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Does the new defence pact with KSA imply that Saudi will defend Pakistan against Indian aggression?

Does the new defence pact with KSA imply that Saudi will defend Pakistan against Indian aggression?


  • Total voters
    13
Evidence:

Ignore me or my personal experience or exposure and listen to BBC coverage


Question to Indians:


Dear @Bhaijaan

You know that I always appreciate you, your thoughts and your input. I do not know your background or where you grew up but I would like you, @uppercut @straighttalk @Rajdeep @Vikram1989 @JaDed @Champ_Pal or anybody else who has grown up in India to answer a simple question for everybody else who has never lived in India.

Is it common in Indian schools, colleges, and universities for Muslims to be mocked or equated with Pakistan?

I want one of you to be honest and respond honestly to @Stewie @ElRaja @Patriot @The Bald Eagle @Major @Mamoon @DeadlyVenom or those who have never lived in India about what happens to Muslim students in Indian schools, colleges and universities.

Please give an honest and direct answer that Muslims in India for no reason do not get equated and compared with Pakistan on a daily basis.

And the answer is not to start saying this (or that) happens to Hindus in Pakistan.

And the answer is also not "I had a lot of Muslim friends in university etc"...

Thanks

Notice the underlined part and pay attention to replies from Indians.


Non-Answer 1:
Is this a serious question?

No it's extremely uncommon for Pakistan to be mentioned in conversation with either Muslims or Hindus. Especially if you're talking in environments like schools, colleges and universities.


Of course Indian Muslims face a lot of challenges. But so do Indians from the North East, lower caste Indians, North Indians in the South, South Indians in the North etc. etc. India is full of challenges for people living here. However, the specific issues Indian Muslims deal with day to day have very little to do with being associated with Pakistan. It's smaller discriminations, name calling...things minority communities face worldwide.

I think perhaps from talking in your own echo chambers, you have a weird idea of how Muslims in India live and the kind of challenges they face. I also assure you there's no wholesale immigration of Muslims from India. While I suppose like most Indians, they'd jump at a chance to migrate to a developed country, they're not looking to illegally escape to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma etc.
Notice, how he first mocks the question then breezes past it and pivots and changes topic.

Non-Answer 2:

How long have you lived in India? Or have you ever?

I have lived here for 45 years across several states and I assure you Pakistan is far less relevant in day to day Indian discourse than you may believe from interacting with the small group of Indians on this forum. While I can't deny that it would be an insult to call a Indian Muslim a 'Pakistani' just like it would be an insult to call me a "Kaalu", neither of these insults are faced in day to day real life.
Notice, how he continues to mock and pivot away from the issue.

Non-Answer 3 & Pivot:

These stuff happens among Pakistanis as well, they might not agree here, from my experience the least derogatory remarks I have heard are from Malayalees and Telugus two of my fav groups that are pretty chill even when in majority.

This is so common in India (North as I don't know about South) that it is covered by BBC!
 
heres simple equation for those who are getting confused on both sides from what i understand...

saudis will never deploy its armed forces to protect pakistan in the event india attacks pakistan, but that is immaterial, the pakistani army does not need personal. what it needs is supply lines and economic support in times of war. pak will likely provide its nuclear deterent to saudi, as well as training and troops stationed either within the saudi army, or as part of a contingent of pakistani soldiers operating form semi autonomous bases. the saudi military will upgrade its technology and will use pakistan as the proxy to get chinese technology, which pakistan will procure and deploy for saudi, and in turn they will likely be allowed to procure the same equipment for themselves to bolster their arsenal.

pakistan gives nukes, manpower, and military wherewithal
saudi gives money, and a supply line which will have to hold up in times of war for pakistan

this is how i read it, from my understanding so far.

Dear @ElRaja

Agree with the Green.

You know you respect your views but I disagree with your opinion about Pakistan extending its Nuclear umbrella to KSA for roughly the same reasons as below:

Pakistan is never providing nuclear profileration, it's very naive to think that. We would be sanctioned to our eyeballs, not a single US intelligence service or their lawmakers would tolerate that. Unless the US is okay with it. There is absolutely not a world where the US would be okay with Pakistan giving nuclear umbrellas to Middle Eastern states, unless the US themselves monitors it.

