You need to learn the difference between Nation and Country it seems
In other words, it is important to make a distinction between nationhood and statehood. An important point. Indeed, many historians have pointed out that the Pakistan demand transcended geographic anchorage.
First, it is important to understand the background to the claim of Muslim nationhood, which was was raised and pursued by Jinnah and the Muslim League rather late in the colonial day. For many years Jinnah worked for Hindu-Muslim unity, but he was aware, as he said in a speech in 1928 that: “Minorities cannot give anything to the majority…It is up to the majority, and the majority alone can give.”
The Lahore Resolution was a rejection of the Muslim minority position. The global context cannot be ignored: the anxiety of being a minority was heightened in a context of Nazi Germany’s brutal treatment of Jews and the unravelling of legal protections for minorities that were envisaged under the League of Nations in the aftermath of the first World War.
By repudiating the notion of the Muslims being a minority and proclaiming instead that they were in fact a nation, Jinnah in effect made the case that a fair constitutional settlement had to be reached between equals. Rather than negotiating an agreement that in the end relied on the goodwill of the majority, Jinnah aimed to reframe the debate, to reach a social contract based on a relationship of equality. Jinnah - the consummate lawyer - sought, as Faisal Devji argued, to turn brotherhood into friendship; that is, transforming a relationship of blood or intimacy into one of contract or interest. He believed, the past could be buried and a fresh start made if honourable settlement was reached between equals.
Pakistan was projected as the ideal for Muslims - who were far from being united politically - to rally around. As Devji, amongst others has forcefully argued, the Pakistan demand was highly idealised, belonging not to blood and soil types of nationalism, but was rather one that was more conceptual or abstract. As an idea, its purchase rested more on it being a symbolic ideal embodying potential Muslim unity than it representing a geographically bounded entity.
Therefore, for Jinnah, as Ayesha Jalal has most clearly argued, while the claim to Muslim nationhood was no longer up for debate following the passing of the Lahore Resolution, the claim to Muslim statehood remained negotiable. So Jinnah was prepared to accept something less than a fully sovereign Pakistan, as indicated by his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946, which envisaged a united India, with restricted powers for the centre. He was also willing to consider three nation-states. In 1947, when Mountbatten asked Jinnah for his view on Suhrawardy’s proposal of “keeping Bengal united at the price of its remaining outside Pakistan,” the Muslim League leader replied: “I should be delighted. What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta, they had much better remain united and independent; I am sure they would be on friendly terms with us.”
