Once the army gained power it became very difficult to roll back their influence. Therefore it is important to understand why the army became increasingly involved in politics in the 1950s, culminating in the 1958 coup. Inheritances from the colonial era were important.
We should note firstly the ‘viceregal’ culture of the regions that today make up Pakistan. These areas were annexed by Britain later than the rest of India and were seen largely through the prism of security owing to its strategic location. Authoritarianism therefore grew deeper roots. The Punjab was also the key recruiting area for the army and therefore an area that needed to be kept placid. Paternalism and authoritarianism were therefore given a freer rein here. Close connections between bureaucrats, landlords and the army had also already formed during the colonial period.
The second inheritance is the political one, relating to the party that spearheaded the campaign for Pakistan. The Muslim League was a party that for most of its existence was concerned with fighting for rights and the autonomy of the Muslims of India but largely within United Indian framework. The demand for a separate nation-state only became the objective from 1940 onwards and even then an uncertain one. Preparations for independent statehood were therefore stunted. It is perhaps, therefore, no surprise that the constitution making process was a fitful one. It might also be noted that whereas the Congress, well before independence, had looked to address potential interference from the army, such discussions were absent within the Muslim League. The Muslim League’s strength was also historically in the regions where Muslims were a minority. It was able to gain ground in the Muslim majority areas in the last decade or so of its struggle, but as a result it was less rooted in the areas that would actually come to constitute Pakistan. It soon disintegrated after independence and was therefore unable to oversee the transition to democratic rule. That many of the Muslim League politicians, upon migration to Pakistan, lost their local power bases also created an incentive not to hold elections.
The third inheritance is a mixture of geographic, economic and institutional factors. These inheritances bred anxiety. Pakistan had to construct a new institutional structure, linking provinces to a brand new centre in the context of financial difficulties. Shortly before partition, the British Secretary of State wrote to the British Ambassador that a Pakistan, with a partitioned Punjab and Bengal "could not be capable economically of survival as an independent state." One businessmen migrating to India stated in May 1947 “After us the deluge. We are leaving Pakistan an economic desert.” British India was administered as a single economic unit, with a free trade area, single tariff, a unified system of currency and credit, stitched together with a network of railways and telegraph. Partition disrupted this and the economic impact on Pakistan was severe. Economic concerns were not the only anxiety inducing ones. There was a sense that India would do their best to undo partition. Disputes with India over territory, water, share of cash balances and military stores, did little to alleviate the sense of existential insecurity. Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan was troubled from the start. Pakistan simply lacked strategic depth. All this led to an effort to strengthen the army. Maintaining territorial integrity was viewed as more important than developing democracy. The sense of insecurity, according to Ayesha Jalal, also encouraged Pakistani elites to seek assistance from the US, cementing the international connections between bureaucrats and military officials and Washington, which helped the army achieve pre-eminence in the context of the cold war.
The final inheritance relates to the social and economic structures. Within West Pakistan there was a dominance of large landlords. In West Pakistan, there was a demographic majority for Punjab but when taking both wings into account a demographic majority for Bengal. There was also a high number of refugees as a proportion of the population and stark divisions between West and East Pakistan. These structures undermined stability. Pakistan also inherited an army with a massive Punjabi overrepresentation which was not cross-cut by other cleavages. It was therefore a cohesive force.
