17th December, 1972 : New line of control agreed to in Kashmir between India & Pakistan

[MenInG]

So will this stay forever?

Who gained and who lost in this?

 

[big_gamer007]

Can you post a link to an article? Or give a brief about this not really entirely read up on this topic..

 

[MenInG]

Can you post a link to an article? Or give a brief about this not really entirely read up on this topic..

Indira Gandhi’s reputation for shrewd statecraft is widely acclaimed, even by her fiercest detractors. Her quest for peacemaking was equally bold, as witnessed by India’s approach to the 1972 peace conference at Shimla. The 1972 case, however, is intriguing for what it did not reflect – India not leveraging the fruits of the 1971 war victory to produce an advantageous geopolitical settlement. After all, for the first time since Partition, India was negotiating from a position of (POWs) strength and prestige with Pakistan; 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war , including the entire military leadership in East Pakistan, had surrendered to Indian forces. India had also captured strategic locations in Kashmir and 5,000 square miles of Pakistan’s territory in Sindh and south Punjab.

Yet, historians have never adequately resolved the puzzle of why India did not impose its will as a victor. While most interpretations of India’s approach to this post-conflict phase have been polemical, the available evidence reveals that ambitious strategic objectives informed India’s negotiating behaviour. In their quest to shape the post-war order, Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.

Indian calculus

The post-1971 international and regional context had made reaching some kind of an agreement an important policy goal for Gandhi and her national security team. Having engaged in a successful war that liberated Bangladesh, policymakers sought to further buttress India’s status by also demonstrating a credible attempt at peace. Elevating India’s image, of course, had to be balanced by attaining concrete outcomes. The most desirable outcome would have been a final resolution in Kashmir around the de facto-administered position of both sides. The evidence suggests that policymakers sought to address some of the deeper roots of the India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir, which was perceived as a direct manifestation of Pakistan’s national identity rather than a normal inter-state territorial impasse. P.N. Haksar, Gandhi’s leading foreign policy advisor, later wrote that India’s approach was based on “a recognition that Pakistan continued to have an unresolved crisis of its national identity”. 1971 had opened the possibility for an alternative future for Pakistan.

In a memo drafted shortly after the war, Haksar described the flux across the border: “The military-bureaucratic and feudal social order had crumbled…Pakistan of Yahya Khan had suffered political and military defeat. It is a nation in ferment seeking new identity for itself.” Having framed the adversary’s precarious internal balance, Haksar introspected on how India should “act towards the emergence of new forces in Pakistan”. Invoking lessons from the past, he argued, “At the end of the Second World War, a lesson was learnt by the victorious powers not to treat the defeated nations and impose upon them a greater humiliation than that produced by the defeat itself. India, proud of its position as a responsible country in South Asia, had to act with wisdom and foresight in its dealings with the new Pakistan”.

D.P. Dhar, another important confidante of Gandhi and the lead Indian negotiator, also appeared to endorse Haksar’s basic sentiment. In his telegram to Haksar in March 1972, Dhar noted: “The (Simla) settlement will not be between the victor and the vanquished because such a settlement has in history led to renewed and more violent conflicts. A settlement on the contrary…should be and would also be made to appear as the end of a chapter of acrimony between two estranged brothers”. But we also now know that Dhar was less enamoured with the prospect of change inside Pakistan than ensuring that India was seen to be making a credible effort at peacemaking. And, most importantly, he wanted India to extract unambiguous gains during the negotiating process. For Dhar, without a resolution of the Kashmir issue there could be “no hope of permanent peace in the subcontinent”.

In essence, there were two rival strategies at the apex level in the lead up to the Shimla talks. Dhar as the quintessential realist “sought to take full advantage of the military victory” and make Indian concessions (i.e. Pakistani POWs and territorial gains) “conditional” on Pakistan’s acceptance of a final Kashmir settlement. If Pakistan rejected such an approach, his policy advice was that India should “continue a state of armed hostility short of war”. The alternative constructivist approach was embodied by Haksar, who in addition to immediate territorial goals also sought an ambitious vision for “subcontinental peace and stability” by assisting in Pakistan’s domestic transformation.