I agree with Dr Rabia Akhtar's analysis on the topic

A Longstanding Alliance, Formalized – Not Transformed

On 17 September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the latter being the only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority country, signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement in Riyadh. The pact’s key clause declares that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”. On its face, this is strong language echoing collective-defense pledges like NATO’s Article 5. However, it largely codifies an existing strategic partnership rather than marking a radical new commitment. Pakistani forces have been present in Saudi Arabia for decades (currently ~1,500–2,000 troops) in training, advisory, and security roles. The two states have enjoyed close military ties since the 1960s, when Pakistani troops first deployed to protect Saudi frontiers during regional conflicts. Over the years, Pakistan has trained over 8000-10,000 Saudi military personnel and periodically stationed units in the kingdom. In short, the new pact formalizes a deep alliance that has historical roots, rather than creating one out of thin air.

It is also worth noting that Pakistan has entered such formal defense pacts before and none led to automatic entanglement in wars or any “nuclear umbrella” guarantee. In the Cold War era, Pakistan pivoted from non-alignment to join U.S.-led alliances. It signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Washington in 1954 and became a member of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO) the same year. The following year, Pakistan joined Iran, Turkey and others in the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Crucially, these 1950s alliances did not yield any automatic U.S. military intervention on Pakistan’s behalf in its conflicts. Indeed, when Pakistan fought wars with India in 1965 and 1971, its Western allies did not come rushing to its defense despite those pacts, a reminder that defense agreements often come with political caveats and context. For Pakistan, the calculus of alliance during the Cold War was shaped less by fears of Soviet or Chinese aggression than by the imperative to counter India. The new Saudi-Pakistan pact similarly must be understood in context: it is primarily a political signal of solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than an unconditional war guarantee.

What the New Pact Does (and Doesn’t) Say

The text of the agreement (as released in official statements) emphasizes strengthening cooperation and “joint deterrence against any aggression”. It pledges that an attack on one will be seen as an attack on both, reflecting a commitment to consult and support each other in crises. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hailed the pact as a culmination of years of discussions, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Notably, a senior Saudi official stressed this deal was “not a response to specific countries or specific events but rather an overdue formalization of deep ties. In other words, Riyadh portrays it as the natural evolution of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any one adversary.

Nowhere does the public agreement mention nuclear weapons, and Pakistani officials have consistently maintained that their nuclear arsenal is focused solely on deterring India. When Reuters directly asked a Saudi official whether Pakistan is now obliged to provide a “nuclear umbrella” to the kingdom, the official answered only that “this is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.” That deliberately broad statement neither confirms nor denies any nuclear dimension. It suggests the pact covers all forms of military cooperation in general terms but it stops short of explicitly extending Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent to Saudi soil. Pakistan’s prior defense pacts never involved nuclear guarantees, and this one is no different.

Nothing in the stated pact magically converts Pakistan’s India-centric nuclear doctrine into a Middle East umbrella. There is no evidence that Islamabad has now re-targeted its strategic forces on Iran or Israel on Riyadh’s behalf.

No “Secret Nuclear Umbrella,” Despite Speculation

It is unsurprising that speculation has run wild in some quarters about possible secret clauses or understandings especially given the history of Saudi interest in nuclear capabilities. For years it has been rumored that Saudi Arabia bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1980s with an understanding it could gain access to warheads if ever needed. In 2024, journalist Bob Woodward even recounted in his book a conversation where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman allegedly quipped to Senator Lindsey Graham, “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan,” if Saudi Arabia ever required nuclear arms. Such anecdotes fuel the assumption that a de facto Saudi nuclear cover exists.

