This does not reflect well on us. A mediator that cannot ensure adherence to mutually agreed conditions risks being seen as ineffective. If violations go unchecked, it signals that the parties involved do not take the mediator seriously.
We need to engage both the United States and Iran firmly and clearly. The sanctity of any ceasefire depends on consistent enforcement. Without consequences for violations, agreements become little more than statements of intent.
One possible mechanism could be to introduce a financial commitment framework. Both parties could pledge a small percentage of their GDP to the State Bank of Pakistan as a guarantee of compliance. If the ceasefire holds for a defined period, say three years, the majority of that amount is returned. If not, the pledged funds are forfeited to the mediator.
At scale, this would translate to roughly $350 billion from the United States and around $500 million from Iran. Upon successful adherence, the United States would recover approximately $315 billion, and Iran around $450 million, with Pakistan acting as the guarantor of the agreement.
Admittedly, this is unconventional. But traditional enforcement tools are limited when one party is a superpower like the United States and the other is a state such as Iran, with significant regional leverage through critical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz.
The broader point remains: any mediator, not just Pakistan, faces structural limitations in such a scenario. The real question is not whether Pakistan appears weak, but whether any country realistically has the leverage to enforce compliance on actors of this scale.