These complex images are perhaps a good proxy for Gandhi’s own attitude before the Shimla summit. The perceived opportunity to exploit the possibility for an internal transformation of Pakistan’s body politic seems to have persuaded Indian policymakers to approach the Shimla negotiations by a dual, if not competing, preference to avoid weakening the new civilian leadership in Pakistan led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and, simultaneously extracting new conflict resolution norms from the same leadership.

It was this inherent tension in these dual strategic aims that arguably conditioned India’s overall posture on the eve of the Shimla summit. Interestingly, India did have some prior insights into Pakistan’s approach to the summit after the Soviet leadership’s meeting with Pakistan’s lead negotiator, Aziz Ahmed. On June 27, Moscow cabled Delhi that although Ahmed had stressed that Pakistan intended to insist firmly on the old ceasefire line, “it seems to us that the Pakistani side had a reserve position on the problem of Kashmir…Ahmed made to understand, that Bhutto is ready, in principle, to consider the possibility of converting the ceasefire line into the permanent international frontier”.

The actual negotiations began on June 28, 1972 and lasted five days, with India persisting with Dhar’s approach where India’s return of the POWs and occupied territory was made part of a package settlement via a durable agreement on formally defining the frontier in Kashmir. In the opening session on June 28, Dhar made it clear that concluding a peace settlement was an “essential” prerequisite for the repatriation of the POWs. On June 29, he sought a clear framework. Any “agreed formulation should be in conformity with the existing situation” and “capable of implementation”. Dhar emphasised “the world was fast moving towards bilateralism”. Ahmed, however, offered minimal commitments and strove to retain the old UN-centric conflict resolution framework. Haksar too stressed that India and Pakistan should “solve our own problems” without “involving distant countries into our disputes”. On June 30, Dhar suffered a minor heart attack with Haksar assuming the lead for the remainder of the summit. India’s negotiating thrust, however, remained consistent.

Haksar now focused more directly on Kashmir. He said that India “would like to remove the endless curse of conflicts on the question of Kashmir” and “if there was no understanding, a new situation would be created which would require serious consideration”, the latter a thinly veiled threat. On July 1, in a session that included the heads of government, Gandhi noted that “the ceasefire line” in Kashmir had “no validity” and “did not keep the peace”. T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary, reiterated the core basis of a deal: “repatriation and withdrawal (of Indian forces in the West)” would “have to be part of durable peace and can take place only after durable peace has been established.” A chagrined Ahmed retorted, “We have agreed to everything except Kashmir.” Bhutto then invoked domestic pressure: “My back is to the wall; I cannot make any more concessions”. But the Indian side still gave no signs of relinquishing its core bargaining strategy of a package settlement. On the fifth day, July 2, the negotiations broke down after Ahmed rejected India’s proposals saying that Pakistan “cannot accept that the ceasefire line had ceased to exist.”

Hoping to salvage an agreement, Bhutto called directly on Gandhi. During this climactic meeting, Gandhi underscored the primary advantage of India’s Kashmir proposal – neither side was required to physically relinquish territory or exchange populations. With “feeling and apparent sincerity” Bhutto admitted that while India’s proposal was the only feasible one, a formal legally binding commitment would severely weaken his domestic position and strengthen the military establishment. He could not offer more than a verbal assurance that the de facto border in Kashmir would gradually acquire, in Bhutto’s words, the “characteristics of an international border”. In contrast, India’s concession was concrete and upfront. India gave up its “package settlement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before an agreement on Kashmir is reached”.

A hope belied

The following day Gandhi admitted to Kaul that while she did “not trust Bhutto”, she “wanted to make a gesture to the people of Pakistan with whom we have ultimately to settle this question”. This was based on a belief, mistaken as it eventually turned out, that Pakistan was on the cusp of a structural transformation after its shock defeat, and, one that India should enable rather than thwart. Gandhi told parliament in August 1972: “There is a great change in Pakistan. It may be that the Pakistanis did not want that change. But the change is there regardless of whether they desire it or not”. It is apparent that policymakers were torn between seeking immediate security gains and holding out for a more durable regional order. Such an order was predicated on the possibility of a new Pakistan that might substitute Islam with a modern secular ideology.

