He writes damagingly of Bhutto’s legacy here, that “Indeed, the assumption of power marked the decline of the PPP as an organisation. Bhutto took an authoritarian and at times angry approach to both party and governmental matters. One by one, most of the old guard departed: driven out, humiliated, and some, like co-chairman Rahim, beaten up.”
When it came to the departure of the old guard, “In each case,” Rafi Raza wrote, ‘ZAB was largely responsible. The camaraderie, a main feature of the early PPP years, ceased. Mir Afzal Khan and I both warned of the danger of this state of affairs, pointing out that he was isolating himself, replacing the affection his colleagues had felt for him with awe, if not fear.”
‘Roti, kapra aur makan’: The Economy
The 1970s was an unkind decade in economic terms. There were massive floods in 1973 and 1976-77. In 1973, there was a four fold increase in petroleum prices leading to rising import costs. Following the OPEC price rise, there was also a world recession depressing demand for Pakistani exports. And in 1974-75, there was a failure of cotton crops following pest attacks.
Though hit by bad luck, many have also judged the economic policies in the decade as being a disaster for Pakistan. Nationalisation resulted not in a takeover of shareholdings but of management. This included private colleges and schools but the consensus was that state managers did a worse job of running these and thereby there was actually a worsening educational standards. Nationalisation not only increased the power of the Civil Servant but also became a new source for dishing out political patronage. Nationalisation also led to flight of capital to overseas and a fall in private investment not matched by an increase in public investment. Land reforms went further than Ayub Khan’s attempts on paper, but in practice less land was resumed than 1959 and amounted to only 0.001 per cent of the total farm area.
‘I, Me and Myself’: Hubris and Nemesis
In Owen Bennett-Jones work on the Bhuttos, he notes that upon taking power, officials loyal to ZAB asked him: “which ‘holy cows’ he wanted protected from journalistic criticism. Zulfiqar replied, “I am the only holy cow.”
His sense of his own intelligence and superiority led to a lot of self-confidence and indeed hubris. Owen Bennet-Jones writes, that “Most Pakistani leaders have succumbed to the flattery of sycophants. Zulfikar was perhaps particularly vulnerable because, especially towards the end, he really was surrounded by people with less talent than him. But his ego knew few bounds. In his speeches he spoke a lot about himself, repeatedly claiming he was willing to sacrifice himself for the nation and often describing himself in the third person.”
“Bhutto was like the unholy trinity” so said Wali Khan, “he stood for I, Me and Myself.”
Or to take the quote from Bennett-Jones’s book from a British Foreign Office official who summed up Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as: “A man of great gifts of the head and great defects of the heart.”
