One factor that has shaped the breaking and making of states in South Asia is anxiety. The Muslim separatist platform, which ultimately led to the articulation of the demand for Pakistan was certainly prompted to some extent by anxiety. The anxiety of being a minority was heightened in a context of Nazi Germany’s brutal treatment of Jews and the unravelling of legal protections for minorities that were envisaged under the League of Nations in the aftermath of the first World War.
In India post 1947, a constitution was framed which handed the centre a great deal of power. A strong, centralised state was desired for multiple reasons, but fear of social upheaval and of centrifugal forces was certainly one of them. As one of India’s leading historians, Gyan Prakash, notes, “The nationalist leaders crafted a constitution for a sinewy state not because they were authoritarian at heart but because of their anxiety as to whether India was yet a nation.”
For Pakistan as well anxiety led to a mistrust of provincial interests, despite the content of the Lahore resolution of 1940. It also led to an emphasis in building the state and so bolstering the bureaucrats at the expense of politicians. It also meant privileging, very early on in its existence, defence over development. All of this contributed to undermining democracy. The basis of this anxiety is certainly hinted at in two of the documents in the link above. In the ‘Analysis of future relations ’, it is stated
“Even if the present bitterness between India and Pakistan lessens somewhat, it can hardly be doubted that for some years to come, at all events, it will be the policy of the Indian Government (or most of its members), whether by obstruction or core positive methods, to make it as difficult as possible for Pakistan to exist as a separate Dominion, in the hope that it will collapse within a measurable period of time. Congress assented to the Partition Plan, but it is quite obvious that in the main most of the present Indian Government, and almost certainly any Government that succeeds the present one, will do their utmost to undo Partition.”
Certainly, it is clear that early Pakistani leaders had an acute sense of Pakistan’s sense of vulnerability and existential insecurity. This was a significant factor in the military gaining the upper hand over politicians.
Even before its coming, concerns were also raised over the economic prospects of Pakistan. In the document ‘Risks of Partition’ the British Secretary of State wrote to the British Ambassador in Washington that a Pakistan, with a partitioned Punjab and Bengal "could not be capable economically of survival as an independent state." This was a widespread view. One businessmen migrating to India stated in May 1947 “After us the deluge. We are leaving Pakistan an economic desert.”
The lack of skilled manpower was summed up by Phillips Talbot writing in December 1947, “Compared to the Indian Dominion, Pakistan has fewer experienced administrators, fewer lawyers, fewer doctors, fewer bankers, fewer traders, fewer mechanics, fewer industrialists, and fewer financiers per thousand people. While India had found it necessary to jump civil servants perhaps three grades to fill secretariat vacancies, Pakistan had to advance them five grades.”
British India was administered as a single economic unit, with a free trade area, single tariff, a unified system of currency and credit, stitched together with a network of railways and telegraph. Partition disrupted this.
With a dire economic inheritance, it is not surprising that an anxious state focussed on centralising powers.
In sum, it was anxiety, which did have some legitimate basis, rather than bad intent on the part of the leaders that led to decisions which ultimately privileged the centre over the province, defence over development and and hence ultimately created conditions for military rule.