Proceeding from such an overall outlook, policymakers did not fully seek to leverage the fruits of victory on the battlefield to ruthlessly bend the defeated party on the bargaining table. Key strategists, particularly Haksar, believed that a modicum of Indian benevolence might facilitate Pakistan’s internal transformation at a critical turning point in the civil-military and socio-political balance in that state’s history. For Haksar, India had to avoid adding to Pakistan’s “political adventurers who play upon Indo-phobia mixed by Islamic atavism”. Haksar’s advice to Gandhi was that India had “a vested interest in seeing there is democracy in Pakistan”. But there is evidence that a realpolitik, if cynical worldview, also had apex level support through Dhar regarding India’s bargaining posture at Simla. However, it is unlikely that this belief was ever strong enough to sway Haksar’s image of reassurance and co-existence. As P.N. Dhar, another PMO advisor at the time, recalled, “The overriding consideration for India was to put an end to its adversarial relations with Pakistan and forge an instrument that would help build a structure of durable peace in the subcontinent”. Nevertheless, Indian negotiators did take their Pakistani interlocutors to the water’s edge.

Ultimately, Gandhi emerged as the swing factor between the assertive and accommodative postures in the finale at Shimla. The alternative of calling Bhutto’s bluff and walking away without any agreement was deemed too costly for Gandhi and Haksar after India’s dramatic 1971 triumph. The self-restraint underlying India’s posture was all too palpable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their lead negotiator, later remarked that despite holding “all the bargaining chips”, India’s “excessive anxiety to avoid the failure of the talks at any cost became its major handicap”. Haksar later noted, “‘Negotiating from strength’ has been made part of diplomatic coinage. But to negotiate with someone who is manifestly weak is even more difficult”.

In more immediate geopolitical terms, India’s main gain was the conversion of the UN-endorsed 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir into a hardened Line of Control (LoC) based on the new December 17, 1971 ceasefire position. It was at the political and symbolic level where Indian policymakers could claim some success. The Shimla Agreement was an expression of the Indian framework for South Asian security, namely the norm of bilateralism. Ever since India’s fateful decision in 1948 to seek third-party mediation in the India-Pakistan conflict, policymakers had struggled to limit the interference of external actors in the Kashmir dispute. Krishna Menon’s UN interventions in 1957 were the first diplomatic expressions of seeking to disentangle India from third party involvement. In 1965, the norm of bilateralism had been implied, although ironically, at a third party venue in Tashkent under proactive Soviet diplomatic efforts. In 1972, Indian policymakers explicitly enshrined this principle at Shimla.

https://thewire.in/199006/puzzle-1972-shimla-summit-india-not-impose-will/

 

[MenInG]

Basically it was a result of the Simla agreement

 

[big_gamer007]

Reading that post it seems Gandhi was wrong in trusting Pakistan or wrong in judging how Pakistan is going tonight to shaped in future.. I think she thought Pakistanis will consider India elder brother and two countries will work together in future and peace will prevail how wrongnshe turned out to be.. However if she had used strong arm tactics then maybe the current situation would have been worse and Pakistan may have turned into a pariah state if losing big to India and then losing negotiations heavily would have given rise to a leader who would take advantage of the broken ego of the population and rise up empire based on Islamic revenge against India..

So don’t know whether Mrs Gandhi was right or not we can only speculate however one can be sure her end outcome of peace with Pakistan did not work out as well like she had hoped..
[MENTION=76058]cricketjoshila[/MENTION] can you give more clarity about this?

 

[MenInG]

Reading that post it seems Gandhi was wrong in trusting Pakistan or wrong in judging how Pakistan is going tonight to shaped in future.. I think she thought Pakistanis will consider India elder brother and two countries will work together in future and peace will prevail how wrongnshe turned out to be.. However if she had used strong arm tactics then maybe the current situation would have been worse and Pakistan may have turned into a pariah state if losing big to India and then losing negotiations heavily would have given rise to a leader who would take advantage of the broken ego of the population and rise up empire based on Islamic revenge against India..