However, one should be cautious about taking these interpretations at face value. Nothing publicly stated by officials on either side explicitly indicates a nuclear-sharing arrangement. In fact, Saudi Arabia officially maintains that it does not seek nuclear weapons and is only pursuing civil nuclear energy (though it insists on developing domestic uranium enrichment, which keeps options open). The new defense pact, as released to the public, sticks to generalities about “strengthening joint deterrence” and cooperation. It pointedly makes no mention of any specific weapons systems. Islamabad would be extremely wary of any commitment that dilutes its control over its nuclear arsenal or entangles it in conflicts beyond its primary focus. In essence, the nuclear umbrella idea remains speculative, a dramatic extrapolation unsupported by the actual text of the pact or Pakistan’s stated doctrine.

A Region on Edge: Why the Pact Happened Now

If the Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement was a long time in the making, its signing was undoubtedly accelerated by recent regional turmoil. The Middle East’s strategic landscape has been shaken by war and unprecedented incidents over the past two years. Most notably, Israel’s widening war against Hamas and its allies has spilled beyond Gaza’s borders, jolting neighboring states. On September 9, 2025, Israel launched a shocking airstrike on Doha, Qatar, targeting exiled Hamas leaders during ceasefire talks. This strike on Qatari soil, a close U.S. ally hosting the region’s largest American air base, infuriated Arab countries. The strike reshaped the region’s diplomatic calculus, prompting Gulf leaders to question whether any state was beyond the war’s reach. Qatar, feeling violated, rushed to bolster its own security: within days it was finalizing an enhanced defense pact with the United States, explicitly “expedited” by the Israeli strike on its capital. The entire Gulf region felt new urgency to close ranks. Arab and Islamic states convened emergency summits to back Qatar, and the Gulf Cooperation Council discussed activating a joint defense mechanism after this unprecedented provocation. In this climate, Saudi Arabia’s signing of a mutual defense pact with Pakistan was widely seen as a signal to Israel (and perhaps to the U.S. as well). The timing was no coincidence: it came one week after the Doha attack, at a moment when Gulf leaders were openly worrying about the reliability of their traditional Western security guarantor.

At the same time, threats from Yemen have escalated, further rattling Saudi security. Yemen’s Houthi rebels (Iran-aligned and fiercely anti-Israel) have, since late 2023, been launching drones and long-range missiles toward Israel in solidarity with Gaza. Some of those missiles have traversed Saudi airspace. In early September 2025, two Houthi-fired ballistic missiles aimed at Israel broke apart in mid-flight over Saudi territory. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has faced a persistent threat from Yemen’s Houthi movement, which has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and drones toward the Kingdom. Saudi defenses have intercepted projectiles aimed at major cities, including attempts near Makkah and Jeddah in 2017 and 2019 . These attacks underscore the Houthis’ willingness to target sensitive sites, reinforcing Riyadh’s sense of vulnerability and the imperative to strengthen its defense partnerships. It is little wonder that Saudi Arabia would seek to reinforce its defense partnerships amidst such dangers. Riyadh has watched as Israel’s war has expanded to multiple fronts (striking Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and even Iran’s soil in recent months). Meanwhile, the United States, though still the Gulf’s primary patron, has been increasingly absorbed elsewhere and politically divided at home. Gulf states are frankly nervous about how much they can count on Washington when crises multiply. All these factors provide important context for why Saudi Arabia and Pakistan chose this moment to seal a formal defense pact.

In essence, the pact is as much about geopolitics and signaling as about bilateral ties.

Signaling Solidarity ≠ Blank Check for War

Despite the bold rhetoric of “one for all, all for one,” it’s critical to keep this pact in perspective. Defense cooperation agreements, especially between asymmetrical partners, often serve to signal unity and deter common threats rather than bind each party to automatic military action in every scenario. The Saudi-Pakistani statement itself frames the pact as “a shared commitment… to enhance security and achieve peace in the region”, aimed at joint deterrence. That phrasing suggests the primary goal is to dissuade aggressors through a show of solidarity. It does not mean Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are obligating themselves to launch full-scale attacks on any adversary at the drop of a hat. In practice, such arrangements leave room for political decision-making.

