On the one hand, you can draw historical parallels, here. You could point to the 1970 elections in West Pakistan, when the PPP despite its socialist ideology and promise to level the playing field had in its ranks the Noons, Gilanis and Qureshis in the Punjab and Talpurs, Jatois and Jam Sadiq Ali in Sindh. And in fact you can go even further to the 1946 election which eventually paved the way for the creation of Pakistan. Whilst ideologically denouncing the politics of local influence, and defining Pakistan in sharp counterpoint to such local politics, when it came to distributing tickets, the Muslim League was very careful to select those candidates that could wield influence in the localities even if meant passing over loyal party workers. This is not to deny the role of popular support and enthusiasm in the victories of the Muslim League and the People’s Party, only to point out that both parties felt compelled to turn to influential candidates to maximise and ensure victory.
On the other hand, PTI’s enthusiastic band off supporters should take note of what the implications are. PTI claims to be transcending existing politics in offering themselves as transformative alternative. There is a distinct moral rhetoric when Imran Khan speaks. Yet, even before they have achieved power at the national level, they have ‘compromised’ with the system. It is not surprising, that his opponents will point to the gap in rhetoric and practice. My point here is not whether Imran Khan possesses sound political judgement - you can make your own mind up on this - but in his supporters assigning messianic type of power to him, they are overlooking the constraints he, or anyone, will have to work with. Pakistan’s problems are far too deep to be resolved by a single individual over a 5 year term. A healthy dose of realism is required.
To return to historical parallels, after partition and independence, the Muslim League disintegrated and popular support dwindled. The Pakistan People’s Party, too, saw in the 1970s popular support dissipate. This was partly because both parties could not meet the expectations that their campaigns aroused. It is also because as institutions, the parties were in fact quite weak and more reliant on a strong leader. It is not clear that the PTI is any different. As Phillip Jones in his work on the PPP stated, when comparing the early PPP and Muslim League:
“Both periods of decline followed periods of unity and electoral success produced by a mass movement strategy, which focused both on a dominant leader…and on a strategy that combined nationalism with a radical social program. Both the League and the PPP were essentially loose coalitions of diverse and competing interests and both parties had difficulties in maintaining their organizational boundaries or finding mechanisms to solve internal disputes. For both parties, the accession to power corroded party organizations and ended any pretense of party unity. As particularistic cleavages began to re-emerge, so too did the pattern of playing off powerful interprovincial interests, one against the other, and in both cases this ultimately rebounded to the advantage of the rural notables and the bureaucracy.”