So don’t know whether Mrs Gandhi was right or not we can only speculate however one can be sure her end outcome of peace with Pakistan did not work out as well like she had hoped..
[MENTION=76058]cricketjoshila[/MENTION] can you give more clarity about this?

She succeeded in her primary mission of breaking up Pakistan - think in a year or so she had lost the appetite to do more.

 

[big_gamer007]

She succeeded in her primary mission of breaking up Pakistan - think in a year or so she had lost the appetite to do more.

That would have eventually happened with or without Indira Gandhi.. Maybe she lost appetite or maybe she understood destruction of Pakistan is not a long term benefit for India when religious angle in the sub continent is very prominent.. Either way without seeing how the it would have panned out if she did go all out one can’t be sure whether it was right decision or wrong..

 

[Pakpak]

That would have eventually happened with or without Indira Gandhi.. Maybe she lost appetite or maybe she understood destruction of Pakistan is not a long term benefit for India when religious angle in the sub continent is very prominent.. Either way without seeing how the it would have panned out if she did go all out one can’t be sure whether it was right decision or wrong..

Why are Indians being deluded about Pakistan's destruction?

In Bangladesh out of the 90,000 POWS there were only actually 33,000 soldiers and virtually no airforce. It was bound to be thrashed. Western Pakistan was more or less holding its line and would have led to another stalemate like 1965.

My grandfathers both have always told me that 1965 was when they thought Lahore was in peril, in 1971 there was no worry.

 

[big_gamer007]

Why are Indians being deluded about Pakistan's destruction?

In Bangladesh out of the 90,000 POWS there were only actually 33,000 soldiers and virtually no airforce. It was bound to be thrashed. Western Pakistan was more or less holding its line and would have led to another stalemate like 1965.

My grandfathers both have always told me that 1965 was when they thought Lahore was in peril, in 1971 there was no worry.

No one is deluded mate thread was started by an admin who is not Indian.. And the post MIG posted with details mentioned about how Indira Gandhi could have acted as a victor in negotiations and could have pushed for more out of the negotiations which would have hurt Pakistan much much more.. So discussion is on that anyways there are no winners in war ever only losers..

Regarding the statemate once india had POW’s and won the eastern front they would have only had to focus on western front and there would have been a chance to win with only one front to focus on.. But that would have taken a lot out of us as well so no point..

 

[Pakpak]

That would have eventually happened with or without Indira Gandhi.. Maybe she lost appetite or maybe she understood destruction of Pakistan is not a long term benefit for India when religious angle in the sub continent is very prominent.. Either way without seeing how the it would have panned out if she did go all out one can’t be sure whether it was right decision or wrong..

The Western front, according to an Indian defence review website, incase I am being accused of being biased:

The major Indian gains claimed in terms of area were about 3,200 square kilometres in the Ladakh region under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh and 1,200 square kilometres. under Lt Gen G G Bewoor in the Rajasthan Desert. In both regions these gains lay in farflung, desolate, uninhabited and difficult areas of negligible economic, strategic and political value which could hurt the rulers of Pakistan only in their prestige.

The major Indian gains claimed in terms of area were about 3,200 square kilometres in the Ladakh region under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh and 1,200 square kilometres. under Lt Gen G G Bewoor in the Rajasthan Desert.
On the other hand, Sartaj Singh lost the area of Chhamb, where the aftermath of the refugee problem still haunts the Jammu and Kashmir administration. The loss of the Kasowala bulge, the Hussainiwala enclave and the Fazilka agricultural belt in Punjab could not be equated with marginal gains in the Sehjra bulge and the Mamdot enclave in economic, military or political terms. The Indian occupation of the major portion of the Shakargarh bulge was somewhat embarrassing to the Bhutto government in view of the restive refugee population, but this in no way impaired the Pakistani economy or upset its military tactical balance. In short, this war failed to achieve a decision, although the Indian public was misled by articulate propaganda and impressive statistics. It is therefore imperative that the public should be educated to judge the country’s military achievement on merit.


http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/1971-assessment-of-campaign-in-the-western-sector/

I am not surprised our army got a thrashing in East Pakistan, any army would have. Heavily outnumbered, with no airforce, no reinforcements and facing a full rebellion. But Western Pakistan held on perfectly fine, much much better than 1965. Pakistan's ''destruction'' was never even the question. So I am unsure why Indians are acting as if they were on the verge of occupying our entire country and the only reason we exist is due to their mercy.