For example, if a crisis erupted between Saudi Arabia and Iran tomorrow, Pakistan would likely evaluate its own national interests and the cause of the conflict before jumping in. (Notably, Pakistan refused to join the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015, despite Riyadh’s requests, because its parliament decided Pakistan must remain neutral in that war, a precedent showing Islamabad is not a rubber stamp for Saudi wishes. Conversely, if Pakistan were to have a skirmish with India (as occurred in May 2025), Saudi Arabia’s support might be diplomatic or economic rather than direct military involvement, given Riyadh’s own priorities and its growing ties with New Delhi. Both parties will calibrate their responses case by case, pact or no pact. This pact powerfully affirms brotherhood and could deter opportunistic aggression, but it does not automatically launch missiles.

Indeed, the political significance of this pact may outweigh its immediate military utility. It sends multiple messages: reassuring Saudi citizens (and the wider Muslim world) that Pakistan “has the Kingdom’s back” at a fraught time; warning Israel (and any others) that Saudi Arabia is not isolated even as it pursues diplomatic opening, it has big friends with big armies; and perhaps nudging the United States to take Gulf security concerns more seriously lest regional states make alternative arrangements. Yet for all its significance, the pact is not a revolutionary shift. It does not alter Pakistan’s fundamental security doctrine, nor does it drag Saudi Arabia into Pakistan’s disputes by default. The real work begins now: clarifying expectations and limits so that both countries understand how to handle scenarios that might invoke the pact. But absent a direct, extreme threat to one of them, it is unlikely this agreement will force either country into hasty military adventures instigated by the other.

Keep the Alarm Bells Silent

There is nothing inherently alarmist about the Pakistan-Saudi mutual defense arrangement when viewed with historical and strategic context. Pakistan has forged similar formal alliances in the past, with the U.S. and within SEATO/CENTO, and those did not lead to automatic war guarantees or any sharing of nuclear weapons. This new pact largely reaffirms a partnership that has existed informally for generations. It comes at a time of extraordinary turbulence in the Middle East, serving as a timely statement of unity and resolve amid regional conflicts. But signaling solidarity is not the same as issuing a blank check of military intervention. Islamabad is not offering Riyadh a covert “nuclear button,” and Riyadh is not signing up to fight in Kashmir, such drastic interpretations are far beyond what has been announced. Defense cooperation ≠ automatic war pledge, and signaling ≠ nuclear guarantee. In keeping this development in perspective, we can recognize its strategic importance without exaggerating its immediate consequences. Rather than sounding alarm bells, observers should watch how Pakistan and Saudi Arabia implement and clarify this pact in practice. It is a symbolic shield of brotherhood, not a sword rattling for the next war.
 
If Pakistan does the dirty deed of terrorist attacks on Bharat, now power in the world can stop India from punishing Pakistan again. Kar lo jo pact wact sign karne hain.. The punishment will be harsher then the previous one. The preist king will make sure of that.
 
If Pakistan does the dirty deed of terrorist attacks on Bharat, now power in the world can stop India from punishing Pakistan again. Kar lo jo pact wact sign karne hain.. The punishment will be harsher then the previous one. The preist king will make sure of that.
Bro wakeup to reality, now the chances of getting Indian occupied Kashmir is at all time high now that India has been cornered and Pak has emerged.

Need 5 more years of Modi so that he can do the decisive blow to India.
 
Bro wakeup to reality, now the chances of getting Indian occupied Kashmir is at all time high now that India has been cornered and Pak has emerged.

Need 5 more years of Modi so that he can do the decisive blow to India.
if you kill indians again after asking to recite kalma. it will be triple kuttai in OP Sindoor part 2.
 
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Bro wakeup to reality, now the chances of getting Indian occupied Kashmir is at all time high now that India has been cornered and Pak has emerged.

Need 5 more years of Modi so that he can do the decisive blow to India.

Brother, remember the converts will always be at the bottom, selling their soul to the Chinese, Arabs or the Americans it makes no difference. A beggar will always at the bottom.

Pakistan's issue has nothing to do with Kashmir, their avg citizens get almost no economic benefits as their military cannot be overthrown and will always remain in power. Pakistan is gone forever, no coming back...
 
Many Indian soldiers were put to their deaths in the last two days in Kashmir.

Indian media has so far maintained some silence and not went into war mode.

They are getting pumped badly. So far no Pakistani chocolates found.
 
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