 

[big_gamer007]

The Western front, according to an Indian defence review website, incase I am being accused of being biased:

The major Indian gains claimed in terms of area were about 3,200 square kilometres in the Ladakh region under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh and 1,200 square kilometres. under Lt Gen G G Bewoor in the Rajasthan Desert. In both regions these gains lay in farflung, desolate, uninhabited and difficult areas of negligible economic, strategic and political value which could hurt the rulers of Pakistan only in their prestige.

The major Indian gains claimed in terms of area were about 3,200 square kilometres in the Ladakh region under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh and 1,200 square kilometres. under Lt Gen G G Bewoor in the Rajasthan Desert.
On the other hand, Sartaj Singh lost the area of Chhamb, where the aftermath of the refugee problem still haunts the Jammu and Kashmir administration. The loss of the Kasowala bulge, the Hussainiwala enclave and the Fazilka agricultural belt in Punjab could not be equated with marginal gains in the Sehjra bulge and the Mamdot enclave in economic, military or political terms. The Indian occupation of the major portion of the Shakargarh bulge was somewhat embarrassing to the Bhutto government in view of the restive refugee population, but this in no way impaired the Pakistani economy or upset its military tactical balance. In short, this war failed to achieve a decision, although the Indian public was misled by articulate propaganda and impressive statistics. It is therefore imperative that the public should be educated to judge the country’s military achievement on merit.


http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/1971-assessment-of-campaign-in-the-western-sector/

I am not surprised our army got a thrashing in East Pakistan, any army would have. Heavily outnumbered, with no airforce, no reinforcements and facing a full rebellion. But Western Pakistan held on perfectly fine, much much better than 1965. Pakistan's ''destruction'' was never even the question. So I am unsure why Indians are acting as if they were on the verge of occupying our entire country and the only reason we exist is due to their mercy.

Refer to post #9... No one here is suggesting Pakistan’s existence is due to India..

 

[Pakpak]

No one is deluded mate thread was started by an admin who is not Indian.. And the post MIG posted with details mentioned about how Indira Gandhi could have acted as a victor in negotiations and could have pushed for more out of the negotiations which would have hurt Pakistan much much more.. So discussion is on that anyways there are no winners in war ever only losers..

Regarding the statemate once india had POW’s and won the eastern front they would have only had to focus on western front and there would have been a chance to win with only one front to focus on.. But that would have taken a lot out of us as well so no point..

You could say the same thing about us, with East Pakistan gone then West Pakistan is where we'd pooled our entire military at.

We could spring a hundred hypotheticals. My post was also aimed at Rohit, who seemed to think ''therw would be no Pakistan today''. And also at you, where you said ''Indira didn't care about Pakistan's destruction''. My point was the aforementioned destruction was not even a reality at any point.

 

[Major]

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto saved the day... India was in a position that could had done anything, as we had nothing to offer to get the POVs out.

Yet Bhutto got the Shimla pact signed!

 

[big_gamer007]

You could say the same thing about us, with East Pakistan gone then West Pakistan is where we'd pooled our entire military at.

We could spring a hundred hypotheticals. My post was also aimed at Rohit, who seemed to think ''therw would be no Pakistan today''. And also at you, where you said ''Indira didn't care about Pakistan's destruction''. My point was the aforementioned destruction was not even a reality at any point.

But Pakistani troops had surrendered on the eastern front so they would have had no reinforcements and Indian troops on the front lines and on the 2nd line of defence on eastern front would have been free after the liberation of Bangladesh to go help on the western front..

My apologies the word “destruction” is not the correct word.. Take it as Indira didn’t want any major gain on western front..

 

[big_gamer007]

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto saved the day... India was in a position that could had done anything, as we had nothing to offer to get the POVs out.

Yet Bhutto got the Shimla pact signed!

What did he do to make it happen and why did india accept it? Genuine question..

 

[Pakpak]

But Pakistani troops had surrendered on the eastern front so they would have had no reinforcements and Indian troops on the front lines and on the 2nd line of defence on eastern front would have been free after the liberation of Bangladesh to go help on the western front..

My apologies the word “destruction” is not the correct word.. Take it as Indira didn’t want any major gain on western front..

What reinforcements

We had a partly 45,000 fighting troops in the East, with no airforce, a lot of whom were police and para-military. I posted the sources in the other thread. The entire problem was that we had no military hardware in Bangladesh near enough to challenge India. 90% of our military assets were in Western Pakistan as it was.

Indians gained nothing in the Western front, and it would have been a stalemate. You can continue on fantasizing I suppose. Its expected of Indian trolls, shame its you this time as you're anything but a troll.

 

[Snak3eye5]

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto saved the day... India was in a position that could had done anything, as we had nothing to offer to get the POVs out.

Yet Bhutto got the Shimla pact signed!

Did you read any part of the above excerpt posted ? We have to understand that Indira was in a tough spot and didn't want to risk Pakistan becoming a state of turmoil and chaos due to its identity crisis which ended up happening anyway with more military coups going to happen down the line. India inspite of having leverage wanted to reset the whole scenario and start from scratch with a better relationship with Pakistan and as an ally which was the whole point of Partition to begin with. A true leader understands this.

 

[big_gamer007]

What reinforcements

We had a partly 45,000 fighting troops in the East, with no airforce, a lot of whom were police and para-military. I posted the sources in the other thread. The entire problem was that we had no military hardware in Bangladesh near enough to challenge India. 90% of our military assets were in Western Pakistan as it was.

Indians gained nothing in the Western front, and it would have been a stalemate. You can continue on fantasizing I suppose. Its expected of Indian trolls, shame its you this time as you're anything but a troll.

Arey bhai mere I am saying the Indian army/aircraft’s which were posted on the eastern front would have been used on the western front and in a prolonged war on the western front India could have made major gains, just keeping that in mind...

There is nothing to troll here.. Anyways let’s leave the hypotheticals of what may have happened..

My point is which this thread is about why didn’t Indira Gandhi set better terms in negotiations which benefits for India with the POW’s in hand? Was that she didn’t want to get any land/resources in return because she sensed such a demand would result in an never ending conflict for future generations or were there any other reasons?

What are your views on that? Post #3 explains what happened..

 

[Pakpak]

Arey bhai mere I am saying the Indian army/aircraft’s which were posted on the eastern front would have been used on the western front and in a prolonged war on the western front India could have made major gains, just keeping that in mind...

There is nothing to troll here.. Anyways let’s leave the hypotheticals of what may have happened..

My point is which this thread is about why didn’t Indira Gandhi set better terms in negotiations which benefits for India with the POW’s in hand? Was that she didn’t want to get any land/resources in return because she sensed such a demand would result in an never ending conflict for future generations or were there any other reasons?

What are your views on that? Post #3 explains what happened..

I am not sure. I did read somewhere however that India wanted to avoid more problems with Pakistan. I am not sure if you're aware but in 1974 there was a full scale battle vs Balochi insurgents. Who were backed by Saddam, Indians refused to take part in it and refused to back the insurgents citing that they did not want uncontrolled balkanization in South Asia which in the future could harm them too.

Maybe this was the reason as well.

 

[KB]

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto saved the day... India was in a position that could had done anything, as we had nothing to offer to get the POVs out.

Yet Bhutto got the Shimla pact signed!

Bhutto does indeed deserve some credit here. During his period at the head of government, he certainly showed himself to be more accomplished when dealing with Foreign affairs than when handling domestic issues. The 1972 Simla Summit was his high point, where from position of weakness he managed to negotiate an agreement which was considered to be widely acceptable in Pakistan. It was a great contrast with the Tashkent summit that ultimately tarnished Ayub Khan’s reputation at home. He was also shrewd in selecting the right time to recognise Bangladesh, without facing calls of a “sell-out”, which was reciprocated by Mujib in the dropping of criminal cases against 195 prisoners of war. Under him, Pakistan was also successful in seeking closer ties with the Islamic world. Prior to Bangladesh achieving independence, 50 per cent of West Pakistan's exports were to East Pakistan. Now Pakistan had to seek new markets and restructure its trade and one market that Pakistan sought to develop was West Asia.

Certainly, even during the Ayub years, Bhutto’s first interest appeared to be foreign policy. Elite connections enabled a young Bhutto to get a place on the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations. In the 1958 he represented Pakistan at the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. Indeed under Ayub, he would lead the Pakistani delegation to several sessions of the United Nations. He would eventually become Foreign Minister in 1963. His book, The Myth of Independence, published in 1969 would outline his foreign policy vision. He noted that being freed from colonial clutches had not in fact led to Third World states becoming fully sovereign:

“Foreign domination had been replaced by foreign intervention, and the power to make decisions radically affecting the lives of our peoples had been curtailed by the cannons of neo-colonialism.”

He was critical of how far Pakistan had tied its interests to those of the US.

 

[big_gamer007]

I am not sure. I did read somewhere however that India wanted to avoid more problems with Pakistan. I am not sure if you're aware but in 1974 there was a full scale battle vs Balochi insurgents. Who were backed by Saddam, Indians refused to take part in it and refused to back the insurgents citing that they did not want uncontrolled balkanization in South Asia which in the future could harm them too.

Maybe this was the reason as well.

Interesting, if that’s the case surely Pakistan should have reciprocated the same and two countries work together and help each other grow? How did it all go wrong which leaders are to blame(in military or civilian)? Was it because Pakistan could not get over Not accepting the Kashmir boundary as it was and move forward in relationship or some other reason?

Or was t because the military leadership in Pakistan could never forgive India for coming between the Bangladesh issue?

Even Germany is now part of EU after two wars and contributing..

P.S. wherever I said Pakistan I meant the leadership not the awaam..

 

[Pakpak]

Interesting, if that’s the case surely Pakistan should have reciprocated the same and two countries work together and help each other grow? How did it all go wrong which leaders are to blame(in military or civilian)? Was it because Pakistan could not get over Not accepting the Kashmir boundary as it was and move forward in relationship or some other reason?

Or was t because the military leadership in Pakistan could never forgive India for coming between the Bangladesh issue?

Even Germany is now part of EU after two wars and contributing..

P.S. wherever I said Pakistan I meant the leadership not the awaam..

I said it to an Indian friend a while back, its quiet simple:

-PA needs a conflict to keep control and to keep getting unlimited $$$$$
-Indians need a conflict to blame any shortcomings on Pakistan

Both sides have got legitimate grievances, let's not kid ourselves that its one-sided. But the above two reasons are still the main ones. In the process chest-thumpers are happy, the leaders are happy and the conflict rumbles on. Kashmir conflict isn't some unbeatable problem that two countries can't solve. There is simply no will-power to do so. Kasuri, a very experienced FM under military and non-military governments has said numerous times that India and Pakistan almost made a deal to end this issue. What derailed it? Musharraf getting kicked out after sacking the judges, the one year political instability which followed and which all ended with Mumbai.

 

[big_gamer007]

I said it to an Indian friend a while back, its quiet simple:

-PA needs a conflict to keep control and to keep getting unlimited $$$$$
-Indians need a conflict to blame any shortcomings on Pakistan

Both sides have got legitimate grievances, let's not kid ourselves that its one-sided. But the above two reasons are still the main ones. In the process chest-thumpers are happy, the leaders are happy and the conflict rumbles on. Kashmir conflict isn't some unbeatable problem that two countries can't solve. There is simply no will-power to do so. Kasuri, a very experienced FM under military and non-military governments has said numerous times that India and Pakistan almost made a deal to end this issue. What derailed it? Musharraf getting kicked out after sacking the judges, the one year political instability which followed and which all ended with Mumbai.

I agree with that 100%.

 

[moghul]

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto saved the day... India was in a position that could had done anything, as we had nothing to offer to get the POVs out.

Yet Bhutto got the Shimla pact signed!

Bhutto was the main culprit behind our losing East Pakistan, politically. He refused to make way for Mujeeb to form the government after he won , Bhutto was no hero.

 

[moghul]

I said it to an Indian friend a while back, its quiet simple:

-PA needs a conflict to keep control and to keep getting unlimited $$$$$
-Indians need a conflict to blame any shortcomings on Pakistan

Both sides have got legitimate grievances, let's not kid ourselves that its one-sided. But the above two reasons are still the main ones. In the process chest-thumpers are happy, the leaders are happy and the conflict rumbles on. Kashmir conflict isn't some unbeatable problem that two countries can't solve. There is simply no will-power to do so. Kasuri, a very experienced FM under military and non-military governments has said numerous times that India and Pakistan almost made a deal to end this issue. What derailed it? Musharraf getting kicked out after sacking the judges, the one year political instability which followed and which all ended with Mumbai.

India has more to gain than Pakistan from resolution of Kashmir issue, one way or other. India should be eyeing to become a world power, like China and to claim a permanent seat in security council but would be hard with Kashmir issue being dragged for so long.

 

[Major]

Bhutto was the main culprit behind our losing East Pakistan, politically. He refused to make way for Mujeeb to form the government after he won , Bhutto was no hero.

How was it Bhuttos fault when he wasn't even part of the govt? Yahyah was the president.

and no idiot was gonna allow Mujib to takeover with his 6 points...... And those 6 points gained more popularity as the govts of the past ignroed east pakistan more. The highest point of escalation of the matter was the 1970 cyclone.

Losing east pakistan wasn't due to some election, it was due to the history of ignoring east Pakistan which allowed mujib to contest and gain popularity under those controversial 6 points

 

[waleed88]

How was it Bhuttos fault when he wasn't even part of the govt? Yahyah was the president.

and no idiot was gonna allow Mujib to takeover with his 6 points...... And those 6 points gained more popularity as the govts of the past ignroed east pakistan more. The highest point of escalation of the matter was the 1970 cyclone.

Losing east pakistan wasn't due to some election, it was due to the history of ignoring east Pakistan which allowed mujib to contest and gain popularity under those controversial 6 points

Point well raised! Somehow people always find a civilian to blame in everything that goes wrong in this country, when Yahya was the guy who ordered the atrocious operation searchlight which led to all those killings. The butchering of those people is on Yahya's hands.

Bhutto was open to dialogue since he was a politician, Yahya meant to take it by force.

 

[moghul]

How was it Bhuttos fault when he wasn't even part of the govt? Yahyah was the president.

and no idiot was gonna allow Mujib to takeover with his 6 points...... And those 6 points gained more popularity as the govts of the past ignroed east pakistan more. The highest point of escalation of the matter was the 1970 cyclone.

Losing east pakistan wasn't due to some election, it was due to the history of ignoring east Pakistan which allowed mujib to contest and gain popularity under those controversial 6 points

If Bhutto wants to keep United Pakistani intact, he would have his PPP contest election in then East Pakistan. PP had no presence in East Pakistan, hence he was planning to and contributing to the secession of EP. BD was not created in a month, the ground work was laid year early and Bhutto was part of it, particularly when he was in government. Again how can you explain for a so called national leader having no presence in 1/2 of the country, then East Pakistan. Did not he famously threatened Mujib not to come to west Pakistan, " you stay there, we'll stay here".

 

[Major]

If Bhutto wants to keep United Pakistani intact, he would have his PPP contest election in then East Pakistan. PP had no presence in East Pakistan, hence he was planning to and contributing to the secession of EP. BD was not created in a month, the ground work was laid year early and Bhutto was part of it, particularly when he was in government. Again how can you explain for a so called national leader having no presence in 1/2 of the country, then East Pakistan. Did not he famously threatened Mujib not to come to west Pakistan, " you stay there, we'll stay here".

You do know awaami league only contested 8 people in west?

Thing is its not about contestion. Both parties were caught by surprise and this was the first time ever an election was taking place.

No idiot at the ebd of the day was gonna let mujib takeover with those 6 points